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ABSTRACT
This socio—legal study of town and country planning draws upon
the examples of the Israeli system and its predecessor of Mandatory
Palestine, and studies them in the light of the British parent
system.
The underlying thesis is that statutory planning functions as a
special component in a complex system of social control. Beyond its
immediate concern with regulating the utilisation of the physical
environment, statutory planning is designed and implemented with the
aim of supporting the prevailing social order.
The application to statutory planning systems of the concept of
social control - which elucidates the regulation of behaviour in
society and the phenomenon of social order - leads to the
identification of three inter—related roles. These can be classified
loosely as: 1) political role, to serve as a tool for effective
government; 2) economic	 role,	 to	 utilise	 scarce resources
efficiently; 3) social role, to advance human welfare. 	 Their
cumulative exercise contributes to the maintenance of the prevailing
social order.
This analysis shows that the social order throughout the
history of Palestine and Israel. 1917-1980's was in constant flux.
It is claimed that the Mandatory system, motivated by colonial
ideology, attached excessive importance to statutory planning's
political role in order to establish the authority of the British
government over Palestine's rival communities. Planning's economic
and social roles were relegated to secondary importance.
During the Israeli system's formative stage, this political
role, which suited the prevailing perception of representative
democracy, was important in establishing and legitimising the new
government. However, the social and economic roles were of paramount
importance due to the prevailing ideology of collectivism. This led
to a unique process of social engineering through physical planning.
The current Israeli system reflects some new trends towards
participatory democracy in planning organisation and individualism in
the planning process and provisions, and a move away from narrow
physical	 land	 use	 perceptions	 towards	 an	 integrated
physical—economic—social outlook. Nevertheless, the basic principles
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INTRODUCTION: AIMS AND METHODOLOGY
Town planning law is often classified as an integral component
of modern social legislation and is mentioned in the context of the
range of 20th century social reforms [1]. However, despite the
quantity of research into the significance of town planning to
society, town planning law Is commonly perceived in Israel, as well
as other places, as a technical-professional subject, of relevance
only to a limited circle of planners, developers, lawyers, landowners
and official planning authorities. Its subject matter is seen as
focusing on the physical elements of the environment, rather than on
the social life taking place within that framework.
It is widely accepted that - in the words of lord Dennis Lloyd
- "beneath even the most apparently technical of rules there may lurk
deeply held social or political philosophies" [2). Nevertheless, the
wider social, political, economic and bureaucratic foundations and
implications of physical-spatial planning and its legal devices have,
with the exception of particular cases, not yet aroused any permanent
interest in the Israeli general public.
This work, which Is a socio-legal study 13] of town planning,
attempts to gain a better insight into the nature of town planning
and the societal aspects of the law and its implementation. It
strives to fill a vacuum in existing research in Israel by providing
a comprehensive explanation to the statutory planning system as a
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whole, rather than delve deeper into limited sections of the system
[ II]. It seeks to bridge the gap between legal studies of town
planning issues, focusing on legislative texts and their judicial
interpretation [5], and studies relating to the formulation of town
planning concepts and their implementation which virtually ignore the
whole of the legal pheriomona [6].
This study draws upon the exaples of the statutory town and
country planning systems of the State of Israel, and of its
predecessor Mandatory Palestine, in light of their British parent
system. These systems provide the subject data which is then analysed
in respect to the concept of social control.
The original objective of this work was somewhat less
ambitious: identification of the underlying dimensions of town
planning law in contemporary Israel. However, very early on it was
realised that, as the existing Israeli system is intimately connected
with its predecessor Mandatory planning law, and as both were
affected by the British statutory planning system, the scope of this
work had to be widened. In addition,
	 a more comprehensive
understanding of town planning law required analysis of the relevant
historical circumstances of the last seventy years, including study
of spatial, political, ideological, social, economic and bureaucratic
conditions.
In the absence of any comprehensive study of this kind, this
work faced a particular challenge which led to the following extended
thesis.
-3-
The underlying theme of the description and analysis of town
and country planning law of Mandatory Palestine and Israel is that
statutory planning serves as a component of a special nature in a
complex system of social control. Thus, beyond its immediate concern
with regulating human utilisation of the physical environment,
statutory planning is designed and exercised to support the
functioning of the prevailing social order as a whole.
This general framework requires	 some clarification,	 in
particular the significance of the sociological concept of social
control in a consideration of statutory town and country planning.
The activity of town and country planning, in the sense of
basic regulation of the layout of design of human settlements, is
assumed to be as old as civilisation	 itself.	 However,	 the
introduction of town planning laws in the 20th century signified the
beginning of the modern era of planning in Britain and consequently
in those territories over which Britain had responsibility. Town
planning laws, as part of modern social legislation, are thus rightly
given as an example of the growing role of legislation as a source of
law.
"Social control" is considered a concept which elucidates the
phenomenon of social order and norm oriented behaviour. It describes
the regulation of behaviour in society by the establishment of morals
and values, standards and rules, which are generally accepted as
binding on human conduct 17]. Under this concept, living in human
—ze-
society implies that pressure is brought to bear upon the individual
to fit into the prevailing patterns of social interaction. The term
"interaction" implies that members of society develop some
expectations as to the behaviour of the individual in a given
situation and upon such expectation they build their own behaviour
[8]. Social control thus safeguards the amount of conformity without
which social order, and in fact the very existence of society, is
impossible 19].
The American sociologist E.A. Ross was the first to coin the
term social control [10]. He used it to describe the mechanisms of
social regulation in the move from the state of "natural order" - an
order which prevails in primary groups (e.g. the family) or primitive
societies - to a state of "moral rational order" - an order which
prevails in complex heterogenous societies. In the former, an
unplanned natural control exists among humans, while the latter is an
artifical order which Ross saw as being erected through law and other
intended and planned mechanisms such as education, morals, public
opinion, ceremonies, etc. By such means, he argued, society ensures
its domination over individuals and enforces conformity to its
norms.
This theory of social order,	 which resembles	 Tounies'
Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft model [11], is regarded by some as
over-deterministic and inconsistent with human history [12]. Other
theories thus emphasise a notion of social control which encompasses
elements from both the small community order and from that of an
advanced, urban-industrial society. Such notions include unplanned
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and unconscious mechanisms, as well as intended and planned ways of
social control (13].
Ross and other early investigators highlighted the variety of
ways by which social control is exercised and affects individuals.
tkring the 1920's and 1930's, the concept of social control was
used extensively in the broad context of social systems. Roscoe
Pound, in his outstanding study, saw social control exercised through
law in this broad sense (14]. By contrast, since the 1940's and the
1950's, the concept has become systematically limited to the control
of deviant individuals, thus acquiring a much narrower definition.
Talcott Parsons developed the concept of social control in the
context of deviance. In his words, "The theory of social control is
the analysis of those processes in the social system which tend
to counteract the deviant tendencies ... Every social system has
a complex system of unplanned and largely unconscious mechanisms
which serve to counteract deviant tendencies" 115].
However, this work is concerned with the former and more
general aspect of control, exercised by society over its members as a
who 1 e.
The sociologist Karl Mannheim considered the issue of planning
in democratic societies from a perspective of the mechanisms of
social control. In his books "Man and Society, in an Age of
Reconstruction" [16] and "Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning"
[17], Mannheim dealt extensively with the theme of planning as a
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necessary method for creating new techniques of social control. Such
techniques were regarded as necessary for reconstruction of the
social order in view of the crisis in the Western world since the
Industrial Revolution. This crisis is characterised by Mannheim as
"maladjustments in modern society". These he considered to be evident
in the social, economic, psychological, moral and cultural spheres of
life. He places the roots of the problems in the population growth,
rapid industrialisation and urbanisation within a comparatively short
period. The unguided and planless transformation from small
communities into mass society led, according to Mannheim, to social
disintegration. The conditions of' the liberal order at the late
industrial age, under laissez-faire principles, were turned into
chaos and anarchy. He thus concludes: "the alternatives are no longer
'planning' or 'laissez-faire', but 'planning for what?' or 'what kind
of planning?'" [18].
In answering these questions, Mannheim advocates "democratic
planning" for freedom and individual liberties. He attempts a
reconciliation between planning as a necessary measure for efficient
couinunity action to prevent chaos and the values of freedom and
liberty. Aware of the danger that planning power can turn into a
corrupt and oppressive tool by which democracies may be transformed
into dictatorships, Mannheim tried to safeguard the democratic nature
of planning by controlling the controllers [19].
Those views of Mannheim and others, which emphasised the
virtues of all embracing social planning, were criticised as being
utopian as well as totalitarian. Hayek [20] saw an inconsistency
-7-
between planning, democracy and the rule of law. He considered
-	 interventionist planning as a dangerous aberration. Karl Popper [21]
criticised the belief that it is possible to make, and act upon, long
term predictions about social development. He advocated instead
piecemeal social engineering in which social arrangements are changed
by small adjustments and readjustments.
However, in spite of the controversy regarding the theory of
social planning, de facto the phenomenon of a planned society has
increasingly prevailed in the modern world.
Social control can be approached at two levels. Firstly as a
neutral technical concept describing the basic mechanisms which
maintain any human society through the use of normative systems.
Secondly as a purposive "social engineering" concept describing the
mechanisms which enable the domination of a particular form of social
order through the introduction and maintaining of particular values,
norms and rules of behaviour.
Likewise, statutory planning can be approached in these two
ways. Firstly, in the traditional way, town and country planning can
be seen as the physical design of the built environment. It can thus
be described as a form of ordering the distribution of land between
competing users by controlling the processes of development and thus
creating a designed base for social life. The key points of this
approach are the physical components; land, buildings, communication
routes, recreation areas, etc. These are said to be arranged
rationally and objectively to meet the needs of society. In this way,
-8-
a system of statutory planning can be seen in a neutral—technical
sense as a contributing method, in the limited sphere of the physical
environment, to protect and maintain society.
A more canprehensive approach first views society in the broad
sense of social interaction and the resulting socio—economic order.
It exanines how this order is expressed in various aspects of life,
including the physical environment. It examines further how the
physical environment in turn affects the social order. In this way
statutory planning can be seen on the one hand as a reflection, and
on the other hand as a tool, of the creation and maintenance of a
particular form of social order.
This work places its main emphasis on the second approach. By
thus treating social control as a defining characteristic of
statutory planning, a better insight is gained into the nature of a
statutory planning system as part of society, rather than if we were
to rely on the first approach and simply study the legal rules in the
context of the physical environment alone.
The application of the concept of social control to the
statutory planning systems of Israel and its former system of
Mandatory Palestine leads to the identification of' three interrelated
roles which were exercised by these systems. These roles can be
loosely classified as follows: 1) political role - to serve as a tool
for effective government; 2) econanic role - to provide efficient
utilisation of scarce resources; 3) social role - to advance human
welfare and progress. The cumulative exercise of these roles, from
-9-
which statutory planning largely draws its characteristics as a
component of social control, contributes to the support 	 and
maintenance of the prevailing social order.
The specific content given in any particular system to each of
these roles, and the relative importance attached to each at any
given time, have different effects, and they are in turn affected by
the prevailing social order. Hence the multi-form nature of statutory
planning as a component in social control.
The methodology of this 	 rk involved the description and
analysis of legislative texts, their judicial interpretation, and
their implementation. For a fuller understanding of the statutory
system, use was male of official explanatory notes, together with
unpublished documents containing comments by officials responsible
for planning legislation. The ideas and perceptions of the people
involved in shaping town planning laws were studied from various
writings and several personal interviews.
As mentioned above, the law and its implementation are placed
in the broader setting of physical developments of the country,
including the constant demographic changes throughout the described
era, social composition, economic conditions, ideological diversity,
political problems and bureaucratic culture. Information on the above 	 -
was gathered from general literature in the respective fields and
writings dealing with town planning issues in combination with other
subjects. Further invaluable material regarding the concepts and
principles of statutory and non-statutory planning applied in Israel
- 10 -
throughout the years was found in both published schemes and
decisions and unpublished proposed plans and policies. The writings
of,	 and	 personal	 interviews	 with,	 professional	 planners,
administrators, legal advisors, politicians, developers and other
public figures shed a great deal of light on the nature and character
of the system and provided first-hand information as to the shaping
of' the theory and practical implementation of the system.
Since this work is a "socio-legal" research paper, the law is
studied while making use of (what is considered by McAuslan as
characteristic to such research) "information, ideas and perspectives
derived from the social sciences, In order to re-interpret and gain
fuller understanding of legal phenomena and concepts" [4]. Here it is
the concept of social control which is applied.
The first part of this work describes and analyses the
evolution of statutory planning in Mandatory Palestine between 1917
and 1 948. The second part deals with the continuing evolution of the
Israeli systems between 1948 and the 1980's. In the third part, the
concept of social control is applied to the above systems through the
typology of the three roles mentioned above.
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PART I
STATWORY TMN AND COUNTRY PLANNING IN PALESTINE, 1917-19k8
Part I of this work focuses on the introduction and
implementation of statutory town and country planning in Palestine
during the era of British rule 1917-19t8. An examination of the
planning system of Palestine provides an exceptional opportunity to
explore the way a modern planning system worked in circumstances of
radical transformation, including rapid and intensive development, as
experienced in this country. It provides a special opportunity to
look at the way the British administration applied British planning
concepts, techniques and legal measures to deal with the situation in
a territory for which Britain had responsibility. An analysis of this
system is also essential for an understanding of the Israeli planning
system which succeeded it.
Palestine during this period was not an ordinary Mandated
territory. Politically speaking, it had in essence become an
international, as well as local, problem. Events which took place
there had worldwide repurcussions. The three main protagonists in
Palestine were the British administration, the Arabs and the Jews.
Each of these had the backing of an external force which were
respectively the British Empire, the Arab nations, and World Jewry.
The goals of each of the groups in Palestine differed considerably,
as did the strategies and actual steps taken by each to achieve their
- 12 -
goals. The British were first and foremost concerned with advancing
their empiral interests through governing Palestine. The Jews, with
their Zionist aspirations, wanted a State of their own in Palestine.
The Arabs strove to be the exclusive rulers of the land.
These differences loomed over life in Palestine during this
period and are clearly evident in the sphere of town planning and
land development.
Statutory planning in Palestine, as seen here, developed
basically in two stages. A preliminary stage was the era of British
military rule, from 1917 to 1920. firing this time, only a limited
form of planning was employed. It was focused on the prevention of
any significant change in the existing structure and on 	 the
protection of the Old City of Jerusalem.
The period of the civil administration, 1920-19'8, is divided
into two stages. The first began with the enactment of the first Town
Planning 'dinance 1921 and lasted until the reform instituted by the
Ordinance of 1936. This stage saw the laying of legal foundations for
the modern planning system of Palestine. At this stage, the planning
system faced significant development of the country. The second stage
lasted from 1936 to 19 145. Under the new planning law which
consolidated and amended the previous legislation, planning became a
much more institutionalised system, yet adopted a lower profile, due
- 13 -
at first to local strife and thereafter to World War II. The rapid
development after the war up to the withdrawal of Britain from
Palestine in 19 4 8 helped the statutory planning system reach its
maturation.
Statutory planning in Palestine, as indeed elsewhere, did not
arise in a vacuum. In tracing the evolution of this system, some
description of the social, economic, political and physical
conditions on the eve of British rule - as well as in each stage - is
required. This should elucidate both the problems with which
statutory planning had to deal, and the solutions it offered.
- 1k -
CHAPTER 1. THE NEED FOR TC&4N PLANNING AND FACTORS AFFECTING ITS
EVOLUTION
The spatial-physical, socio-economie, administrative and legal
circumstances in Palestine during the final period of Turkish rule
formed the basis upon which British rule was established in 1917.
These circumstances had a bearing on the organization and operation
of the British Administration in general, and on the evolution of
statutory town and country planning in particular. It will be
worthwhile therefore to describe briefly the circumstances prevailing
on the eve of British rule.
Palestine [1], a relatively small country lying between the
Mediterranean and the River Jordan, cc*iiprised a total area of 27,000
square kilometres (1O,kOO square miles). Its location at 	 the
crossroads of three continents and two oceans resulted in a wide
range of ecological conditions within its small territory.
Approximately half its area consisted of the semi-arid plains of the
Negev.	 e third was made up of the hills of Judea, Sumaria and the
Galilee, with some fertile but swampy values in between. The
remaining area was taken up by both the narrow coastal plain,
stretching along the Mediterranean Sea in the West, and the Jordan
Valley following the River Jordan in the East (2].
Such a small area appeared to call for a national planning
outlook, while the geographical diversity justified regional and
local planning. The elongated shaped of the country, which resulted
- 15 -
in relatively long distances between major areas of settlement
required multi-level transportation planning. Likewise, the
climatological conditions and the unbalanced rainfall required an
articulated policy of water distribution and drainage programmes
13].
Before and during World War I, Palestine was underdeveloped and
underpopulated by any European standard. Historically the settlement
pattern in Palestine followed two major axes, one along the ridges of
the hill country and the other along the coast. It consisted of a few
urban centres which were of ancient origin, and of numerous villages
which created the agricultural characteristic of Palestine. The
development of most of the towns and villages had never been
systematically planned, but was the result of traditional organic
evolution, influenced by the prevailing social and economic forces
[a]. Rudiments of modern town planning can be traced in towns such as
Jerusalem and Beer Sheba, where the Turks employed German engineers
to provide basic plans, largely for a road system 15]. The few Jewish
settlements which had been gradually established since the 1880's
also demonstrated initial attempts at modern rural planning. However,
Palestine of 1917, the year the British entered the country, can best
be described as a devestated zone. Of limited attempts at physical
modernisation in the past, almost nothing remained after World War I.
The land was ravaged by military operations, neglect and general
deterioration [6].
A good example to take to illustrate the physical conditions
and the challenge they posed for modern planning and development is
- 16 -
that of the transport and communication system.
The transport infrastructure, always very poor, was virtually
non-existent after World War I. The few roads which were paved were
damaged by the military, as was the railway network which had been
laid down in the pre-war era to link the main towns and create a
connection with Constantinople and Europe. Palestine had no telephone
service and the Turkish telegraph offices ceased to operate after the
war [7].
Due to both human and natural disasters, the population of
Palestine declined from approximately 790,000 before the war to
approximately 600, 000 by 1917 [8]. There are conflicting estimates as
to the division of population at the outset of British rule, One
British report [9] gave the following figures: Four-fifths of the
entire population was tbslem and some 70,000 were Christians, largely
belonging to the Cthodox Qiurch. The Jewish community numbered
76,000. The urban population is estimated at 250,000, while the
majority lived in large or small villages.
The various coiiinunities of Palestine developed side by side
along parallel but separate lines. There was no integration between
the numerous ethnic groups making up a cohesive society. Arabs were
divided according to religious affiliation (Moslem, Christian, etc.),
and between villagers and city dwellers. Their social structure was
marked by the traditional base of family links. Their leaders were
mostly those belonging to the oligarchy of property owners. At that
time, the Arabs lacked any decisive Palestinian national identity,
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independent of other P1rab populations of the Ottoman Enpire 110].
The level of social institutionalisation of the Jews was at
that time only slightly different. The Jewish community was very much
divided amongst itself between the old and new communities, the
Orthodox Jews and Zionist pioneers, Jews from Europe and those from
oriental countries, Ottoman citizens and those 	 with	 foreign
citizenship. Despite attempts to
	 establish central	 communal
institutions, these bodies lacked authority over the entire Jewish
community [11].
With a population of only 600,000, planning in Palestine might
seem to be a relatively easy task. However, the complicated social
composition made it, even at that time, an extremely difficult
matter, particularly because of its political implications.
The political problem which has loomed over this region for so
many years had already begun to emerge by 1917 112]. Without going
into elaborate detail here, it may be said that the British were
caught between the rival claims to Palestine. On the one hand, the
Balfour Declaration of 1917 encouraged Jewish hopes for the
establishment of a National Home [13]. The Arabs, on the other hand,
in putting forward their claim an independence state, relied on the
McMahon Pledge [V4]. Since then, the conflict arising from these
claims has dominated the history of the entire region and has led to
bloodshed from civil strife and national wars [15].
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Furthermore, for Britain itself Palestine was very important,
both from the point of view of imperial strategy and the country's
religious—cultural value. D.je to its physical decay and poor economic
condition, Palestine per se had no economic attraction for a foreign
power. Hence Britain's main motive in becoming the Mandatory power
was not direct economic profit, but rather strategic and political
gain [16]. Strategically, Palestine was the eastern outpost against
any potential threat to the Suez Canal and the route to India. It. was
the outlet of the oil pipeline from Kirkuk and was also a starting
point for the desert route to Iraq. In addition, Palestine's special
religious status and historical, archaeological and culture value
made it a unique region [17]. It was thus of interest to the British
public as well as to the rest of the Western world.
Palestine had a predominantly agricultural economy. The region
lacked natural resources and the standard of living was extremely
low. Swamps covered large areas of the plains due to lack of adequate
drainage. Primitive methods used for generations dominated the type
of agriculture. Industry and commerce were almost non-existent. In
addition, the economy was in a state of total collapse due to the
World War I and the currency was worthless. Agricultural land was
left untilled, which led to total impoverishment of the population.
Food shortage was widespread, leading to starvation and death [18].
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In ancient times, Palestine had been a very fertile country and
the current situation was the result of centuries of neglect which
had destroyed the economy. The country's major requirement in order
to renew and make use of its economic potential was physical and
economic planning, financ ial investment and extensive development.
On the eve of British rule, Palestine was an outlying part of
the Ottoman Empire, governed centrally from Constantinople. The
territory did not form a single political or administrative unit, but
was divided between the vilayets	 (provinces) of Beirut
	 and
Damascus, and the independent
	 sanjak	 (region) of	 Jerusalem.
Vilayet was divided into sanjaks which in turn were sub-divided
into agdiya (districts). Aqdiya included a main town and its
environs. The smallest unit was the nahiya (rural district)
containing a number of villages 119].
At the local government level, twenty-two municipal councils
were established under the Provincial Municipalities Law of 1877
[20]. These existed in the major towns and larger villages. Mayors
were appointed by the goverment and elections rarely took place. The
rural districts established under the Vilayet Law of 186k were
supposed to have a council, but very few were in fact established.
However, many district heads (mudirs) and heads of Arab villages
(mukhtars) were local Arabs appointed by the government.
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The Jewish settlements organised their own pattern of
self-government, based on elected councils which were recognised by
the Turkish rulers. However, the Turkish regime was despotic.
Although formally Ottoman legislation did provide for some local
participation through delegations to the Turkish Parliament, for the
establishment of popular councils near the administrative units
described above and for local authorities, in actual fact the local
people had no real say in the government of the country [21]. In
general, the Ottoman provincial authorities exercised strict control
over the local institutions.
Land ownership and tenure, and restrictions on land use, were
an essential factor in the development of Palestine. A short
description of these might be of help in an understanding of the
evolution of town and country planning [22].
Under the Ottoman Land Code [23], the land of Palestine was
classified under five main categories. Most of' the cultivated land
was termed miru in which the State had the ultimate ownership. In
addition, large stretches of uncultivated land, termed mewat was
owned and possessed by the State. Land in public use, such as roads
or common pastures was classified separately as metruka. 	 Wagf
land was land dedicated to the Islanic religions charitable trust.
The remainder was privately owned land, called mulk. It should be
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stressed that private land was very rare, except in the existing
urban areas. tbst of the land was publicly owned and, in practice,
inhabited and tilled by tenants holding long or short leases. The
rights of these leaseholders varied according to the class of land
they possessed.
An Ottoman law provided for the registration of land E2]. This
law also established land courts with jurisdiction in these matters.
Ho wev er, most of the land was unregistered and some, owing to
misinformation or incorrect registration, belonged to more than one
owner. Very often Arab villages had their land registered under
comunal ownership (musha'a), although it was actually divided
between families according to informal agreements. This informal
allocation of land was constantly changing.
This complicated system caused great confusion as to the real
rights to the land, such as ownership and tenure. Yet the Ottoman
system remained for the most part in force throughout the Mandatory
period and for another twenty-eight years under Israeli law 125].
This was due to the difficulty of making reforms over this type of
property right, owing to the importance attached to land in general,
and to this country in particular. By contrast, the laws governing
the use of land and its develoç*nent progressed extensively after the
Ottoman era, as shown below.
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On the eve of itish rule, the law in force included only a
few elements of land use regulation and town planning [26]. Typical
to the times, the transport network, of' all physical planning
matters, was of prime concern. The planning and construction of' major
roads and railways of' strategic importance were matters for the
goverrinent in Constantinople, while other roads and public utilities
were dealt with by the administration of the vilayet.
At the local level, the Municipal Council was given powers,
amongst other things, relating to the provision of streets and
pavements, construction of public buildings, markets, water pipelines
and expropriation of land for public use [27).
The Ottcan law as to provincial Municipalities dealt with
construction and repair of roads, and the buildings alongside these
roads. It prescribed that in cases of' planning a new road, widening
or changing existing roads, or the rebuilding of an area destroyed by
fire, preparation of schemes f'or the above were the responsibility of'
the Municipal Council. A notice of such schemes had to be sent to any
person interested in the land. Such person was given time to sutinit
any objections. The final decision lay with the central authorities
of' the vilayet. Of particular importance was the provision which
gave the authorities power to expropriate land without compensation
of' up to one quarter of a unbuilt plot, for the widening of' streets
or the rebuilding of' a quarter.
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This law also allowed the authorities to Impose a charge on
land owners whose land increased in value as a result of the widening
or construction of a road. The money was intended as a contribution
towards the cost of this work.
Other laws allowed the local authorities to impose some basic
building regulations which were made compulsory in urban areas. The
law also imposed strict controls over building operations. &iilding
permits were required for the construction of individual buildings,
as well as for new neighbourhoods. In cases of applications to change
agricultural plots into residential land, the owner also had to
contribute some of the land, without compensation, for public
purposes. In other cases, expropriation of land was subject to
compensation under the law of expropriation. However, despite these
formal provisions, no systematic planning process existed and the
control of physcial development exercised by the officials was
"looked upon as a revenue producing measure" 128].
The main force behind the development of Palestine throughout
the Mandatory era was the Zionist and other Jewish organisations
[29]. Their development activities did not begin in 1917, but
gradually grew from the 1880's onwards 130). The importance of their
activities in the evolution of the Mandatory planning systen
justifies a brief introduction to their main bodies and their role in
urban and rural development prior to World War I.
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Since the last quarter of the 19th century, various Jewish
bodies were involved in land purchase and settlement in Palestine.
This was rooted in the long cherished drean of the Jews to return to
Zion. The first agricultural villages (moshavot)
	
were established
mainly on the coastal plain [30]. They were stnallholders'
settlements, supported by Jewish philanthropists tho set up the
Jewish Colonisation Association (J.C.A.) to organise land purchase
and to help the farmers. However, these early develoçinent activities
were characterised by utopian plans and disorderly implementation
[31].
The foundation of the World Zionist 'ganisation (W.Z.O.) in
1897 helped formulate in political and practical terms the ideal of
the creation of a Jewish State in the Jewish homeland. Zionism was
rt just an ideology, but a highly programmatic and pranatic
movement. Its founder, Theodor Herzl, In his programme "The Jewish
State", formulated a detailed plan Including, inter alia, a centrally
organised scheme of land purchase, town and settlement planning and
systematic implementation [32].
Organisational tools for the realisation of this ideal Included
a WZO office In Palestine, established In 1907 and heaied by Arthur
Euppin. Other bodies active In this reallsatlon were the Jewish
National Fund for land purchase and the Land Development Ccinpany for
the planning and building of settlements.
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The basic ideological principles underlying the activities of
the Zionist bodies are of great importance in understanding the
evolution of planning and development. First was a nationalistic
perception of land development where the soil was to remain a public
asset; second was the emphasis on rural rather than urban settlement,
a literal expression of the ideal of returning to the soil.
Development activities were also characterised by two sources of
tension: the conflict between pragmaticism and activism; i.e. between
predetermined policy and proper preparation against the necessity to
find solutions as quickly as possible; and between socialist views of
national development and liberal perceptions of private initiative
[33].
There was no shortage of plans for the development of the -
Jewish State, ranging from comprehensive all-embracing programmes of
national land development to plans for particular villages or
neighbourhoods. Though actual conditions often defied attempts to
impose systematic plans, it is important to point out those major
plans which did influence development in practice. These plans
concentrated on systematic land purchase, physical planning or both
I 34].
To give just one example, the first important plan at a
national level was that prepared in 1907 by Dr. Ruppin. In this plan
he urged a concentrated effort of development in two major regions:
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in the central Judean area to the coastal plain, and in the north in
the Galilee—Tiberias region. He chose these regions due to the
relatively high numbers of Jews living there: Thus in his view
additional Jewish settlement would advance the political objective of
Jewish autonomy in Palestine.
Dr. Ruppin described in detail the requirements of land
purchase and Jewish immigration to achieve this goal. Aware of the
numerous difficulties faced by the Jewish agricultural settlements in
the area, he advocated urban as well as rural types of settlements
and proposed the construction of industry as well as agriculture as a
means of supporting the population.
On Dr. Ruppin's recommendations, the Palestine Lane Development
Company was established. Since the Ottoman legal and administrative
systems inflicted many difficulties on Zionist activities, Zionist
bodies adopted a pragmatic policy of purchase of any available land -
urban and rural - and encouraged private initiative, in addition to
its purchase of land for public ownership.
Notably the balance reflected by this plan between different
ideologies and ways of life became in later years a highly
controversial matter.
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On the eve of World War I the land was already inhabited by k7
Jewish rural settlements of various types, ranging from communal and
co-operative settlements to privately-held farms.
	 Their total
population was 13,000 and they owned 110,000 acres of land. The
Jewish urban population was considerably larger, comprising some
60,000 persons, concentrated in the ancient towns of Jerusalem,
Hebron, Jaffa, Tiberias and Sefad.
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CHAPTER 2. PLANNING UNDER THE BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATION:
THE PRELIMINARY STAGE OF STATUTORY PLANNING
The first British Administration in Palestine was a military
one. It began formally on December 11, 1917, after the capture of
Jerusalem [1], and lasted until July 1, 1920, when it was superseded
by a civil administration. Military rule was generally a transitional
form of administration which would continue until the future of the
territory was determined. In the case of Palestine, this period of
military occupation was prolonged due to the dispute between the
Allied Powers as to control of the area. The Military Administration
in Palestine was thus compelled to assume all the ordinary functions
of a peacetime government [2].
Prior to giving a detailed description of the evolution of town
planning in Palestine during this stage, the major conclusions of the
period may be set out as follows:
a)	 Town planning as a legal—administrative activity was not
yet implemented during this period in any systematic or
comprehensive manner. However, it had been introduced in
particular places where it had far—reaching consequences
for the future evolution of the Mandatory planning
system.
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b) In comparison with the contemporary level of development
of British town planning, the notion of planning in
Palestine was very narrow. It was limited to
architectural—aesthetic considerations of urban and rural
areas and
	 centred	 on conservation and
	 building
restrictions.
c) The political role of town planning, which was to help
the military administration impose law and order and
establish authority over the local population, was the
most significant during this period. Due to the policy of
preserving the "status quo" in Palestine, the economic
and social functions of town planning had little impact.
d) Together with the first steps of statutory planning in
Palestine, this stage saw the growth of unofficial,
non—statutory planning within the Jewish communal
institutions. This also strongly affected the evolution
of the planning system in the following years.
Three levels of government were set up under the military rule:
At the central government level, the departments of Finance, General
(including Police), Commerce, Law, Public Health and Public Works
were created [31.
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At the regional level, the administration was carried out by
military governors. They were posted to every region (district) as
soon as that area was captured. By the end of the war, no less than
thirteen administrative districts had been set up [LI].
At the local level, the existing municipal councils were
allowed to continue, but at the expiration of their periods of office
their members were replaced by nominees of the military governors
[51.
Town and country planning was not administered from the centre
but, like most other civil matters, was left to the discretion of
each governor. Physical developments of national importance were
carried out centrally by the Public Works Department. They were by no
means an implementation of predetermined plans, but were ad hoc
reactions to immediate and pressing problems. In this way the gulf
between planning preparation and actual physical development began in
fact during this first period of military administration [6].
The fact that most of the staff of the administration had no
previous experience of administrative work [7] was, paradoxically, a
benefit in the area of town and country planning. The need for
professional and experienced planners was quickly recognised, which
led to the use of eminent British planners in the administration of
Palestine [8]. In turn, this led to a speedier introduction of modern
planning in that region.
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The legal and administrative principles to be used in the
operation of the administration, including its planning activities,
were set down by the Commander—in—Chief General Allenby as follows:
"The system of administration will be in accordance with the
laws and usages of war as laid down in chapter lt sec. 8 Manual
of Military Law and no departure from these principles will be
permitted without the approval of the Commander in Chief. As
far as possible the Turkish system of government will be
continued and the existing machinery utilised ... Chief
Administrators are reminded that the administration is a
military and provisional one and without prejudice to further
settlement of areas concerned. They are therefore instructed
not to undertake except so far as may be necessary for the
maintenance of public order and security any political
propoganda or to take part in any political questions" [9].
In relation to these vague guidlines, one writer rightly says:
"As the struggle between Arabs and Zionists intensified, British
Officials in Palestine were inevitably drawn
	 into situations
demanding the exercise of political judgement and political decision.
EventualJy the Arab—Jewish conflict came to cover such a universal
terrain of dispute that almost every official action or decision,
however miniscule and however purely 'administrative' in nature, came
to be regarded as having political implications" [10].
This was true in relation to policies and decisions in the
field of town planning and development as much as in other functions
of the administration. As the main pressure for physical and economic
development came from the Zionist Organisations, politics was
inevitably involved. Thus the stand taken by most officials regarding
the political conflict was the key to understanding the deeds of the
administration.
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Although the government in London was at that time determined
to give practical expression to the Balfour Declaration for the
establishment of a Jewish National Home, the military administration
was generally unsympathetic to Zionism [11). It constantly resisted
requests for further development of the land; indeed, it went further
and issued a proclamation prohibiting the sale or distribution of
land without official consent [12]. This was almost the first act of
the administration. In accordance with its declared principles the
military administration officially limited itself to the keeping of
law and order - physical, social or economic progress was beyond its
scope as it would violate the tstatus quo".
Nonetheless, some important developments were carried out by
the military administration. These were effected mainly because of
military needs, or because the existing conditions did not allow any
delay. They included the improvement of the transport system by
building new railway lines and repairing old lines, and
	
the
construction and repair of roads and bridges [13]. The authorities
also provided water pipelines to Jerusalem and basic sewerage and
drainage in a few places [1L]. Moreover, the foundations of modern
town planning in Palestine were laid at a local level during this
period of military rule. Surprisingly it became one of the first
deeds of the new administration [15].
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Why did planning, amongst other
	 important aspects of
administration, receive such attention?
It is asserted that the answer is to be found in both the
nature of the Holy Land and the nature of the military rule. A
detailed explanation of this will be given by considering the
particular case of Jerusalem.
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A.	 TOVN PLANNING IN JERUSALEM
The main factor leading to the introduction of modern town
planning, which also had a major and lasting influence on the
essential nature of planning throughout Palestine, was the capture of
Jerusalem.
Jerusalem was a unique city, not only in Palestine but the
whole world. As a holy city for Jews, Moslems and Christians, it was
of importance to millions of people throughout the world. It was an
ancient city containing a wealth of historical monuments, unique
architectural features and above all numerous places of worship. It
therefore required special care for the preservation of its precious
heritage.
On the day of the official entry into Jerusalem, which was the
first day of military rule in Palestine, General Allenby issued a
proclamation to its inhabitants. After declaring the imposition of
martial law, he went on to say: "Furthermore, since your City is
regarded with affection by the adherents of three of the great
religions of mankind, and its soil has been consecrated by the
prayers and pilgrimages of multitudes of devout people of these three
religions for many centuries, therefore do I make known to you that
every sacred building, monument, holy spot, shrine, traditional site,
endowment, pious bequest, or customary place of prayer, of whatsoever
form of the three religions, will be maintained and protected
according to the existing customs and beliefs of those to whose
faiths they are sacred" [16].
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In this way, town planning began in Jerusalem soon after its
capture. This was largely the result of the personal attention and
care of two key figures: the Commander in Chief, General Allenby, and
the Military Governor of Jerusalem, Colonel Storrs.
General Allenby had no desire to be involved in civil affairs
and usually left these matters to his subordinates [17]. The
preservation of Jerusalem was,
	 however,	 an	 exception	 [18].
Furthermore, Colonel Storrs, who served as Military and Civil
Governor for eight years, was passionately interested in the City and
contributed a tremendous amount to its conservation and restoration
[19].
Notwithstanding the continuous military operations against the
Turks to the north of the City, General Allenby sent at that early
stage for the then Town Engineer of Alexandria, McLean, to come and
advise on the protection of Jerusalem's character and beauty [20]. On
McLean's advice, a set of regulations was promulgated under Martial
Law [21). Its main provisions were:
1.	 A written permit was required from the Mi]4tary Governor
for any erection, demolition, alteration or repair of any
building in or near the Old City.
2.	 The use of either stucco or corrugated iron within the
walls of the Old City was prohibited.
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3.	 Advertisements were prohibited, save on small authorised
hoardings in commercial quarters.
Penalties were prescribed
	 for contravention of these
regulations.
Development control was at first the sole tool for protecting
the fabric of Jerusalem. The guidelines for this control were
contained in a provisional set of conditions which were accompanied
by a provisional plan. Only a limited type of development was then
allowed. This was subject to restrictive conditions relating to the
height of buildings, their use, their location, their effect on the
landscape and the external building materials used [22]. A final form
of McLean's scheme was approved by General Allenby on July 22, 1918.
McLean's scheme was in fact the first modern scheme prepared
for Jerusalem. It divided the City into four zones, with different
levels of building restrictions. They ranged from a total prohibition
of building to a limited form of development. The Old City, with its
medieval aspect, was to be preserved and surrounded by a zone where
no development was allowed. The north and east sides of the City were
to remain undeveloped open space. The western area was intended as a
built up area [23].
There is an assertion [2k] that this plan "was intended to form
a frame of postulates in principle and a strategic platform for
development and building initiative and not as a solution to
practical and definite projects". Furthermore this required "a system
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of' detailed plans that would translate the general plan into terms of
development and building schemes and transform it from theory into
practice".
This analysis should be accepted only partially; namely that
the scheme was a general strategic scheme only with regard to that
part in which it considered the future development of Jerusalem
towards the western side while it was a detailed scheme with regard
to its main subject; i.e. the Old City. The underlying concept of
this scheme was preservation and conservation rather than future
growth and development. This concept mirrored the thoughts of the
Military Governor. As he wrote in his memoirs: "Early in March (1918)
I borrowed the services of W.H. McLean ... not to plan so much as to
bring out regulations which will at any rate preserve the unique
character and tradition of Jerusalem" [25].
To this purpose, the scheme contained some guidance as to the
work required for the conservation of the Old City and its walls. Of
particular interest is a recommendation to the municipality that it
make a list of' buildings of special value and give its attention to
the maintenance of such buildings [26].
Now to the second factor, that of the nature of the military
rule. The powers of the military governors in Palestine in the
administration of their particular districts,
	 specifically in
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planning and development control, were virtually unlimited. Colonel
Storrs wrote about the first month in office: "My word was law. As
there were no lawyers, judges or courts, it was the only law. Better
for Palestine then, there were no
	 newspapers.	 Legally and
journalistically we lived in a State of Innocence" [27].
In view of the many problems which needed to be solved, these
extensive powers unfettered by legal or bureaucratic procedures were
described by Storrs as being very useful. This basic characteristic
of the military rule - to execute "by a stroke of a pen" [28] allied
with the use of legal and administrative tools of government - was
fundamental to the speedy introduction of modern town planning. It
also influenced the content and form of planning regulations and
development control measures. They could be simplified and condensed:
the unfettered discretion of the	 Governor	 enabled	 continual
elaboration and clarification when the specific case required. The
risk of arbitrariness and abuse cannot however be overlooked.
On his part in the administration of Jerusalem Storrs claimed:
"I may have failed - worse than a thousand irregularities - in making
the utmost use of the power I was given: I know I never abused it"
[29]. His administrative work in the area of' town planning (or rather
conservation) may be seen as providing some justification for this
assertion. Storrs, in spite of his absolute powers, realised that to
make positive and even restrictive planning effective "the Heads and
representatives of the Communities concerned should be interested and
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consulted" (30]. He therefore founded the "Pro Jerusalem Society"
which was modelled on the British National Trust, though it developed
into a different type of body. The Society may be regarded as the
first example of public participation in town planning in Palestine.
The objectives of the Pro Jerusalem Society were in general the
"preservation and advancement of the interests of Jerusalem, its
district and inhabitants" [31]. The Society, of which the Military
Governor was the president, was however more than just an amenity
group. It was a landmark in the planning of Jerusalem and Palestine
as a whole. In the words of Storrs, it. "became in effect the Military
Governor civically and aesthetically in council" [32]. Financially
the Society did not rely on the military administration. It managed
to raise funds for its objectives from public organisations and
private individuals in Jerusalem and throughout the world. To what
extent this fact helped the Society take an independent stand in
planning matters is difficult to determine.
The Society consisted of the most distinguished leaders of the
population, as well as British officials. The Governor succeeded in
assembling around one table the Mayor of Jerusalem, the heads of the
various religions, the chairman of the Zionist Commission, the
British Director of Pntiquities, other British officials and leading
members of the Moslem, Jewish and Christian communities. As Storrs
wrote: "these differing and elsewhere discordant elements (were)
bound together by their common love for the Holy City" [3j].
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Storrs appointed as his technical assistant the eminent British
architect and town planner C.R. Ashbee, who served as Civic Advisor
and Secretary to the Pro Jerusalem Society. The "discipline of
civics", in Ashbee's romantic—idealistic view, was an integrated
approach to city life embracing the techniques of architecture with
the needs and the resources of the community [3t]. Jerusalem provided
him with a good opportunity for implementing his ideas of the
"gradual ordering" of all resources in town development. However, by
concentrating on the conservation of the Old City and the aesthetic
aspects of planning rather than on constructive planning for the
growth of Jerusalem, this opportunity must be regarded as having been
wasted 135].
Ashbee was in practice also in charge of dealing with planning
applications and on his recommendation permits were granted [36].
When an application touched upon questions of special architectural
or archaeological value, the case was submitted for discussion to the
Council of the Society before any decision was made.
After granting planning permission, responsibility for ensuring
that its provisions were carried out was given to the Municipality.
The Society itself was, however, also active in the enforcement of
the law 137].
Development control and restrictive measures alone could not
achieve the restoration and preservation of neglected buildings and
the Walls of the Old City. More positive action was also required.
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The Society was mostly active in this area 138]. Other contributions
by the Society included the encouragement of the preparation of a
basic survey of Jerusalem and granting of financial aid for this
purpose. Such a survey was essential for the creation of a scheme and
for the drawing up of detailed plans for future development.
The lack of essential data was first felt in the preparation of
McLean's scheme. However, despite the requests of Ashbee and others,
the Military Administration did not help in carrying out such a
survey.
Town planning during these crucial years of military government
was conceived mostly as a method of controlling development and
securing the conservation of existing structures 139]. Architectural
and aesthetic considerations were almost the sole concern of the
administration. Town planning was therefore limited to its narrowest
sense [ 4O ]. Rather apologetically, the Governor of Jerusalem wrote
that his work "at least insure the temporary provisional Military
Administration against the charge of encouraging or permitting
vandalism" [41].
Planning policy was consistent with the official doctrine of
the Military Administration, which was the preservation of the
"status quo" until a permanent arrangement was made for the governing
of the country. The essence of this doctrine, as it applied to
planning, was to halt the advance of physical
	 and	 economic
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development. Actual development carried out by the government, or
carried out by public bodies and the private sector with government
permission, as limited to serving the needs of the army or the
interests of the Administration 142]. The general result was a
continuation of the frozen state of development.
This approach of the Military Government to town planning may
be contrasted with that of Patric Geddes, as expressed in his
recommendations for the improvement and development of Jerusalem
[43]. Geddes had an original approach to the art of town planning
[44]. He expressed his view when he wrote: "Thus the renewed art of
town planning has to develop into an art yet higher, that of city
design - a veritable orchestration of all the arts and
correspondingly needing even for its preliminary surveys, all the
social sciencest [45].
In 1919 Patric Geddes, an already famous planner, prepared a
report and a scheme for Jerusalem [46]. In his work he practised his
ideas of "bringing harmony to the physical economic and social
complex of the city" [47]. His first months were spent on a
"diagnostic survey" of the old and new parts of the city [48]. No
other place of earth could have given him a better opportunity to
follow his method of survey based on historical, geographical and
sociological study. Geddes' report and scheme included, apart from
conservation of the Old City (what he called "conservative surgery"),
physical development on a large scale of the new Jerusalem: housing
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in new garden suburbs, an extensive park system in the east and south
sides of the city, cultural centres such as the Hebrew University on
Mount Scopus and a National and Civic t&iseum. Under this scheme, the
Old City was to become less isolated, but was intended to serve as a
focal point of the new city. The scheme also specified different
functions for various parts of the new and old city.
Geddes based his proposals on, among other factors, the
prevailing requirements of all sections of the population [9]. This
should be stressed, since it begins to reveal Geddes' approach to the
political problem of Palestine. In the words of his biographer,
Boardman, Geddes showed "understanding of, and respect for, the
spiritual significance which Jerusalem has for Jews, Christians and
Moslems alike. His desire to reconcile and evoke co-operation was as
great as his urge to renew or rebuild. Whether it was a question of
Christian monasteries, Moslem mosques or the Jewish Wailing Wall, he
diagnosed and proposed treatment on a basis of equality and mutual
respect among all civic groups" [50].
The military administration responded with a marked lack of
enthusiasm. Geddes' ideas were far beyond its restrictive approach to
planning. The shortsighted bureaucratic attitude of some military
officers drew Geddes into conflict with them. From this emerged his
pessimistic view of the future of the British administration.
Nonetheless, the effect of Geddes' work in Jerusalem was felt
strongly in later years.
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Thus under the military government all schemes were of a
limited scope. A detailed development plan was not prepared during
this period. "Zoning" as a method of detailed plan making was not
employed by McLean or by Geddes. The explanation for this can again
be linked to the provisional nature of the government and the
consequent policy of preservation rather than planning for the
creation of new urban areas. While detailed planning was recognised
as essential to the future of the city, it was regarded as premature.
Detailed planning could only result from certainty as to the
political and economic future of Palestine. As Ashbee said: "Until we
can see ahead more clearly we cannot zone, and until we zone we
cannot make our town plan effective" 151].
There is an additional aspect to this negative approach to town
and country planning during the period of military rule, where
extensive use was made of development control measures. As pointed
out, this administration was strongly opposed to the then pro-Zionist
policy of the British government. Constant attempts by the military
administration to persuade the government to change its declared
policy were unsuccessful. The administration therefore used its
administrative powers and discretion to limit Zionist activities as
much as possible. In general this was achieved by invoking the
status quo principle. This attitude of the military government was
expressed	 in	 administrative fiats which prohibited 	 Jewish
immigration, prevented land transactions by refusing to re-open the
land registries, and so on [52].
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This attitude also affected town planning. The use by the
military government of development control rather than positive
development was also a result of this attitude. The main pressure for
development caine from Zionist activities. The halting of preparation
of schemes for new development and the limitation of the scope of
planning to the conservation of the existing structure can be seen as
a method by which the military government carried out its own
political fight against Zionism.
In other words, town planning was used to express the political
aims of the ruling power. These aims were concerned with favouring
those whom the administration regarded as the disadvantaged party in
the Arab—Jewish conflict. Here again the ideological and pragmatic
factors were of paramount influence.
This attitude did not deter planners within the
	 Jewish
community from looking into the future and proposing plans and
programs for land development on a large scale in Palestine. At the
same time, they understood that, due to the military administration's
attitude, the implementation of any such plan would have to be
delayed temporarily. The period of military rule in Palestine thus
saw the preparation of many types of plans at different levels [53].
This was, of course, non—official planning activity, which was
motivated by Zionist ideology.
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The most striking example of such planning was Tishler's plan
L5']. In 1919, Joseph Tishler, an engineer and town planner,
published a revolutionary program for its time, though perhaps
over-ambitious. The subject was the physical planning of Jewish land
settlement in Palestine. In line with Zionist ideology of the Jewish
return to the homeland, the plan was based on a population of five to
six million. Of this, two-thirds was considered urban and one third
rural. A basic element in the plan, for the development of the
country as a whole, was the dispersal of towns and villages in
accordance with regional planning policy. Tishler suggested the
division of the country into geographical regions of about 150 square
kilometres each. The planning of a region consisted of the
development of urban centres, interrelated with their rural
surroundings. The regional towns, conceived as "garden cities",
foillowed Howard's philosophy and ideas 155].
In articulating the importance of a good	 communications
network, green built-up areas, recreation areas and, above all, the
functional links between the various types of settlements, Tishler
was also influenced by economic and humanitarian theories. A central
factor in this planning was the need to provide appropriate
educational services. He thus determined the size of each type of
settlement in accordance with the educational services provided.
-	 -
As it is shown later, some of these ideas had a lasting
influence and became part of Israel's planning policy. Yet when they
were first published, they were in sharp conflict with the prevailing
British policy of "status quo" and restrictive planning. In addition,
they went beyond current pragmatic perceptions of the
	 Jewish
organisations and public. Tishler's plan is thus rightly classified




CHAPTER 3. PLANNING UNDER THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION:
TWO STAGES OF STATUTORY PLANNING
On July 1, 1920, a civil administration headed by a High
Commissioner superseded the military administration. The Middle East
was then assigned to the governance of France and Great Britain. The
Mandate for Palestine was, however, still under consideration. Due to
various complications, among them disagreements between the Allied
Powers, it was not until 1922 that the Palestine Mandate was given to
Britain and confirmed by the League of Nations Li].
P1n International Mandate was then a new form of government by a
state acting as a delegate or trustee of the international community
and subject to the supervision of the League of Nations 12]. The
Mandate for Palestine differed fundamentally from other mandates in
its dual obligation: 1) to put into effect the Balfour Declaration on
the subject of a Jewish National Home; 2) to safeguard the rights of
the k'abs in Palestine regarding their self—government 13].
Despite the "general uncertainty as to the future of Palestine"
[14] and the lack of firm legal—constitutional basis for British rule
over it, the civil administration was carried on, from the outset, as
if the granting of the Mandate to Britain was assured. Britain saw
its position as the ruling power in this region secured for a
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considerable number of years. British Imperial aspirations were well
served by this ruling. The vagueness of the term "Jewish National
Home" on the one hand,	 and	 the conflicting promises of
self—government to the Arabs on the other, ensured that Britain would
be involved in Palestine, if only to reconcile the rival parties.
The High Commissioner was both the representative of the
Mandatory power and the head of the local government which was the
organ of the Mandatory Power 15]. He carried out his executive
functions through an administrative apparatus which was similar to
those existing in British colonies. The High Commissioner presided
over an Executive Council which was the highest administrative
authority. Members of this Council were the Chief Secretary, the
Attorney General, and the Treasurer 16].
The Civil Administration continued the centralised system of
administration through the existing departments and also expanded
their number by setting up new departments such as Agriculture and
Fisheries, Education, Customs and Excise, Land Registration, Land
Settlement and Surveys. This expansion occurred together with a
reduction in the number of districts through amalgamation 17]. This
centralised administration was a distinct change from the autonomy
enjoyed by the military governors under the previous administration.
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As for town planning administration, this developed through the
years from the appointment of a town planner to advise the government
to a Town Planning Advisor's Office under the Attorney General's
Department and finally to an independent Town Planning Department
[8].
The new administration was mostly staffed by officials of the
previous administration [9]. This helped in the transition period and
influenced the way the new administration operated in the initial
stages. Under the policy of the first High Commissioner Herbert
Samuel, local inhabitants were gradually given official positions
[10]. In practice, however, no real political responsibility was
entrusted to the local population [11].
A similar trend took place at the local authority level. The
declared policy was to reestablish elected bodies which would replace
those nominated under military rule. In addition, there was to be a
gradual transfer of powers and responsibilities regarding local
affairs to these elected bodies [12]. This policy was only slowly
implemented [13]. Although a Local Council Ordinance was introduced
as early as 1921, only limited powers were transferred to the local
authorities, and the government officials retained overall control.
British action in regard to self—government of the local population
was therefore met by criticism from both Jews and Arabs [1'I].
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The High Commissioner for Palestine was granted both executive
and legislative powers, as given	 to	 all	 British colonial
administrators. He was responsible to the Colonial Office in London
and not to any elected body in Palestine itself. However, the first
High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, attempted to provide for the
participation of the local population in the legislative process.
Soon after assuming office, he constituted an Advisory Council
consisting of twenty-one nominated members ( Moslems, 3 Christians,
3 Jews, 11 British officials) whom he consulted over any draft
legislation. An attempt to establish an elected legislative council
in 1923 under the terms of the Mandate and the Order in Council 1922
[15] (which was in fact a constitution for Palestine) failed because
of an Arab boycott. From that time to the end of the Mandate the
Advisory Council consisted solely of British officials [16].
In his five years in office the first High Commissioner was
remarkably active as a legislator. No less than one hundred and fifty
Ordinances were enacted. These new laws gradually replaced the
archaic Ottoman laws and became the basis of a modern system. On the
other hand, they ensured extensive government control over almost
every aspect of life in Palestine. The granting of almost unfettered
discretion to the bureaucracy was a hallmark of this legislation.
Nonetheless, these wide-ranging governmental powers were in
principle, though not in effect, distrusted by Sir Herbert Samuel. In
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a private letter to Lord Curzon he wrote: "I have to be on my guard
against the tendency of every new and active administration to be too
'efficient'. There is a disposition among the departments to trop
de zele sometimes. I don't want this country to be a land flowing
with licensed milk and registered honey" 117]. However, despite the
feelings of the High Commissioner, the colonial tendency prevailed.
Surprisingly, among all the matters which required modern
legislation in Palestine in the early 1920's, it was town planning
and control over the environment which received remarkable attention
[18].
The very first enactment of the civil administration was the
Advertisement Ordinance 1920 [19] which controlled the display of
advertisements throughout Palestine. The Antiquities Ordinance for
the conservation of ancient monuments was enacted in 1920 [20] and in
early 1921 the first Town Planning Ordinance was added [21].
The speedy introduction of this legislation was largely due to
the influence of some eminent figures of the "official classes" [22]
in Palestine. With this legislation an attempt was made to adapt
modern English environmental laws to the particular conditions
prevalent in Palestine [23]. Some personal attitudes of those
involved in their introduction can be seen in various aspects of this
legislation. For example, the Advertisements Ordinance 1920 was
enacted at a very early stage because of the interest shown by the
High Commissioner. In his memoirs Samuel commented: "I had always
felt strongly about this vulgarisation of modern life everywhere and
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was glad to be able when I was Under—Secretary at the Home Office to
help the passage of the first statute in Great Britain for checking
the abuses of public advertising" [2 ê ]. He therefore took great pride
in his role in making Palestine "one of the few countries in the
world whose scenery and historic sites and buildings have remained
unspoilt by the intrusion of advertisements" [25]. The Pro—Jerusalem
Society, and particularly Storrs and Ashbee, were obviously among
those who pressed for the introduction of this law which was in fact
the application to the entire country of a regulation which had
related solely to Jerusalem [26].
The Antiquities Ordinance 1920 was yet another measure whose
introduction was stimulated by leading members of the Pro—Jerusalem
Society [27]. The preservation of archaeological sites in Jerusalem
was one of the main concerns of the Society ever since it was
established; hence its calls for a new comprehensive law which would
replace the Military Government proclamation on the subject.
The Town Planning Ordinance was enacted and already operational
by February 1921. The first draft of this ordinance was the outcome
of discussions held by a small group of people with very different
views on the matter. Among them were the Administrator Storrs [28],
the town planners Geddes and Ashbee, Ruppin, head of Zionist
development activities and Attorney General Norman Bentwich. Once
modified after consideration by the Advisory Council [29], their
draft was approved by the High Commissioner [30]. Further changes
were made on the recommendations of the British Colonial Office, to
which the draft was sent before coming into force [31]. Judging from
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the different backgrounds, professions, experience and conceptions of
those involved in the making of this law, it is not surprising that
the end product was planning legislation which encompassed so many
varying philosophies, ideologies and world perceptions. These are
outlined here and elaborated throughout the following chapters.
The basic philosophy of this law was dictated by the
colonialistic—paternalistic concepts of the Mandatory Government,
although it did introduce some liberal and progressive concepts,
particularly in regard to state intervention in private property. It
espoused a managerial—executive approach to planning implementation,
while at the same time allowed for a limited degree of local
participation in the planning process. It allowed room for social and
economic consideration, though the guidelines for planning control
were expressed in spatial—physical terms. However, more than anything
else, the planning law was a regulative tool for the imposition of
law and order and, in turn, for the institutionalisation of the
government's authority over the local population.
It is argued here that the swift introduction of the planning
legislation was influenced by the pressure put by the Jews to start
large scale physical development in Palestine. It seems apparent that
the legislator had in mind the new existing market forces which were
determined to introduce and implement considerable changes in the
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physical fabric of the country. Given the general apathy of Arabs
towards land development, it seems obvious that without these new
Jewish forces there would have been no need to deal with this
planning legislation or at least to give it the priority it was
given.
The idea that some State control over the use of land Is
necessary In order to overcome the problems created by free operation
of market forces was widely accepted in Britain, Europe and the
United States in the 1920's. This idea, when applied to the local
circumstances in Palestine, was taken much further. The scope of
State intervention in the way land was used was expanded to include
the power of restricting or impairing the activities of one sector,
the Jewish, and the encouragement of another sector, the Arabs. Such
use of planning powers for the advancement of political objectives
should be regarded as revolutionary for its time. The law of
Palestine which is now being discussed provided
	 the	 central
government with extremely wide powers, hitherto unknown in Britain,
Europe or the United States.
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CHAPTER 1. THE FIRST STAGE OF STATUTORY PLANNING: 1921-1936
A.	 TOWN PLANNING ORDINANCE 1921
The first comprehensive enactment introducing modern statutory
planning to Palestine was the Town Planning Ordinance 1921 [1]. This
was a professional and advanced piece of legislation for its time.
Written plainly and clearly in a concise form [2], it dealt with the
subject in a logical order, embracing the most important components
required for the introduction of a new planning system [3].
The Ordinance was influenced [] by English planning concepts
existing at the time, together with their expression in the Housing,
Town Planning Acts of 1909 [5] and 1919 [6].
The English planning law as It stood in 1921 was 12 years old,
yet it was still at an elementary level of implementation. This law
attempted to remedy those environmental deficiences with which other
laws were unable to deal Li]. However it tackled the matter in a
hypercautious manner; hence Its failure to Introduce any substantial
changes in the existing situation [8].
Four significant aspects evident in the then English statutory
planning formed the main differences between this system and the one
introduced in Palestine. First, the planning law of Britain was the
product of a democratic society. The result was a long and rather
cumbersome procedure of democratic decision making 19]. Second, the
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prevailing attitude was that of great respect for private property
rights, often at the expense of potential opportunities to improve
the conditions of the public in general [10]. This resulted, among
other things, in the securing of these rights by means of
compensation [11], which heavy burden often ruled out any effective
planning. Third was the principle of minimum government intervention
in the development market, making the positive steps which the
authorities were willing to undertake, regarding the areas most in
need of improvement, of a very limited nature [12]. Fourth, the
hesitations and doubts as to the capability of the newly established
town planning profession were significant enough to narrow the scope
of the English planning law. The law was applicable mainly to
undeveloped suburbs and emphasised the physical components of the
environment rather than the treatment of many aspects of life in
general in the town [13].
The following description of the Town Planning Ordinance of
Palestine 1921 reveals how much - or rather how little - of the
English model was in fact adapted to the planning system of
Palestine.
As this Ordinance continued to have a strong influence on
subsequent legislation of the Mandatory era and even in Israel, it is
essential to analyse it thoroughly. Emphasis is placed on the
institutionalisation of town planning machinery and process, the
content of the planning norms and the implementation of the system.
The evolution of the system to its present form is shown in the
subsequent chapters.
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1.	 Planning Administration under the 1921 Ordinance
The first part of the Ordinance detailed the organisational
framework of the Mandatory planning system. Planning was administered
by newly established machinery with little reliance on administrative
bodies inherited from the Ottoman Rule. Consequently the membership
of some institutions was detailed in the Ordinance itself, and not
left to the internal arrangement of the executive [13A].
Compared with the English system of the time, the two most
significant aspects of the Mandatory planning administration were its
dominance by central government and the extensive powers, given
particularly for the implementation of schemes.
Town planning in Palestine did not develop from a town planning
movement or from the demands of local authorities, as was the case in
England [1 L j. The Mandatory planning system was imposed from above.
In fact, the majority of the local population of Palestine was barely
aware of the effects physical planning could have on their lives.
Furthermore, they did not see in it a feasible solution to the
physical problems of the country. As one senior official wrote: "In
this matter Government was certainly in advance of public opinion and
had in consequence to cope with many hindrances" [15]. This probably
gave the government the justification for the adoption of a
paternalistic pattern of planning machinery which largely denied any
local participation in the decision making process. A striking
example of this was the reluctance to adopt the English model of
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"public local inquiries" into the Mandatory planning law. This
attitude on the part of the government was consistent with the
general colonial approach which pervaded many of its administrative
activities. There was a concentration of power exercisable by the
government and which pervaded all stages, level and institutions of
the Mandatory planning system [16).
In Britain, planning powers were more openly balanced between
central and local government. This was true also with regard to the
Continental-German planning system [17]. Planning was perceived as a
matter for local authorities while the government was expected to
supervise and control their activities. Furthermore, under the 1909
Act, the two tiers of government were placed in turn under the direct
supervision of the Houses of Parliament [18]. Although this Act
empowered the Local Government Board [19] to make substantial
planning provisions regarding preparation of schemes, in practice the
Board did not propose any such regulations and the content of the
planning proposals was left to the intiative of local authority. Even
a decision to prepare a scheme was discretionary, yet when local
authorities decided to take such steps, they required the
government' s consent.
The subsequent planning act of 1919 made the preparation of
schemes obligatory for local authorities above a certain size [20].
Under the same law, smaller authorities were freed from the need to
obtain permission from the government for the preparation of schemes
while the Minister was granted the necessary powers to require such
schemes to be submitted [21]. The direct supervision of the Houses of
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Parliament was also abandoned [22]. The balance between central and
local government in the preparation and approval of schemes remained
much as it had been under the 1909 Act. This balance, as mentioned,
was not adopted by the Mandatory legislator.
The second significant aspect of the Mandatory planning
administration was the active role it played in the implementation of
schemes. Under the law, the administration was expected to take over
managerial as well as regulatory functions, at least in relation to
development for public purposes. Any scheme could provide the
planning institutions with "special powers ... for the purpose of
carrying out the general objects of the scheme" 123]. The scheme
could also detail the "special conditions for the exercise of such
powers regards notice or otherwise" [VU. The Ordinance provided for
the obtaining, by the planning administration, of the resources
necessary for public development. Finance was to be secured by means
of a betterment tax and other payments by landowners [25]. Land could
be obtained by expropriation [26]. The administration thus had the
power to become deeply involved in the operation of the market. Such
extensive governmental powers were in opposition to the liberal
attitudes then prevalent in Britain which believed in government
intervention only as a last resort [27]. The extensive powers of the
Mandatory administration, however, could be explained partially by
the weakness of the local private sector. They were also based on the
colonial concept of the role of the Mandatory administration [28].
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Planning institutions were structured in Palestine in four
tiers, as follows:
	
I	 High Commissioner for Palestine
V
	
II	 Central Building & Town Planning Commission
V
	




a.	 The High Commissioner for Palestine
At the top of the hierarchy was the High Commissioner for
Palestine. In this way, the head of the entire British Mandatory
administration had the ministerial responsibility for this particular
subject [29]. Since the responsibility for planning lay with the High
Commissioner, this added to the importance and the strength attached
to the regulation of land use. The concentration of extensive power
enabled him to cover the functioning and implementation of planning.
Further, his responsibility for the entire administration in
Palestine enabled him to eQ-ordinate town planning with other
government policies. On the other hand, it could easily lead to the
use of planning powers for a policy not explicitly sanctioned by the
Ordinance.
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Control Over the Organisation: The High Commissioner
controlled the composition of the planning institutions. He was
granted the power to choose the members of the second tier (the
Central Commission) [30] and although the law imposed the duty to
establish this body, it allowed the High Commissioner total
discretion as to the number of members, their qualifications and
their period in office. He could terminate appointments at any time
and replace any member • The High Commissioner also had to approve any
delegation of power from this commission to any person or body [ji].
In effect, control over this important commission was totally in the
hands of the High Commissioner. In addition, he also had indirect
control over the composition of the lower tiers (the local
commissions). These latter bodies were established in every area
which the High Commissioner declared a "town planning area" (32].
This power to make such declarations and to designate the boundaries
of such areas could influence the composition of the local
commissions. It could also be used to influence the distribution of
functions of the fourth tier (Municipal Councils) [33].
Control Over the Content of Planning: Any proposed scheme
had to be approved by the High Commissioner L3]. His power to
approve Inherently included the power to refuse, alter or impose
conditions upon the scheme [35]. For this purpose the High
Commissioner was furnished with the proposed scheme together with
comments and objections made hitherto in the scheme preparation
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process [36]. His power of approval was not limited to the original
scheme but also applied to any modification, suspension or annulment
of any schemes [37]. Furthermore, any subsidiary legislation
containing more details as to the content of planning had to be
approved by the High Commissioner 138].
Control Over Develop.ent:	 In addition to the regulative
planning process and by virtue of his pre—eminent position in •the
administration (both in planning and generally), the High
Commissioner had the opportunity to allocate government resources for
positive planning.
Such allocation could not only lead to extensive physical
development for public purposes, but also become a catalytic agent in
the operation of the local private sector.
This centralised control of the High Commissioner with its
concomitant risk of abuse was in stark contrast to the British
position where power was more dispersed. This was characteristic of
colonial rule as opposed to that of a democracy. It is clear that in
such circumstances the personality of the High Commissioner and his
attitude towards planning could have significant impact on the
operation of statutory planning.
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b.	 Central Building and Town Flanning Commission
The 1921 Ordinance prescribed that a Central Building and Town
Planning Commission be established by the High Commissioner [39]. It
could be regarded as part of central government rather than as an
independent entity. Most aspects of the planning process came within
the jurisdiction of this body; among them, planning functions of a
legislative, executive and quasi—judicial nature.
This commission had a role in establishing the lower tier of
local administration. It made proposals as to the geographical areas
to be covered by statutory planning, namely Town Planning Areas [O].
Once such Areas were declared, the central commission had the power
to initiate the establishment of a thcal Building and Town Planning
Commission for each Area and to appoint some or all of the members of
each local commission as the Ordinance prescribed [t1].
The law made the central commission in charge of the
preparation of schemes for each local area. Although these schemes
emphasised a local approach to the use of land, they were not
prepared locally. This centralised preparation of schemes could, in
theory, help to co—ordinate the planning and development of
neighbouring areas and thus become the first step towards regional
and national planning. However, a major problem with such an
organisation was that this body was remote from the areas covered by
the schemes and was unable to appreciate local problems and
requirements. In an effort to overcome this problem, the Ordinance
- 65 -
imposed a duty upon local commissions to provide the central
commission with the necessary details concerning local issues [2].
Subsidiary legislation, which was another legal tool for the
prescribing of planning norms, was initiated by the central
commission. However, like statutory schemes, it needed the approval
of the High Commissioner Lk3J.
The central commission was also to serve as a final appelate
body frcm the local commission when planning permission was refused
It was also a superior authority to which planning applications
could be transferred if two members of the local commission so
required [5]. Since two members of the local commission were
appointed by the central commission, they could be used by the
central commission to "call in" applications.
The central commission could initiate steps towards securing
implementation of schemes through its executive functions. The
commission could determine if and when to expropriate land and to
carry out development for public purposes [46]. It had the power to
supervise the process of expropriation and the financial side of
compensation. The authority which operated under the central
commission in respect of expropriation and public implementation was
the Municipality, yet the central commission had default powers in
respect to these functions.
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To sum up, this commission played the key role in the entire
planning process, a situation unprecedented in the then English
planning administration [ LI T]. In fact, only minor tasks in the
planning process were left to the lower tiers.
c.	 Local Building and Town Planning Commissions
In each declared Town Planning area a local town planning
commission was established ['18]. Its composition depended upon
whether or not the area included a Municipality.
In the latter case, the Ordinance prescribed in detail the
composition of the commission, which included a majority of
representatives of the central government: the district governor or
his deputy together with another two members appointed by the central
commission. It also included representatives of the local population
(two members appointed by the Municipal council) ['19], and two
professionals employed by central and local government respectively,
the Public Health Officer and the Municipal 	 Engineer.	 Once
established, the local commission had at its discretion the use of
power to co-opt as members representatives of amenity groups [50].
This last provision may be considered as an advanced form of public
involvement in the planning process, despite the fact it was only
discretionary.
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Planning areas where there was no Municipality were considered
of secondary importance; thus the composition of the local commission
was left to the discretion of the central commission. The Ordinance
provided no guidance for the composition of the second type of local
commission 151].
It is important to note that local planning commissions were
new legal entities introduced by the Ordinance and were separate from
the existing elected authorities. Although the Ordinance declared
that the local commission "shall be a committee of the Municipality"
[52], this was only a formal organisational arrangement.	 The
composition of, and powers given to, the local commission made it
legally and functionally distinct from, and in planning matters
superior to, the Municipality [53]. Thus, for example, the local
commission could, with the approval of the central commission,
require the Municipality to carry out planning tasks specified in the
Ordinance [5k].
It was the duty of each local commission to submit information
concerning its area to the central commission 155]. In doing so the
local commission could indirectly initiate planning and development
and influence the planning process at this crucial early stage,
although it was actually working in an advisory capacity only.
However, more important functions of local commissions related to the
stages after the scheme was approved. These included the financial
aspects of taxation and compensation, and the performance of
development control and enforcement of the scheme.
- 68 -
The local commissions were put in charge of collecting
betterment tax which was used mainly for covering the cost of
implementing a scheme. In addition, they had to deal with
compensation payments for expropriation and for "planning blights"
[56]. The commission was given minimum discretion as a "licencing
authority" in respect to development control. This resulted from a
provision that a permit could only be granted if the	 "work
contemplated fulfills the requirements of the scheme" 157].
ftwever local commissions were in practice dominated by central
government representatives and can be seen as yet another agent of
the Mandatory administration.
d.	 The Municipalities
The fourth tier was comprised of the t&rnicipalities. These were
left with only a very limited role in the planning system. Their
tasks, as prescribed by the 1921 Ordinance, corresponded more with
the attitude that the Municipalities existed to serve as "the means
for carrying out the general requirements of the Administration" 158]
rather than as institutions of' local government serving as "the
collective mouthpiece of the people" 158]. The Municipalities were in
charge of carrying out expropriation of land for public purposes when
required to do so either by the central or local commission 159]. The
Municipalities had almost no discretion in this function. Even the
negotiations with landowners as to the means of compensation were, by
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law, to be supervised closely by the central commission [60].
Further, in town planning areas where no Municipalities existed,
these functions were given to the central planning commission.
The Attorney General, Norman Bentwich, who served as the
chairman of the Central Town Planning Commission, expressed a typical
British colonial approach when he wrote: "In order to preserve the
amenity and character of historical cities like Jerusalem, Bethlehem
and Tiberias it is necessary that the ideas of local authorities as
to development should be controlled and that the planning of new
quarters should be entrusted to competent persons. The government too
has its advisor a town planning expert ..." [61].
It must be admitted that the granting to the Municipalities the
task of preparing schemes would have been a meaningless exercise:
since even in England local authorities then lacked qualified staff
and had no political or technical tradition of town planning [62], @a
fortiori	 the local	 authorities in	 Palestine were equally
ill-equipped for the job. Even central government was unable to fill
this vacuum. On the other hand, no real attempt was made to involved
elected Municipalities or their members in the determination of
policies and the preparation of schemes, which was the task of the
central government alone.
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2.	 The Statutory Scheme Under the 1921 Ordinance
The scheme was the main legal instrument used for the
imposition of binding planning norms and had the 	 force of
legislation. While in England it had the force of primary legislation
[63] and hence could supersede any Act of Parliament [ 6LL], under the
Mandatory Ordinance the scheme was merely subsidiary legislation and
was subject to primary legislation [65]. In fact, however, this was
more a formal than practical difference.
A significant aspect of the statutory scheme under the
Mandatory Ordinance was the authority to deal with an entire
city/town/village and to cover a whole range of land use matters at a
highly detailed level. Another important factor was the managerial
powers which could be granted for the implementation of schemes.
Thirdly, the preparation of schemes was voluntary and was at the
discretion of the central commission.
By comparison the statutory scheme under the English law at
that time was far more limited both in its spatial application and
the means it could secure for its implementation. Development schemes
under the 1909 and 1919 Acts were generally confined to unbuilt areas
and thus could not treat a town as a whole [66]. They were also not
intended to deal with any but urban areas [67]. Furthermore, such
schemes were based on the assumption that implementation was not a
matter for government Institutions but for private or public
enterprises and they concentrated mainly on the regulation and
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co-ordination of market forces [68]. Under the English 1919 Act,
however, the preparation of a scheme was made obligatory for all
boroughs and urban districts with a population of 20,000 or more
[69].
Since, under the 1921 Ordinance, the scheme was allowed to
provide for the introduction of new planning in built up areas, this
gave greater freedom to planners. At the same time the interests of'
private landowners in existing built up areas did not play a
significant role in the preparation of schemes. On the surface this
could be explained as being necessary in the then devastated and
almost deserted territory of
	 Palestine, where any previous
development was of extremely poor quality. However, in fact these
powers enabling the administration to override existing interests can
be regarded as tools for the redefinition of a socio-economic order
in a manner dictated by the administration alone. As a consequence,
the State could not only intervene in the operation of the
development market, but also in the distribution of land ownership
and thus the whole social structure of the country.
The Ordinance allowed for the inclusion of four main groups of
planning matters in the scheme:
1. Provisions as to the use of land.
II. Provisions as to the rearrangement of plots of land and their
ownership.
III. Provisions for the construction of public utilities.
IV. Provisions for allocation of powers and resources for
implementation.
- 72 -
I. Provisions For Use of Land: This followed the list of
matters forming part of the Fourth Schedule to the 1909 Act. It
included wide ranging aspects of physical land use. The Ordinance
explicitly mentioned the technique of "zoning" as a method for
segregating land into areas of different uses [70]. The scheme could
then detail the appropriate use for each plot of land [71]. It could
assign land for public use such as roads, schools, hospitals,
recreation areas, etc. [72]. It could regulate the use of existing
buildings, including prescribing alteration and removal of any
existing structures [73] and could also impose extensive conditions
and restrictions in regard to the erection of new buildings [7k].
II. Provisions for Rearrangement of Plots of Land: These were
exclusive to the Mandatory system and were in sharp contrast to
English principles of protecting property rights and minimising
government intervention. The Mandatory scheme could impose
reallocation of plots and alterations to boundaries of existing plots
[75]. These wide powers included transfer of ownership from one owner
to another; allocation of land to an owner whose land had been
assigned for public use, and the creation, with the consent of the
owners, of joint ownership of newly constituted plots.
The power to reallot land was not intended as another method of
expropriation, but to enable the authorities to overcome the
difficulties of disparate ownership of small plots. In practice,
however, this power could be used as a method of expropriation, thus
changing the balance between public and private land ownership.
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It is worth noting that such rearrangements could be imposed,
in general, without the consent of the landowners subject to the
rules of compensation for limited kinds of "blight" caused by the
scheme.
III. Provisions for Construction of Public Utilities: These
provisions expressed the active side of the Mandatory scheme as a
tool for organising development. The scheme could include not only
regulations as to land use and co—ordination of private development,
but also contain provisions for the actual construction of projects
for public purposes. Such provisions could include the construction
of road networks, buildings and structures for public use, and
utilities such as drainage, sewerage, water supply and lighting
[76].
Although such provisions were not excluded from the English
scheme [77], English legislation did not emphasise these active
aspects as much as the Mandatory Ordinance. In England the mechanism
of the private market was accorded prime importance in the carrying
out of such developments. In Palestine, however, the private sector
was weak and unable to carry the burden of intitiating public
developments. Hence the need for public intervention on a wide scale.
Again, the risk attendant upon such intervention should not be
overlooked.
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IV. Provisions for Powers & Resources for IMplementation:	 These
provisions added to the practicality of Mandatory schemes, enabling
the construction of public developments by allowing the addition of
special provisions to the scheme. These were in addition to the more
extensive provisions prescribed by the Ordinance itself which were of
general application.
The scheme could allocate particular powers for implementation
to the Central or Local Commission or to the Municipality [78],
The estimated net cost of the scheme had to be included [79].
The recovery of money to meet that cost was arranged in the
Ordinance. Part of the cost, however, which related to construction
or alteration of roads or streets could be met by special payments
imposed by the scheme itself [803.
These measures emphasised the aspect of the Mandatory scheme as
a tool for rational implementation, at least in relation to public
projects, rather than as a list of pious hopes whose fulfillment was
dependent on the whim of market forces.
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a.	 The Form of the Scheme Under the 1921 Ordinance
The form of the statutory scheme was influenced both by its
content and objectives. The framework for prescribing the scheme's
provisions was not explicitly expressed by the Ordinance, though it
could be deduced from the various articles of the Ordinance together
with the Rules and Instructions issued by the central commission
181]. The Ordinance required that "the scheme shall in all cases be
accompanied by a plan or plans of the area" 182]. This was aimed
primarily at the definition of the geographical boundaries of the
areas covered by the scheme [83] and to ensure a description of
existing developments in the area. The proposed planning had to be
presented in the following types of documents: map, report and, when
necessary, a draft set of by-laws 18k].
The map was the main means of providing a detailed account of
how the area should be developed. It had to detail the appropriate
use for each plot of land [85], and to specify which land was
required for public purpose and the developments which were to be
carried out [86]. It had to specify the utility services and
infrastructure [87]. If a scheme included rearrangement of plots of
land, the changes in the boundaries of the original plots had to be
shown [88].
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The report was intended to provide additional information in
the form of written regulations. It had to include a list of
landowners, the land proposed for expropriation, special requirements
for water supply and drainage, etc.
The purpose of the draft by-laws, when necessary, was to
indicate which special powers should be used for the implementation
of the proposed scheme, which were vested with the planning
authorities.
By its very nature the statutory scheme was extremely rigid. It
was based on a static concept of planning which prevailed in Britain
at the time [89]. Town planning as a process which demands constant
review and modification of its content was far from the attitude
conveyed by the 1921 Ordinance or by the existing English planning
legislation [90].
Although the systems in England and Palestine both provided the
legal means of modifying an approved scheme, these were not regarded
as more than the means for modifying statutory norms prescribed in
primary or secondary legislation.
The result in both countries was that statutory schemes became
out of touch with reality after a short time. They took a separate
course and the gap between statutory planning and land development
was increasingly widened.
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There was actually nothing explicit in the Ordinance to prevent
the inclusion of general provisions, policies or principles guiding
decision making as to future development, but neither was there any
encouragement to do so. In any case, such a general approach could
not substitute detailed schemes containing specific rules.
b.	 Planning Objectives and Relevant Considerations Under the
1921 Ordinance
The Ordinance did not define "planning" nor did it prescribe
its limits. However the preamble which is unique to this planning
legislation may help - together with the Ordinance itself - to divine
the official purpose of statutory planning at this time. It stated:
"Whereas it is desirable to secure the orderly planning of'
towns and to control the erection of buildings and the layout
out of streets within certain areas with a view to securing the
proper development of such areas in the interests of public
health, the amenity of the neighbourhood and the general
welfare of the community" [91].
From this preamble it is understood that statutory planning
employed two kinds of legal processes. One was a process of "orderly
planning" and the other was "control (over) the erection of buildings
and laying out of streets within certain areas". These were
complementary measures. The former implied the preparation of' schemes
to substitute present chaos in town growth while the latter implied
imposition of restrictions and regulations to secure the
implementation of the schemes, or at least to prevent deviation from
them.
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These means were intended to serve goals which were expressed
in physical terms; namely "proper development". This means first and
foremost the arrangement of physical elements such as roads,
buildings, structures, open spaces, etc. However, pure physical
planning could not be an end in itself. Clearly it had a meaning only
in the context of human use of the physical environment. Hence the
Mandatory Ordinance explicitly proceeded further to goals which were
expressed in general terms. These included "public health, amenity of
the neighbourhood" and more vagually "the general welfare of the
community". These social values were, in turn, the criteria for the
achievement of "proper development". The social goals, although the
ultimate objectives of statutory planning, had to be substantiated in
terms of physical regulations (land use). However, since they were
central to the essence of planning they could be regarded as relevant
considerations in planning decision making. Unfortunately such social
values were vague and open to many interpretations. Consequently
those who made the interpretation, namely the central commission, had
even wider powers which were open to abuse.
In his explanation of the expression of the ideology of public
interest in British town planning, Professor McAuslan wrote: "Town
planning became an activity which depended upon the wisdom and
integrity of the officials to act in the public's best interest"
[92]. Since in Britain the notion of public interest and its
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realisation by the administration was controversial a fortiori 	 the
use of such open—ended considerations and unfettered 	 planning
discretion in the political circumstances of Palestine gave rise to
endless controversies.
In regard to the social aspects of planning, the Mandatory
Ordinance went further than English legislation. The 1909 Act stated
the objectives of the scheme as securing "proper sanitary conditions,
amenity and convenience in connection with the laying out and use of
land, and of any neighbouring lands" [93].
These objectives resulted from social problems which ensued
from unsanitory conditions, overcrowding and the disorderly rapid
growth of towns in England. Professor Ashworth in his criticism of
the 1909 Act said: "It was concerned only with the physical layout of
land and buildings: the social considerations which might guide that
layout were left either to be disregarded or to be sought empirically
for every separate scheme" [94].
Cherry [95] on the other hand saw these prescribed objectives
differently. In his view the combination of housing and town planning
in the 1909 Act was a "community based approach" which involved "a
comprehensive exercise with integral social objectives".
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No doubt the social aspects of planning were in the minds both
of those demanding the planning legislation and those responsible for
its provision. In practice, however, the way the law was implemented
at the time in England corresponded more to the view of Ashworth, who
saw it as restricted in application to physical planning.
To sum up, the planning Ordinance of Palestine was more general
in its goals, though the precise ambit of social considerations was
far from certain.
3.	 Positive Implementation Under the 1921 Ordinance
An attempt to link schemes and their realisation was well
evidenced in many provisions of the 1921 Ordinance [96]. Although
radical in comparison with existing English legislation, the steps
that could be taken towards positive planning were of a limited form.
These steps could secure the accomplishment of only limited parts of
the scheme, although sometimes they did enable considerable progress
in that direction.
Implementation of a scheme required positive steps by both the
public and private sectors. The public sector's primary concern was
with public developments and infrastructure; the private sector
concentrated on private development. Nevertheless the two sectors
still required co—operation from one another for their respective
activities.
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In relation to the public sector the scheme could provide for
the supply of two main resources needed for implementation: land and
finance. Land for public use could be obtained by expropriation under
the terms of the Ordinance [97]. The central and local commissions
could require municipalities to carry out expropriation [98]. The
central commission could also postpone the completion of
expropriation until the land was needed for the implementation of the
scheme. In this way central government dominated the initial stages
(i.e. expropriation) of public development [99].
Compensation for such requisitions was either agreed upon
between the parties or payable in accordance with the provisions of
the Ordinance. In the latter case, the Ordinance did not follow the
English liberal principle of market value [100] but imposed an
arbitrary ceiling value on compulsory purchase [101].
A far more radical provision enabled expropriation of land
without compensation for the purpose of constructing or widening of
roads and streets [102]. The origins of this provision, as mentioned,
were in the Ottoman Land Code. The 1921 Ordinance somewhat limited
its application to circumstances where the land concerned was not yet
developed and where expropriation left the rest of the plot suitable
for any construction as the scheme permitted. In spite of these
limitations, this provision provided the authorities with its most
important tool for positive implementation, albeit at the expense of
private landowners.
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The financial cost of the scheme and its implementation was to
be met by means of a betterment tax. The recovery of this tax by the
local commissions was a duty imposed by law 1103]. Further positive
steps to be taken by central or local coninissions or the municipality
for carrying out development were at their discretion, though legal
powers enabling them to act could be set out in the scheme itself.
Although the major part of public implementation was discretionary,
the law envisaged that public authorities would assume a managerial
role in development.
The Mandatory Ordinance was in theory interventionist in
respect to the private sector's share in the realisation of schemes.
It enabled the imposition of duties upon the private sector to erect,
alter or demolish any building or other structure [1Ofl. In theory
such duties could be enforced by the authorities when executing the
works themselves and recovering the expenses from the private
individual. These powers were exercisable when a delay in execution
of work prejudiced the efficient operation of the scheme 1105].
The English planning law did not authorise similar powers for
compulsory purchase of land 1106]. Even the powers for "the execution
of any work which under the scheme or this part of this Act are to be
executed by a local authority" 1107] were rarely used in practice.
The private sector was expected to carry out actual development in
England. Default powers were given to the authorities in cases where
the landowner or other person did not himself carry out any erection
or alteration of any building [108]. However, very little use was
made of these provisions.
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4.	 Development Control Under the 1921 Ordinance [109]
Development control was the second measure which, together with
a scheme, aimed at securing "proper development" as described above.
In the context of the newly established Mandatory government and its
desire to introduce law and order, the control of building operations
was in itself an important objective. The geographical ambit of this
control was determined by the declaration of "Town Planning Areas".
From the date of constitution of such Areas, no person was allowed to
carry out development operations, as defined in the Ordinance, in
relation to streets, buildings and other structures unless a planning
permit was first obtained from the local commission [110]. This did
not apply to development by central government [111]. The Ordinance
proceeded to state that from the date at which a scheme first came
into force no permission "shall be granted by the local commission
unless the work contemplated fulfills the requirements of the
scheme" [112].
Consequently, from the date of the declaration until the
introduction of a binding scheme, planning permission could be
granted subject only to rules and by-laws in force, since no
provision was made for interim development [113].
Once the scheme became binding, development control was to be
used in accordance with the scheme to secure its implementation. This
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meant the licencing and enforcement powers which were operated by the
local commission. The obligation to adhere to provisions of the
scheme as required by the Ordinance limited the discretion of the
authorities in dealing with planning applications.
The term "building operations" covered the layout and
construction, as well as an attempt at such, in relation to streets
and It included the erection, demolition, reconstruction, alteration,
addition or structural repair of buildings Lu L ]. Development control
did not, however, cover the use to which land and buildings were
put.
A refusal of planning permission could be appealed to the
central commission [115]. Apart from its appelate role, the central
commission could also deal with planning applications at first
instance if two members of the local commission so required [116]. In
both cases the central commission had the final word LilY] except, of
course, in cases where the courts exercised their review powers.
Law enforcement was another aspect of the local commissions'
duties. They were empowered to carry out the necessary work such as
removal, alteration or demolition of any building In order to make it
comply with the provisions of the scheme [118]. They could also
execute any work which was the duty of a private individual when a
delay in the execution of the word "would prejudice the efficient
operation of the scheme" [119].
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Characteristic to the Mandatory regime, the enforcement of the
law was secured by regarding any contravention of the scheme's
provisions as a criminal offence. On conviction, a fine could be
imposed, in addition to the mandatory demolition of the unauthorised
structure [120].
On the whole the control powers of the Mandate were much more
extensive than those allowed by English legislation. The 1909 and
1919 Acts, apart from requiring that work should be in compliance
with the scheme's provisions, did not set up any machinery for the
sanctioning of building operations via a permit system.
Nonetheless, development control under the system in Palestine
was not at that time an exceptionally stringent measure. It did not
make any dramatic changes in the legal position, since building
permits had also been required under Ottoman Rule. It fulfilled the
functions which were regulated in Britain under Public Health
legislation and building by—laws; namely the imposition of elementary
building standards. In addition, it was applied only gradually with
the declaration of Town Planning Areas. It did, however, give the
authorities the feeling that they had the power to create rather than
merely regulate existing property rights. This last point is
elaborated further in the following paragraph.
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5.	 Rights of the Individual Landowner and 1kblic Participation
Under the 1921 Ordinance
As described above, the effects of statutory planning on the
rights of the individual landowner in relation to his property could
be dramatic. It could lead to the expropriation of land without
compensation 1121], or could at least make considerable changes in
existing property rights or delimit development rights previously
undefined. It could impose restrictions on land use and subject the
land to development control by means of a licencing process and
criminal sanctions. It could also impose	 taxes	 and	 certain
infrastructure payments. Planning powers allowed the government to
make fundamental changes in property rights of individuals and
consequently alter the balance between private and public interests.
Yet the actual involvement of individuals whose rights could be
affected by such measures was kept to a minimum.
At the scheme preparation stage, individual involvement was
limited to airing objections to a draft scheme already prepared by
the authorities. The fact that the right to object was accorded not
only to landowners but to "any persons interested as owner or
otherwise in land affected by the schemes" [122] did not compensate
for the fact that these objections were heard at a rather late stage
in the scheme's preparation. The consideration of these objections
and the final decision was in the hands of the central government
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which had actually prepared the scheme. In effect, the provision for
objections merely allowed interested persons to let off steam without
giving them any substantial powers in the decision making process.
Financial matters resulting from the scheme's
	 provisions
(namely compensation for expropriation and planning blight, payment
of betterment tax, etc.) were open to negotiation between the
authorities and the individual, subject to the provisions of the
Ordinance. When disputes regarding these financial aspects of'
planning arose the only right of the individual was to demand
arbitration. The arbitrator was at the time appointed by the
authorities [123].
The requirement to seek planning permission before carrying out
any development vested the power of such decisions totally in the
hands of the authorities. The only right preserved to the interested
party was to appeal to a higher body within the planning
administration L12].
In comparison with the then English system, the Mandatory
Ordinance showed a marked bias towards the administration. The
English law emphasised the need to take account of the private
interests concerned, as illustrated by sec. 56(2) of the 1919 Act
which stated:
"Provisions shall be made by those regulations: (a) for
securing co-operation on the part of the local authority with
the owners and other persons interested in the land proposed to
be Included in the scheme at every stage of the proceedings, by
means of conferences and such other means as may be provided by
the regulations;"
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The regulations [125] prepared under this Act included no less
than six separate occasions when an owner could state his case.
Moreover, there were eight separate occasions when notices of a
scheme had to be published with days or weeks to elapse after each
publication [126]. The safeguarding of private rights proved to be so
lengthy and cumbersome a process that Ashworth commented: "the result
was a labyrinthine procedure in which any scheme might well be lost
for ever and which was likely to make town planning appear to all but
the most enthusiastic a task involving efforts much more than
commensurated with the advantages which it might procure" [127]. Some
of these safeguards were revoked by the 1919 Act in order to simplify
the process of plan preparation. Nevertheless, the "co-operation
principle" and securing of property rights remained, at least in
theory, as fundamental as before.
The Mandatory Ordinance on the other hand, although it did not
ignore existing property rights [128], emphasised the superiority of
the public good as determined by the central government. The
individual had a much less influential role in the process of
statutory planning.
In view of the discretion given to the central commission in
the preparation of statutory schemes where and when it wished, the
omission of a provision giving the public an opportunity to demand
the preparation, adoption or modification of such schemes was
striking. Under English law [129] the public could submit
representations and participate in public local inquiries when it
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wanted the Minister to order the responsible authority to prepare a
scheme, adopt a scheme proposed by owners or modify an existing
scheme. Such rights of the public were in opposition to the attitude
of the Mandatory government. It could not allow such rights against
an agent of the central government (the central commission) and the
English provision was not adopted.
It is only fair to point out that as a whole this Ordinance was
far from being another "Turkish despotism". On the other hand, it did




B.	 STATUTORY PLANNING IN ACTION DURING THE FIRST STAGE
The first stage of formal statutory planning in Palestine began
with the coming into force of the 1921 Ordinance and lasted until the
reforms introduced by the 1936 Ordinance. The 1921 Ordinance was set
into operation immediately after its enactment.
	 The central
commission was constituted and held its first meeting only two days
after the law had been published 1130]. The commission was composed
of senior British officials, including the Civil Secretary (as
chairman), the Treasurer, the Attorney General, the Director of
Public Works, the Director of Public Health and the Civic Advisor,
Ashbee. It also included two local leaders representing the Arab and
Jewish communities 1131]. In later years the chairmanship of the
commission passed to the Attorney General, who held it for no less
than seven years [132], and representatives of the Survey and the
Antiquities Departments also became members [133]. A British town
planner, Clifford Holliday, who succeeded Ashbee as Civic Advisor in
the Pro-Jerusalem Society in 1922, also served as a member and
advisor to the commission on planning matters 113I]. Apart from the
central commission, no government institution was established for the
carrying out of the technical aspect of plan preparation [135].
The most important planning authority in the country was thus
ill-equipped in terms of technical personnel. Further, a lawyer and
not an administrator or planner was its chairman in the early years.
The reasons for this appointment, in our view, are related to the
prevailing legalistic orientation of town planning systems. As
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mentioned above, planning was first and foremost a means for ensuring
law and order. Positive planning was considered by the government to
be a minor part of the work of the commission. It was clear that for
the tasks of formulating rules and by-laws, considering objections to
schemes and supervising the imposition of this regulatory law, the
appointment of a lawyer would be most appropriate.
At first planning activities were concentrated in the main
cities. Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa and Nablus were declared Town
Planning Areas [136]. Local commissions were
	 constituted	 and
statutory schemes were gradually prepared and approved. In the
following years other Areas covering the main towns of Palestine were
declared and by 1929 there were eleven Town Planning Areas [137].
Schemes were gradually prepared, largely as a result of local
initiative, usually by the local commissions or individual landowners
[138]. It became evident that the central commission which was
formally in charge of scheme preparation could not prepare on its own
the scheme for each local area. The commission thus concentrated on
supervising and co-ordinating the planning activities of the various
areas. It dealt with the proposed schemes and objections to such
schemes and made recommendations to the High Commissioner who then
made the final decision. The commission was also active in preparing
procedural rules and model building by-laws [139]. In the period
1921-1929 it held fifty-five meetings, an average of 6 meetings a
year. About fifty schemes for the main urban areas were approved.
During the years 1930-1936 the Central Commission, responding
to the increase in urban population and development activity, was
- 92 -
considerably busier. It held 76 meetings and discussed 1313 items, of
which 69L were related to statutory schemes (both outline and
detailed), and the declaration or modification of Town Planning Areas
[lkOJ. Three new Town Planning Areas were declared during this
period, making a total of 114 Areas by 1936 [1141]. Many parts of the
Areas were covered by detailed schemes and outline schemes were
gradually prepared to provide an overall view of the
	 future
development of these Areas [1142].
This is a remarkable achievement, especially when compared with
the slow implementation of the counterpart legislation in England.
The first planning laws in England were, from the aspect of plan
preparation, a failure [1143]. Under the English 1909 Act, only 13
schemes were formally submitted [1414] out of an authorised 172
schemes, and only a few of these were actually implemented in the
first ten years up to 1919. In order to promote the preparation of
schemes, the 1919 Act laid a statutory duty to prepare schemes upon
local authorities above a certain size. This Act was unsuccessful in
effecting a real change in the preparation of schemes. In fact the
deadline of 1926 for schemes to be submitted had to be extended [1145]
and little progress was made during the twenties. By 1928 there were
In England 98 out of a total of 262 urban authorities which had not
submitted any proposal, in spite of the duty laid down by the law
[146). More than twenty years after the first English planning law
had been enacted only 38 schemes had been approved covering only
57,897 acres [1147].
A short while after the 1921 Ordinance had been put into effect
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it encountered criticism from various sections, including complaints
that the system was complicated and unworkable. On these complaints
Ashbee commented: "there is much of real truth in them. Laws and
Ordinances that are suitable to western cities, and partly because of
the way in which their citizens observe and administer them, may not
be suitable to eastern cities or it may be a very long time before
they are" [148]. Was this a cynic al —colonial attitude or a genuine
criticism of a maladjusted system?
1.	 Town Planning (Pmendment) Ordinances 1922 [149]
The first amendment to the 1921 Ordinance related to four
articles and dealt with the machinery of planning, the recovery of
the betterment tax, and the enforcement of the law.
The first provision stated that the president of the
municipality should serve as chairman of the local commission in the
absence of the District Governor [150] or his deputy.
Although the status of the municipalities was raised by this
provision, putting the local elected member of this commission in
third place in the hierarchy of the commission, before other British
officials, it was in fact a minor change applicable only in special
circumstances.
The second provision enabled the local commission to delegate
its powers of granting planning permission to a sub—committee of
three of its members [151]. It also elaborated the powers of the
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commission to impose such conditions and limitations as it thought
fit on the granting of permits [152]. This could make development
control more efficient.
The third provision dealt with the recovery of the betterment
tax. It was aimed at overcoming the difficulties in implementing the
existing law by providing that the money be paid 	 to	 the
municipalities in four annual installments. It also provided for the
setting off of payments of this tax against compensation for
expropriation.
The fourth provision was related to the enforcement of
jurisdiction over of fences under the law. It vested jurisdiction over
offences under the Town Planning Ordinance in line with the
reorganisation of the courts which took place after the 1921
Ordinance had been passed.
2.	 Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 1929 [153]
After five years the Town Planning Ordinance of 1921 was again
subject to examination; some further amendments were considered [15k]
and in 1929 an amending law was introduced.
Compared with the first amendment, this Ordinance made more
fundamental changes in the principal law. Yet it still related to
planning techniques rather than to principles. It marked the
acceptance of some practices which had been developed in the previous
years of implementation of the law. The main innovations were: (1)
- 95 -
decentralisation of scheme-preparation; (2) revision of statutory
schemes and the establishment of two new types of scheme - outline
and detailed - which replaced the single scheme of earlier
legislation; (3) making obligatory the preparation of an outline
scheme; () introduction of interim development provisions; (5)
changing some provisions for expropriation.
a.	 The Local Institutions and the Planning Machinery
The changes introduced by these amending laws may appear
trivial; however they conceal a fundamental debate on the
relationship between the Mandatory central government and the local
institutions. From the outset, both the Jewish and Arab local
communities had demanded participation in the government of the
country. Though the British wished to keep to themselves the main
governmental powers, they realised that co-operation with the local
institutions was crucial for effective government in Palestine. The
colonial method of indirect rule was thus employed in many spheres of
administration, including municipal affairs and town planning.
The history behind these amending laws greatly helps in the
understanding of the changes they made in the statutory planning
system, and it is worth describing in brief the events leading up to
these laws.
Most of the complaints against the principal law were directed
towards the cumbersome process of dealing with planning applications
and the domination of central government over the planning process.
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In a meeting held in 1922 between government officials and the mayors
of the main cities, the latter raised these issues, particularly
pressing for more involvement of local authorities in the planning
process 1155].
As a result of this meeting a Town Planning (Amendment)
Ordinance was drafted [156]. The draft included, 	 inter alia,	 a
provision allowing planning applications to be dealt with by a
sub-committee of a local commission, chaired by the president of the
municipality. This suggestion was opposed by some British officials
when it was discussed by the Advisory Council [157]. The Assistant
Governor of Jerusalem, H.C. Luke, had this to say: "The town planning
commission acted as a sort of aesthetic court of appeal against the
Mayor and members of the municipality, especially in districts like
Jerusalem where there were a number of zones and where	 for
archaeological, aesthetical and other reasons considerable experience
was necessary if building permits were to be granted" [158].
This illustrates a common paternalistic attitude amongst
British officials who felt that the local people were not capable of
making what they regarded as proper decisions on planning matters. On
the other hand, British officials at that discussion stressed the
importance of maintaining close collaboration in the planning process
between the local commissions and the municipalities [159]. It was
understood that the local institutions were essential for the
implementation of the decisions made by the planning institutions.
This twofold attitude reflected the British colonial method of
indirect rule [160].
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As mentioned, the proposal to appoint local mayors as chairmen
of sub—committees for building permits was not made obligatory. The
creation of such bodies and the power to make these appointments were
made possible, but were left to the discretion of each British
District Governor in his capacity as chairman of the local planning
commission. Nevertheless, the tendency to increase the powers of
local authorities was developed in the 1929 Ordinance and subsequent
legislation, yet never at the expense of control by the British
officials.
The 1929 Ordinance provided a new division of tasks between the
tiers of planning institutions. Since the burden of preparing local
schemes for the entire country had been too much for the central
commission, schemes were prepared and submitted by local commissions,
or even the landowners themselves. This practice was regularised
under the 1929 Ordinance which gave formal recognition to the changed
relationship between the central and local commissions.
As a result of the 1929 amending law, the local planning
commissions, and in turn the local institutions, improved their
status within the planning machinery. Their functions were extended
to include the initiation and preparation of statutory schemes and
they became the first bodies to deal with draft schemes prepared by
private landowners.
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However, the central commission retained its functions of
supervising and co-ordinating schemes inter se.	 This ensured
conformity of schemes with central government policies. Final control
over statutory schemes remained with the High Commissioner himself as
the highest planning authority, though he normally acted on the
recommendation of the central commission.
It is worth stressing the fact that although the	 1929
(Amendment) Ordinance introduced a functional reform of the existing
planning machinery, a more comprehensive reform of the composition
and organisation of the planning institutions had to wait for the
consideration of the structure of local government as a whole.
b.	 Two Categories of Statutory Schemes
The second change introduced by the 1929 Ordinance related to
the form of statutory schemes. The 1929 Ordinance adopted the
practice which had been developed in Jerusalem some years earlier.
Two categories of schemes were introduced, outline and detailed,
making planning techniques in Palestine more sophisticated. The two
types of schemes formed a two-tier structure. The outline scheme
formed the higher tier and was aimed at providing a general framework
for the development of an entire town; the detailed scheme formed the
lower tier and filled in a number of particulars relating to the
plots included in it. However, many questions regarding the
relationship between the two schemes had no explicit explanation in
the 1929 Ordinance. It was not clear which scheme prevailed if there
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was conflict between them; nor was it certain to which scheme the law
referred in the articles of the principal Ordinance of 1921. Apart
from this structural change, the format of the new schemes was not
changed and remained map—based with a written report and a proposal
for new bye—laws when required.
As for the content of the schemes, the 1929 Ordinance did not
make any radical changes. It mainly rearranged the list of subject
matters of the 1921 Ordinance into two groups, one for each new type
of scheme. The outline scheme included matters of some degree of
generality, while the detailed scheme included more specific issues
which elaborated on the general provisions of the outline scheme.
One result of this reorganisation was additional emphasis on
the physical land use aspect of town planning and a weakening in the
tendency to include social considerations In planning. In addition,
while the financial and managerial aspects of planning implementation
remained within the scope of the new schemes, they were also weakened
by the extended part given to, and stronger emphasis placed on,
regulatory planning. The new schemes were made more rigid than the
single scheme under the original law through the omission of a catch
all clause, which allowed the inclusion of matters other than those
listed in the Ordinance.
In prescribing the content and form of the new schemes, the
Mandatory legislator was influenced by the English Town Planning Act
1925 and the then Town Planning Regulations in force.
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A. The (Xitline Sche.e:	 This seems to have been designed to
cover the whole territory of each Town Planning Area. Its preparation
was made obligatory and had to be carried out by each local
commission. This duty was imposed in line with a similar obligation
existing under the English law. In Palestine, however, the duty
applied to any town, large or small, which was declared a Town
Planning Area and covered built up as well as undeveloped land.
Another difference was that in Palestine no time limit was imposed
for the submission of' such schemes, but within a period prescribed by
the central commission [161].
The Amendment Ordinance, although it did not include any
definition of outline schemes, stated the purposes and the matters to
be dealt with by such schemes. The prescribed objectives were based
on those mentioned for a town planning scheme under the English law.
Its provisions for schemes were to be directed towards "securing
proper conditions of health sanitation and communication and amenity
and convenience in connection with the laying out and use of the
land". This again strongly emphasised physical land use planning.
The content of the outline scheme was to include zoning as a
prime method of regulating land use, infrastructure such as roads,
drainage and water supply and general rules as to the erection of new
buildings. These matters were to be dealt with broadly from the point
of view of the entire area, as the word outline suggested. The
content of this scheme resembled an English "preliminary statement"
of the proposed scheme which had to be submitted under the English
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Regulations. The difference was that while in England the outlines of
the scheme were submitted to the Minister prior to the submission of
the full draft scheme, in Palestine the outlines themselves were made
the subject of a separate scheme in the new two tier structure.
B. The Detailed Scheme This aimed at dealing with small areas
at some depth. As it covered only part of each Town Planning Area, it
is appropriate to talk of several detailed schemes and one outline
scheme relating to each Town Planning Area [160]. The preparation of
a detailed scheme was usually made at the local commission's
discretion [1611, although the central commission had the power to
require the preparation of such schemes in certain circumstances
[162]. A particular power was adopted from the English law, which was
to require the preparation of a scheme for the preservation of any
area or building with a special archaeological interest or natural
beauty [163].
The content of a detailed scheme was based on the full list of
matters which first appeared in the 1921 Ordinance and on matters
which appeared in the English law. All the matters which were subject
to an outline scheme had to be dealt with in a detailed scheme [16k].
It could also deal solely with particulars such as the rearrangement
of building plots of land, the use of plot including the assignment
of land for public purposes, the allocation of powers, and some
financial resources for the implementation of the scheme. It could
also deal with aesthetic control of building design and provide for
the conservation of areas, buildings or trees of special interest. In
addition, the detailed scheme could include provisions as to
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abolition and reconstruction of overcrowded and congested areas
[165].
c.	 Interim Development Provisions
This was the third change made in planning law by the 1929
Ordinance. The introduction of provisions empowering the central
commission to regulate interim development was of considerable
importance. Although such provisions existed in English legislation
since 1919 [166], in Palestine they were not introduced until the
reform of 1929 [167]. Under	 earlier	 Ordinances,	 development
activities during the preparation of a statutory scheme could proceed
without restriction, save for the need to obtain a planning permit.
It is doubtful whether the authorities had any power to prevent
development from taking place, even if it were prejudicial to a
proposed scheme, so long as it fulfilled the requirements of the
existing by-laws and rules.
The innovation of the 1929 Ordinance was that the central
commission could prescribe conditions and restrictions regarding the
granting of a permit for development within an area affected by a
proposed scheme. After a proposed scheme was deposited, the general
rule was that no planning permit would be granted unless the central
commission so authorised. The wording of these provisions emphasised
the negative aspect of control of development in the interim period
of plan preparation. In England the corresponding provision had more
positive implications in which the permission to carry out interim
development work was aimed primarily at ensuring the entitlement of
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the developer to compensation if the scheme, as finally approved,
conflicted with this development [168].
Under both the English and
	 Palestinian	 laws,	 interim
development provisions which conferred more discretion on the
authorities produced, on the one hand, a more flexible system, but on
the other it gradually created a greater dependency on the
bureaucratic machinery. This was particularly true in Palestine where
a licencing system was applied to control development activities
[169]. The interim development provisions enabled the officials to
exercise even greater control over development at the various stages
of plan preparation.
d.	 Rearrangement of Expropriation Provisions
The 1929 Amending Ordinance unified the procedures for the
expropriation of land under planning law with provision regarding the
expropriation of land for public purposes [170].
This substantial provision which was added to the final draft
of the 1929 Ordinance [171] prescribed the proportion of land which
could be expropriated without compensation for the construction of
public roads as one quarter of one plot. This changed the provision
of the 1921 Ordinance which gave excessive power to take an undefined
part of land for road construction. Obviously this provision was too
wide and required limitation.
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In a similar vein, the limitation in the 1929 Ordinance on the
amount of compensation payable for expropriation of land was
considered inequitable in view of the great increase in the value of
urban land around the principal towns. It was therefore abolished
[172].
These two changes marked a move towards a more liberal attitude
in regard to the rights of the individual landowner whose land was
required for public purposes. They replaced the Ottoman legacy which
had dominated the approach to these matters in 1921. On the other
hand, the new provision regarding expropriation of land without
compensation remained a radical tool by any English or Eiropean
standard. The 1929 Ordinance went even further and repealed the
preconditions for the use of this power. It thus provided the
authorities with a powerful tool for securing land for a road
network. This was at the expense of private landowners and was due to
the nature of the existing regime and the tradition of the previous
rule that such powers could be exercised in Palestine.
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C.	 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PALESTINE DURING THE FIRST STAGE
The enthusiastic implementation of planning law in Palestine
was closely connected with the operation of the development market.
With the exception of the strikes in 1921 and 1929, this was a period
of relative political calm, enabling Palestine to undergo a degree of
progressive development under the successive High Commissioners,
Samuel and Plumer.
1.	 Development by the Government
The newly established civil administration gave priority to the
essential activities of a state; namely, the maintenance of public
security, the administration of justice and the establishment of
sound finance. Other activities were in the areas of health,
education, agriculture, trade and communications. The government
rapidly completed several major development projects and signs of
improvement could be seen in many aspects of life. The Department of
Public Works constructed and repaired roads, railways, bridges and
water pipes. Postal, telephone
	 and	 telegraph	 services	 were
established. The Department of Health made improvements in medical
care, sanitation and drainage, Land registries were reopened and
reorganised, enabling land transactions to take place [173].
However, physical and economic development was not an objective
per se of the government. Development was the concern of the
government mainly in so far as it advanced British interests and the
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governing of the country. Imperial strategy [l7J4], internal security
and administrative convenience were the main considerations in
carrying out development projects.
Thus, a strategic harbour in Haifa was planned, a transport
junction in Lydda constructed and administrative centres established
in Jerusalem, Beer Sheba, Gaza and Ramleh. Britain, as the Mandatory
power, had been charged with a special duty regarding the development
of the country. Article 2 of the Mandate stated [175):
"The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country
under such political, administrative and economic conditions as
will secure th establishment of the Jewish National Home, as
laid down j.n the preamble and the development of self governing
institutions and also for safeguarding the civil and religious
rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine irrrespective of
race and religion".
Article 11 gave the Mandatory "full power to provide for public
ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the
country or of the public works, services and utilities
established or to be established therein ..."
However the British government, on the advice of the Chancellor
of the Exchequer, rejected the implementation of the Hope-Simpson
Report 1176] which recommended substantial British investment in the
development of the land. For example, he estimated that 6-8 million
pounds sterling would be needed for the settlement of 10,000 Arab and
20,000 Jewish families.
Despite the early improvements made, the administration of
Palestine actually spent very little on physical development. Between
1930 and 1936 the central and local authorities spent 'I million
pounds on buildings, roads, bridges and water supplies. This figure,
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which includes the expenses of the military authorities, was less
than one seventh of the sum invested by the private sector in
development. The government did very little to alleviate the shortage
of housing and the poor living conditions which were widespread
throughout the congested cities, particularly among the Arabs. Public
buildings such as schools, hospitals and government buildings were
inadequate throughout the country. Even government offices were
houses in rented buildings which had been constructed for other
purposes. An exception were the new buildings for police stations. As
one study commented: "The contrast between the numerous and spacious
modern police stations and the lack of facilities for other and more
constructive purposes reflects the primary interest of the
Government" [178.
The most that can be said of the administration's policy of
that time is that it usually permitted local Zionists and
particularly the Jewish organisations to carry out development
activities, though it did not stimulate nor encourage them. This
passivity was due both to a policy of laissez—faire resulting from a
lack of financial resources and even more to uneasiness or opposition
to the idea of a Jewish State. Many influential officials in
Palestine came to believe that in circumstances of strong Arab
hostility, the implementation of the Balfour Declaration would be a
dangerous and costly mistake. However they could not ignore the fact
that the British presence in Palestine was strongly linked to its
obligation to the development of a Jewish National Home. Their
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attitude was ambiguous enough, therefore, that at most it could cause
a delay in the development of the country to postpone the
establishment of a Jewish State, but could not prevent the Jews
themselves from developing Palestine towards the realisation of their
ideal [179].
One of the most striking instances of the lack of government
help in physical development related to the provision of a most vital
ingredient: land. As successor to the Ottoman regime, the government
of Palestine administered all State land, which consisted of most of
the land of Palestine. However, almost no land was offered for sale
or otherwise made available for local development.
	 Political
considerations dominated this policy, since the
	 pressure	 for
development came mainly from the Jewish sector. State land was
largely left undeveloped and this position of the government remained
unchanged throughout its rule in Palestine, causing great hardship,
particularly with the resulting lack of housing.
Local investment was insufficient to cope with the growing
demand for building for various purposes, particularly residential
housing. This resulted both in a sharp rise in land prices,
construction costs and rents, especially in the main cities, and also
in overcrowding and poor quality housing.
The rapid development of new neighbourhoods, often without any
proper planning, led to further problems of overcrowding and slum
areas. Even sections of Tel Aviv which were only 15 to 20 years old
were found to have inadequate housing facilities. This was due. to
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poor planning, lack of control and poor construction. In the older
cities and towns the problems of old housing, narrow streets and poor
sanitation were even worse, particularly in the Arab sectors. Rural
areas were less congested than the cities but their conditions were
often worse. Jewish villages were generally of better condition than
Arab villages, partly because they were newer and used modern
architecture and techniques. In general, however, housing fell far
below Western European standards.
Speculation in land had been rife and urban land prices rose
sharply during the building boom of the early 1930's. In many cases
the speculative buying up of land resulted in land costs accounting
for 30 percent of total investment cost, compared with the then 10 to
20 percent in Europe. The increase in land cost also led to raising
of rents and created pressure for maximum exploitation of land,
leaving little or nothing for public utilities, parks and other open
spaces. Scarcity of capital meant little was invested in unproductive
construction, which in turn led
	 to	 inadequate housing
	 and
availability of urban areas in general.
This housing problem was neglected by the government and left
to local private initiative and Jewish public bodies. These latter
bodies acquired land mainly around the main cities and provided for
the plans, expenditures and construction of buildings, roads and
water supplies. Sometimes the settlers were organised into
co—operative societies, given freehold of their properties or long
leasehold ''ights. However these initiatives by the Jewish Agency and
other bodies were limited, did not provide low cost urban housing for
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low income workers, and therefore did not solve their housing
problems. In addition, they were restricted to certain areas and
could not solve the problem of the country as a whole 1180].
Nonetheless, the location of the public housing had a long term
significance on the spatial distribution of the Jewish population in
Palestine and subsequently in Israel [181].
2.	 Development by the Local Population
The development of Palestine at this stage was marked by the
continuation of differing trends by Arabs and Jews and the
establishment of' completely separate Arab and Jewish societies,
isolated from one another.
The major Arab national institution was the Supreme Islamic
Council, whose authority was derived from its responsibility towards
the management of the Waquff land. The major Jewish authority was the
Zionist Organisation, which was recognised under the terms of the
Mandate as a Jewish representative institution
	 [182].	 This




During this time, the composition of the country's population
was gradually changed. By the end of 1929 the Jewish population had
grown to about 160,000, twice that of the pre-War population [183].
Its percentage of the total population grew from 9.5 in 1919 to 16.5
in 1929. This resulted in increasing purchase of land by Jewish
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public bodies. The number of Jewish agricultural settlements more
than doubled to 110 and in 1931 their population tripled to 38,000
[184], while new urban areas sprang up with the influx of middle
class immigrants from Eastern Europe.
iXiring the period 1917-1929, Jewish capital amounting to U0
million pounds sterling flowed into Palestine [185]. Some industries
were established and modern agricultural methods introduced. Another
direct result of the influx of immigrants was the dramatic increase
in demand for housing, and the building industry became the most
important factor in the economy of Palestine. In 1925, 43 percent
(7,800) of all Jewish workmen were employed in the building industry.
From 1924-1931 local communities invested 11,500,000 pounds sterling
in the buiding industry. In fact it was this industry which prevented
a major crisis of unemployment during the 1926-1928 depression
[1 86].
In 1929 the disturbances in Palestine led to new restrictions
on Jewish immigration 1187]. The new British policy gave permits to
immigrants according to the country's capacity to absorb them. Such a
vague yardstick naturally gave rise to conflicting opinions and led
to controversy between the administration and the Jewish community.
In 1931 these restrictions were lifted due to worldwide pressure on
Britain. The beginning of the thirties marked a resurgence of Jewish
immigration and development. Under the shadow of Nazism, an
unprecedented influx of immigrants from Germany and Central Europe
entered Palestine between 1933 and 1936. These immigrants numbered
164,000, mostly middle class 1188]. They came from urban centres,
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were self-supporting and brought into the country the sum of
31,570,000 pounds sterling. This volume of immigration and new
capital opened further opportunities for physical and economic




facilities were developed further. Again the building industry
governed by the private sector took the largest share of the total
economic activity. The boom in private building occurred from 1933 to
1935 and reached its peak in 1935, the year of the largest
immigration. Jewish investment in the public and private sectors of
building was over 30 million pounds sterling between 1930-1936.
IXring that same period, investment by the government, municipalities
and army was no more than t million pounds sterling on buildings,
roads and water supplies [189].
The years of the first stage saw the emergence of ideological
differences within the Jewish sector in Palestine. Though most Jewish
activities in physical and economic development, land purchase and
land settlement were centralised under Zionist organisations, the
Jewish private sector grew steadily in these years, directing its
resources mainly towards urban development, commerce and light
industry. There was a growing tendency within the Jewish national
institutions to favour the ideologies of ruralism and collectivism
over urbanism and private initiative. The growing political power of
the Socialist-Zionist parties within the movement did not affect the
decision of most Jewish immigrants to live in urban rather than rural
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areas. It did, however, strongly affect actual development of rural
and urban settlements.	 The implications of this internal
ideological-political conflict to the evolution of town and country
planning in Palestine is further elaborated below.
Major urban projects were implemented during this period, many
of them planned by the architect and town planner Richard Kaufmann.
Kaufmann, a German Jew, was invited as early as 1920 by the Zionist
institutions to prepare plans for new settlements, in order to avoid
a repetition of the mistakes made in the building of the pre-Jar
Jewish settlements [190]. Kaufmann prepared three types of plans in
the 1920's: urban, rural and regional [191]. His plans for urban
settlements were submitted to the planning authorities and after
being approved were implemented in Jerusalem, Haifa and Tiberias.
Kaufmann's plans for the development of three Jewish garden
suburbs in different parts of Jerusalem influenced the method adopted
by the local commission for the statutory planning of the entire
city. It led to the sectional planning of Jerusalem. The city was
divided into eight sections each of different functions. Plans were
gradually prepared for some of these sections with the view that
these plans would form one comprehensive statutory scheme. At the
same time, Azhbee's outline zoning scheme of 1922 and Holliday's 1930
scheme were prepared and used as a guideline for all decisions
relating to development control [192]. This practice of outline and
detailed planning, as seen above, was enshrined in the
	 1929
legislation and became standard for the country as a whole [193].
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It is noteworthy that in those sections of Jerusalem where
planning and building operations were centrally organised,
development control was far more effective than in areas where
development was carried out on an individual basis. In the organised
neighbourhoods, restrictive covenants were also imposed upon the
landowners and developers, thus ensuring their conformity to the
approved plan. In practice, local committees had effective control
over development, in addition to the statutory bodies [19L1].
Richard Kaufmann also had the unique opportunity of planning an
entire new town called Afula in the Jezreel Valley. This town was
planned as an intermediate urban center surrounded by rural
settlements [195]. The difficulty of forecasting changes in
socio-economic conditions became evident in the planning of this
town. Much necessary information was either unavailable or
unpredictable. In the event this town turned out to be a failure. It
did not serve its purpose, mainly due to the anti-urban attitudes of
the surrounding population which led them to ignore the town and deal
directly with the major urban centres. Afula could not therefore
progress beyond the level of a small settlement [196].
Afula is an exap1e of planning that could not be completed.
Tel Aviv is an excellent example of development without coherent
planning.
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In the 1920's Tel Aviv grew rapidly from a suburb of Jaffa into
a town of over kO,000 inhabitants [197]. This growth was due to the
initiative of middle class private investors. However, because of the
growing antagonism towards urbanism and private initiative, Tel
Aviv's planning and development was, from the outset, neglected by
the Jewish institutions and unco—ordinated development was a major
factor in the town's chaotic expansion. In the words of Kaufmann in
1926, Tel Aviv was "defying all effort to make it conform to a
systematic scheme" [198]. The huge demand for dwellings and other
types of buildings also made it impossible for the planning
authorities to control or direct development.
In 1925 Patrick Geddes made a working trip to Palestine and was
invited by the Zionists to prepare a development plan for Tel Aviv.
He was instructed to plan a town of 100,000 inhabitants, with its own
port, which would also provide the amenities of a garden suburb
1199]. Though Geddes' plan only covered part of the town, it was
submitted to the statutory bodies and approved in 1927 [200]. After
the 1927 scheme, Tel Aviv continued its anarchic development despite
the existence of a statutory scheme. Ironically, Geddes' scheme is
still in force today.
In addition to Tel Aviv itself, other towns in its
neighbourhood and the old villages (Moshavot) on the coastal plain
also developed rapidly during this period, and a second new urban
centre grew in Haifa and the Haifa Bay.
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Jewish settlement in Palestine had begun to show a tendency to
concentrate on the central-coastal plain. This may be said to reflect
on an old rooted tendency to cluster together for security and
convenience. This tendency continued at an accelerated scale during
the new few years and ultimately posed a major planning problem. It
also acted against the Zionist goal of a balanced development of the
country as a whole.
Despite the new type of outline scheme, urban planning in
practice lacked the overall view of the whole town. Schemes expressed
the basic technicalities such as zoning, communications, open spaces,
etc., but did not integrate them into one coherent system of town
life. Planning also lacked the vision of the country as a whole and
no attempt was made to ensure a proper distribution of population and
sources of employment 1201].
In England at the same time the conception of planning as a
wider activity than the design of garden suburbs was recognised by
the Town and Country Planning Act 19j2 [202]. This Act extended its
scope to include built-up as well as undeveloped areas, though in
actual practice this aspect did not differ significantly from that in
Palestine.
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a.	 Rural Planning and Development
Rural settlement in Palestine was the core of the development
activities of the Zionist organisations, both for ideological and
economic reasons. The purchase of large areas in the Jezreel Valley
provided new opportunites for rural settlements. This land required
reclamation, including drainage of malarial swamps and the provision
of water supplies. To achieve this,
	 a development	 project
encompassing 39 settlements was carried out in 1921-1927. A similar
project entailing the draining of swamps on the coastal plain between
Haifa and Tel Aviv led to the establishment of 58 new settlements
between 1926 and 1936 [203]. Jewish rural settlements were both
economic and social experiments [20's]. They were of three types:
collective, co—operative and private. In planning the layout of these
settlements, Kaufmann had to take	 into	 account ideological,
sociological, economic and security factors, as well	 as the
physical—geographical conditions. This led to many different forms of
schemes for various settlements.
The first settlements had been established on every available
and suitable piece of land. These settlements were, in general, in
remote uninhabited and undeveloped rural areas. Since the early
1930's, several villages were established on the coastal plain south
of Tel Aviv, in the Hefer plain and the Sharon region [205]. During
these years land purchase and rural settlement were motivated more by
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considerations of security and convenience than urban settlement. The
main objective in organised rural settlement was to concentrate the
population around existing areas of Jewish settlement, rather than
extend the area of settlement, as was the previous goal [206].
However,	 notwithstanding	 the	 planning	 of	 individual
settlements, the development activities of the Zionist organisations
as a whole were not the result of' a coherent, national or even
regional planning.
Statutory Control Over New Settlements:	 Although the new
Jewish settlements were outside the declared Town Planning Areas and
thus not covered by the 1921 Ordinance, they were nevertheless under
statutory development control. For this very purpose the Mandatory
government revised an old Ottoman law of 1858 (as amended in 1913)
[207). This law forbad the erection of a new village or quarter
without first obtaining a special imperial decree from the Turkish
authorities. A notice which was published in 192k by the government
provided that on the basis of the Ottoman law:
ti Any person or corporation desiring to establish a new village
or quarter outside a town planning area shall first make
application to the British Commission; and submit plans which
shall indicate the site of the village or quarter, the position
of the roads which it is proposed to construct and any system
of drainage or water supply which it is proposed to introduce.
No permanent building and no construction of roads shall be
begun till the approval of the District Commissioner has been
communicated" [193].
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This was another form of country planning through the
restrictive measure of control
	 exercised by the	 District
Administration. The discretion given to the commissioner was wider
than normally given under the Town Planning Ordinance, though it was
exercised only in areas not covered by this Ordinance. With the
increase in the number of declared Town Planning Areas, the
importance of this legal instrument was reduced until it finally
disappeared. Nonetheless it signified 	 the	 intention of the
administration to exercise broad control over development operations
of all types. This control sometimes became an end in itself and
apart from checking the activities of the inhabitants, it did not
provide for any positive planning.
b.	 Regional Planning
The possibilities for regional development by the Zionist
organisations were naturally very limited during the years concerned.
Such operations required first possession or control over large
stretches of land, and administrative and legal powers to make
development effective. The Zionists lacked all of these. Despite
this, a rather rudimentary form of regional planning took place in
the Bay of Haifa, made possible in 1925 with the accumulation of
25,000 acres of land [209).
A drainage scheme was necessary to provide a base for human
settlements and a large scale scheme was prepared by Kaufmann which
provided for several settlements, linked together into a functional
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region. This plan was rejected by the central planning commission,
since the government had its own plans for that area. In order to
exert pressure on the government, the Zionist organisation invited
Patrick Abercombie to prepare a plan for the area, which was
ultimately accepted. This plan provided the basis for the development
of the Haifa Bay, whch included 19 new settlements in the region.
c.	 Physical Development in the Arab Sector
Almost no initiative for urban or rural development was made by
the Arab community, which was generally hostile to Jewish activities,
seeing in them an unwanted progression to the creation of a Jewish
State. However, as private individuals, many Arabs took advantage of
the new opportunities opened up by Jewish development. They created
new villages in the developed coastal plain and while the landowning
class benefited from the increase in value of their land, the masses
enjoyed improved employment opportunities and increased sales with
the development of markets for their agricultural products. The Arab
urban population grew even more rapidly than the rural population,
due to the rise in wages and facilities, and some industrialisation
was introduced into the Arab towns. Between 1931 and	 1937,
approximately 500 new Arab enterprises were registered E210J.
Nonetheless, the disparity in the physical and 	 economic
development of the Arab and Jewish sectors added to the already high
tension and fueled the fires of nationalism. The growth in the Arab
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population from about 600,000 in 1920 to about 900,000 in 1936
increased their socio-economic problems and led to a deterioration in
their physical environment.
Arab opposition to Zionist activities grew through the years,
culminating in the bloody riots of 1929. The disturbances began in
Jerusalem in 1928, where conflicting religious rights over the
Western (Wailing) Wall served as a background to deeper emotional
feelings against the Jewish community. Nearly two hundred Arabs and
Jews were killed and four hundred injured in the 1929 riots.
The investigations into the causes of these riots resulted in
disagreement between the League of Nations and the British
administration as to the responsibility of the Mandatory for these
events 1211]. The Mandate's Commission of the League of Nations
contended, among other things, that Arab discontent was due to
insufficient attention to the social and economic adaptation of this
population to the new conditions created by Jewish activities. They
also charged the administration with neglecting agricultural and
other developments in the Arab sector.
Britain replied by stating its general policy, which was that
the territories under her control must be emancipated as soon as
possible from dependence upon grants-in-aid from the British
Exchequer, and they must be developed on a self-supporting basis if
they were to progress on sound economic lines.
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This statement of policy clarifies much about the British
attitude to planning and development in Palestine, as described
previously.
The government could have alleviated the problems of the Arab
sector by direct positive investment in proper planning, rehousing,
sanitation, recreation, etc. This was rejected because of the cost.
The other method of control was to impose restrictions on the Jewish
sector, which began after the 1929 riots and was expressed in the
British Colonial Secretary's, Lord Passfield's, White Paper of 1930.
Only after this policy was nullified did the major Jewish physical
and economic development of the first half of the 1930's take place.
To sum up, this phase laid firm statutory foundations for town
planning in Palestine. However, the prevailing British policy led to
minimum involvement in positive planning and development. A great
deal of investment and determination were required to make planning a
positive tool for promoting material development and welfare, which
could not be provided solely by local resources. The government was
both reluctant to commit British resources for the development of a
territory for which self-government was envisaged in the long term,
while the economic depression in Britain which began at the end of
the 1920's definitely ruled out British development projects in
Palestine other than for vital strategic interests or mandatory
administration.
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In its political role, town planning remained largely a tool
for governing Palestine and less an organised development process. It
served to ensure law and order in the area of physical development,
particularly in times of political turmoil and
	 inter-communal
Clashes.
For some time statutory planning was used as an instrument in a
general policy of slowing down the pace of development. In line with
other measures such as restriction of Jewish immigration and land
purchase, control of development in urban and rural areas was
tightened up to serve the overall aims of British policy.
The change in this policy came in 1931. It allowed Jewish
economic and physical development activity since it was felt that
economic prosperity, benefiting both the Arab and Jewish communities,
might help ease political tensions. The rapid development which
resulted from this new policy made considerable changes in the
physical and economic structure of urban and rural areas in
Palestine.
Socio-economic progress was part of the statutory planning
system, though local initiative was considered crucial for its
realisation. The challenge was taken up mainly by the Jewish sector
and progress was aided by the use of both official statutory schemes
and non-statutory plans and programmes.
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CHAPTER 5. THE SECOND STAGE OF STATUTORY PLANNING: 19J6_19L8
A.	 TMN PLANNING ORDINANCE 1936 11]
The 1936 Ordinance marked the beginning of the scond stage of
the evolution of statutory planning in Palestine. This Ordinance
repealed the former Ordinances dealing with town planning and
reenacted the law in a consolidated form with some important changes.
This Ordinance remained the principal planning law for nearly thirty
years until the Israeli Planning and Building Law 5725-1965.
The most Important innovations of the 1936 Ordinance were in
the reorganisation of planning administration. The new structure of
the planning machinery was divided into three tiers, as follows:
I. The High Commissioner for Palestine
V
II. District Town Planning and &dlding Commissions
V
III. Local Town Planning and ilding Commissions
With the above structure the Ordinance followed the tendencies
of a) decentralisation of central government planning institutions,
and b) transfer of responsibilities to local elected bodies.
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1.	 Decentralisation of Planning Administration
The reorganisation of planning administration may be understood
better in the context of the general functioning of the Government of
Palestine. The Peel Report of 1937 [2] which examined 	 this
functioning heard evidence of a trend towards departmental government
resulting in over-centralisation. The 	 Report called	 for an
improvement in the relationships between the Departments and the
District Administrations. In this respect, the innovation of the 1936
Ordinance came at exactly the right time. It abolished the central
commission and created aiilding and Town Planning Commissions in
every administrative district [3]. The district commissions were
invested with the powers and functions of the central commission in
relation to their respective districts. They did not include
representatives of the local population but consisted solely of
British officials. The chairman of each commission was the District
Commissioner and other members included a town planner and the
representatives of the Legal, Health and Public Works Departments
[k].
The main tasks of the district commissions were the regulation
of planning and development activities through subordinate
legislation, the consideration and determination of statutory
schemes, the supervision of the functioning of the local commissions
in relation to development control, and the enforcement of the law.
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The High Commissioner remained the highest planning authority
with overall responsibility for statutory schemes,
	 subsidiary
legislation and the general implementation of the law. As the High
Commissioner could not personally exercise most of his control
powers, he was helped by the Government Town Planning Advisor and
other officials to whom he delegated his powers [5]. The High
Commissioner remained the only centralised planning authority after
the abolition of the central commission.
The tendency to decentralisation in planning was in sharp
contrast with the existing departmental government. Planning was
largely locally oriented, with almost no regional or national
conceptions; hence the call for decentralised operation which had the
advantage of having access to firsthand knowledge of the needs of the
local area and its potential regarding planning matters.
While the dispersion of the main planning functions among the
districts may appear to be a regression to a primitive type of
government, in fact a rather sophisticated system was created. The
district town planning commission was not identical with the district
administration, but was a combination of the government departments
with the district administration. These bodies could help ensure that
local circumstances were taken into account in the application of
national departmental policies. Ad additional step towards uniformity
in the operation of the district commissions was the appointment of
the government draftsman and town planning advisor to each of the
three commissions [6].
- 127 -
The fact that no fundamental differences in planning policies
of the various districts could be pointed out [7] shows that this new
structure prevented the development of inconsistencies which could
have followed the abolition of the Central Planning Commission.
2.	 Transfer of Responsibilities to the thcal Elected Bodies
The 1936 Ordinance followed the tendency of local participation
in the planning process by transferring responsibilities to the
municipal councils. The Ordinance provided [9] that in a town
planning area which included a municipal corporation 110], the local
commission would be the municipal council. Thus the fourth tier of
the old structure was amalgamated with the third (the local
commission) 111]. In other areas where no municipality existed [12],
the local commission consisted of seven members, of whom 2 were
non-officials, appointed by the district commission [13].
The tasks of the local commissions remained unchanged. They
were in charge of the preparation of schemes, the operation of
development control, the implementation - in a limited form - of the
schemes, and the enforcement of the law 11k]. Since the tasks of
considering and determining the proposed schemes were given to the
district commissions, the local commissions' functions in this matter
"would seem to be purely consultative or advisory ..." 115].
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The transfer of responsibilities did mark a move away from
paternalistic control over the local population, though it was
limited by the fact that close supervision and control over these
local bodies was secured by the law [16]. The main question was
whether the local institutions had reached a stage where they could
carry out the duties which they were entrusted by the law. It was
clear that most Arab municipalities had many difficulties in
providing municipal services, and even those municipalities including
both Jews and Arabs, such as in Jerusalem and Haifa, had problems of
finance and lack of professional staff. The situation was worse for
Arab rural councils; hence the provision
	
for	 the different
composition of local commissions in rural areas. The legislator had
anticipated problems in scheme preparation by local commissions by
giving the district commissions default powers [17].
Thus despite the greater involvement of local institutions in
the reorgan ised p1 ann ing administration, statutory planning remained
largely in the hands of the central government.
3.	 Structure and Content of Statutory Schemes
The innovations of the 1936 Ordinance concerning	 scheme
preparation were of secondary importance, changes being more
technical than substantial. The existing outline and detailed schemes
were maintained, while the list of matters to be dealt with by each
scheme was revised and enlarged in the light of experience acquired
prior to 1936 [18]. The outline scheme, designed as a framework
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including the most important issues, dealt with general matters of
physical planning. The social and economic implications of town
planning obviously required consideration, but the formation of
explicit normative provisions seems to have been beyond the scope of
the statutory scheme.
Under the reform of 1936, an outline scheme could deal with
additional matters such as assignment of land for open spaces, nature
reserves, airports and burial grounds [19]. Considering the type and
form of such schemes as a map-based plan [20], these additional
details increased the details of the outline scheme, obscuring the
difference between outline and detailed schemes.
The content of the detailed scheme was also enlarged with the
inclusion, among other things, of the allotment of land for
recreation grounds, car parks, airports, slaughter houses and
cemeteries [21]. The inclusion of these forms of land use indicated
needs which had arisen as a result of the rapid development of the
country [22].
A more significant innovation was the introduction of a
parcellation scheme [23]. This was inferior to other types, and could
be prepared only after the coming into force of either an outline or
detailed scheme relating to the concerned area. The parcellation
scheme was aimed at providing a means for the further subdivision of
any individual plot of land. The separation of the issue of
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subdivision from the more general matters of schemes was an attempt
to make the procedure of consideration and approval of detailed
schemes more efficient 12k].
The preparation of a parcellation scheme was generally done at
the discretion of the concerned landowner, although the local
commission could require its preparation and even make it a condition
for the granting of planning permission [25]. In spite of its limited
scope, the parcellation scheme had to pass through a cumbersome
procedure of deposit, publication, consideration of objections and
the approval of the district commission [26]. Apart from being a
burden on the individual applicant, this procedure added to the
numerous duties of the district commission and reduced their ability
to deal with more important planning issues. Nevertheless, the desire
to ensure maximum government control prevented the delegation of such
matters to the local commissions. This is another example of the
colonial attitude which dominated many aspects of statutory planning
in Palestine during the second stage.
Private Property Rights, the Public Interest and the
Planning Administration
Some aspects of the 1936 Ordinance were more liberal towards
the rights of the individual landowner than the first Ordinance of
1921, while others were not as concerned with these rights as was the
English law of 1932 127].
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On the matter of land expropriation, the 1936 Ordinance limited
the postponement of a completion of expropriation to a maximum of 2
years and the four percent ceiling of interest payable during a
postponement was abolished 128].
the other hand, the expropriation of land without
compensation of up to one quarter of any plot was not only maintained
but extended. This power enabled the authorities to expropriate land
not only for public roads but also for recreational areas [29]. The
authority could take ininediate possession even without notifying the
owners [30]. Although the law provided for ex gratia payments in
cases of hardship, such payments were at the discretion of the High
Commissioner if "having regard to all the circumstances of the case
he shall think fit" [31]. This clearly shows the prevailing approach
of the Ordinance in favouring the administration's views regarding
the needs of the country at the expense of the private landowner, an
approach which was in sharp contrast to what McAuslan described as
the "ideology of private property rights" prevailing in the British
planning legislation.
The Supreme Court of Palestine, which was dominated by British
Justices, affirmed the supremacy of the Mandatory administration's
considerations by adopting a line of non—interference with the
executive's wide discretionary powers. However, the court -
particularly when sitting as a High Court of Justice - did help
control the executive and safeguard the rights of landowners. In C.A.
10/39 A.G. V Azari [32], the Court said: "Under any system of town
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planning the liberty of the individual must to some extent be
sacrificed for the benefit of the public and however much one may
symphathise with the objects of town planning on the grounds of
health and amenity, Courts must be careful to see that the safeguards
which the legislature has imposed are observed".
Although the Court refrained from re-examining the planning
aspects of a decision taken by a planning commission, it often
interfered to keep the authorities within the terms of the law,
especially in regard to discretionary powers. A striking example of
this is H.C. 37/39 Keren Kayemet Leisrael Ltd. V District Town
Planning Commission Jerusalem [33]. In this case the District
Commission of Jerusalem approved a detailed scheme submitted by the
petitioner, subject to a condition that the building which may be
erected should be of stone facing and not otherwise. The petitioner
claimed that the commission had no power to impose such condition
since there was no law or by-law in force that stone-faced building
is obligatory in that part of Jerusalem. The Court followed a
principle which was laid down by the English Court of Appeal. It held
that since the existing by-laws allowed concrete as well as stone to
be used for external walls, the commission could not vary its own
by-laws by an ad hoc decision in any particular case. The only way
to make the use of stone compulsory, said the Court, was by amending
the by-laws. Judge Copland ended his judgement by saying:
"I wish to make this quite clear - this Court is not concerned
with the merits or demerits of any particular scheme. We are
not town planning experts. A scheme may be a good one, or it
may offend every aesthetic consideration, - that is no concern
of this Court. But what we are concerned with is that public
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bodies such as the District Commission should exercise very
wide powers strictly in accordance with the law, and not merely
in accordance with what they think is desirable, and that they
do not exceed their legal powers." [3L1]
In the context of private property rights, the 1936 Ordinance
introduced an interesting innovation, which was the power given to
the district commissions to make rules "as to the regulation of the
mutual rights and obligations of adjoining owners, lessees or
occupiers of properties ... in respect of the making, repairing,
maintaining and cleaning of all party walls ... and as to the manner
in which disputes and differences concerning such rights and
obligations should be determined." [35]
Statutory Town Planning trespasses here into the realm of
private property law, whose concern is the rights and obligations of
individuals inter se. The power described above represented an
intrusion into the private property law realm, beyond the recognised
scope of planning in England [36]. It marked an increase in the
powers of planning administration in Palestine to intervene in purely
private property law matters.
The attitude towards landowners' rights in relation to the
planning process was very different when it came to the most powerful
landowners, the religious bodies. These bodies, which had extensive
property rights throughout the Holy Land, had a special procedural
advantage compared with any other landowner. For example, they were
entitled to receive notice of the deposit of any scheme which might
affect their property. The origin of this provision could be found in
the 1921 Ordinance [37], and in 1936 this privilege was extended
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further due to the sensitivity attached to dealing with religious
bodies, especially after the 1929 disturbances. Although this special
arrangement caused many difficulties to the planning authorities,
particularly in places like Jerusalem, a suggestion to limit the
arrangement was rejected. The Attorney General commented on that
suggestion: "Nothing should be done which might disturb these
bodies." [38]
5.	 Positive and Restrictive Tools
for the Implementation of Planning
The 1936 Ordinance followed the tendency of the 1929 Ordinance
in moving from a managerial attitude towards a merely regulatory
stance. The powers and resources for plan implementation were still
matters dealt with by the statutory scheme 139]. However the
important role played by these Ynanagerial aspects in the first
Ordinance were changed in 1936 by a stronger emphasis on the other
aspects of planning.
One reason for this change were the difficulties in ensuring
the financial resources for institutional implementation of schemes.
This problem led one District Commissioner to suggest: "that
provision for betterment tax should be omitted on the grounds that
its collection has been practically impossible hitherto." [O] This
suggestion was not fully accepted, but the problem of collecting this
tax led the legislator to modify the general obligation to collect
betterment tax. The authorities were given a discretionary power to
collect the tax in individual cases [1]. Onviously such a discretion
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could be abused by discriminate implementation. The Attorney General,
on commenting on the exercise of this power, said that the
authorities "may use this discretion as a bargaining lever in cases
of expropriation." [2]
Development control was the task of the new type of local
commission. The district commissions had, however, appelate powers
and in general the 1936 Ordinance did not change the existing
measures for controlling development, although the scope of control
was slightly widened by requiring permission for any structural
internal repairs [t3].
Law enforcement measures under the 1936 Ordinance were more
innovative. In order to combat the growing unauthorised development,
penalties were increased. The courts were also provided with
extensive powers to issue orders for the demolition of unauthorised
structures, not only against the offender but "against any other
person" Lt]. By such extension the offence of unauthorised building
was not yet made in rem but the law extended the liability in
personain.	 This was done to prevent a transfer of ownership
defeating an order for demolition 145].
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B.	 STAT1TORY PLANNING IN ACTION DURING THE SECOND STAGE
The second stage in the evolution of Mandatory statutory
planning began after the reform of 1936 and lasted until after the
Second World War and the withdrawal of the British from Palestine in
1948. Planning as a government activity was considerably improved
during this period due to the appointment of the Town Planning
Advisor, Henry Kendall. Greater interest was shown by the central and
local authorities, as well as by the local public.
The first significant act under the new law was the expansion
of the area covered by planning law. In 1937 the number of declared
Town Planning Areas was doubled from 14 to 28 [46]. This process
continued in 1938 with the establishent of 5 more Areas and the
introduction of a new category of planning area, known locally as
Regional Areas, which covered rural and suburban areas in each
administrative district [48]. By 1948 there were 46 planning areas.
Of these, 24 covered cities and towns, 16 covered areas of local
councils, and in each of the 6 administrative districts a Regional
Area was declared to cover the remaining land 139]. The objective of
bringing the entire area of Palestine under the jurisdiction of
planning law had been achieved.
By the end of the second stage the machinery of district and
local commissions was well established. However, the working of the
planning machinery, particularly in the mixed towns, encountered many
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difficulties concerning statutory schemes due to the civil strife of
1936-39 [9] and the Second World War decelerated the entire process
of planning and development in Palestine.
During 1937-39, despite the disturbances, Haifa, Jerusalem and
to a lesser degree Tel Aviv, were the main areas of plan preparation
activity [50]. Although there was a considerable decrease in building
activities as compared to the boom years, planning institutions were
largely concerned with the consideration of new and amended statutory
schemes, principally for the main cities. In 1937-38 the number of
approved schemes in Haifa, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv actually increased.
184 schemes were considered in the Northern district, 178 in
Jerusalem and 92 in the Southern district.
The above figures include a wide range of schemes, from small
parcellation schemes submitted by individual landowners to amendments
to the outline scheme itself [51]. Not every area was covered by an
outline scheme, however, despite the legal obligation to prepare such
schemes. The intensive scheme preparation was, in the event, no more
than a process of updating old schemes in the light of the
development which had taken place. This process was really the
legalisation of unauthorised buildings. Statutory schemes were
sometimes of such a limited scope and so detailed as to resemble the
current English planning application rather than a development
scheme.
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The newly established Town Planning Department provided some
technical help, mainly to the Arab sector, but even so
	
the
consideration of detailed schemes and the exercise of development
control was often done without an overall view as to future
development.
The explicit provisions of statutory planning remained
predominantly physical, dealing with outward appearances.
The years of the second stage were marked politically by the
British retreat from the policy expressed in the Balfour Declaration
and the Mandate for Palestine. A Royal Commission [52] which was sent
to look into the causes of the Arab rebellion in 1936 recommended a
partition of the land between the two communities, with some
territory under British control. It also recommended restricting
Jewish immigration for five years to a maximum of 12,000 persons a
year. The situation deterioriated after Arab rebellion of 1936-39
which led to the White Paper of 1939 and the imposition of drastic
restrictions on Jewish immigration and Jewish activities in land
purchase and development.
The years between 195-8 were politically the most difficult
of all. Anti-British protest and inter-communal clashes led to
terrible bloodshed. The situation continually worsened and became too
heavy a burden for Britain to bear. This led to the decision to hand
back the Mandate to the United Nations.
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Against this political background, the implementation and
revision of statutory planning can be seen as part of a more
comprehensive policy of attempting to impose law and order on the one
hand, and preventing further imbalance in the development of the
rival communities on the other.
Civil strife affected both the activities of the British
administration	 and	 actual development initiated by
	 local
institutions. The Government of Palestine was mainly preoccupied with
internal security problems. The new planning attitudes which were
then gradually being implemented in Britain 153], i.e. comprehensive
regional master plans [5k], decentralisation of population in new
towns, and so on, were the least of concerns of the government in
Palestine, where law and order were of utmost priority.
As during previous periods of political
	 turmoil,	 the
disturbances during this stage led to a reexamination of various
government tools and policies, of which statutory planning was one of
the most important for ensuring government control. Review of the
system was also made urgent in the light of the criticism of
disorderly building activity, particularly in the City of Jerusalem.
The principal Ordinance of 1936 was amended no less than four
times within five years [55] due to this review. Changes were also
made in the subsidiary legislation. Most of these amendments were
technical and of secondary importance, aiming at curing defects in
the drafting of the principal law [56] or attempting to make the
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operation of planning machinery more efficient. However, the prime
concern of these amendments was the tightening of government control
over development activity throughout
	 Palestine	 and	 providing
authorities with better tools for the enforcement of the law. Parts
of these amending Ordinances were substantive and worth consideration
at this point.
1.	 Town Planning (Pinendment) Ordinance 1938 [57]
This amendment came after six months' experience of the
implementation of the principal law [58] and was influenced by
recommendations made by experts in the Colonial Office in London. As
the explanatory note in the draft stated: "This Ordinance amends the
Town Planning Ordinance 1936 mainly in order to enable the town
planning authorities to exercise tighter control over the appearance
and use of buildings" [59]. The scope of development control was
extended to cover not only building but also use of land and
buildings. The Ordinance also increased the stringency of enforcement
of the law by providing a penalty for continuing offence and giving
power to the court to make any order "as the court seems fit" against
a person convicted of a planning offence or any other person [60].
These new measures only slightly improved enforcement of the
law. In general, local building activities responding to the high
demand for housing and other constructions remained outside any
effective control.
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Soon after the 1938 Ordinance a new amendment to the principal
planning Ordinance was enacted.
2.	 Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 1939 [61]
The main innovations of this
	 dinance related	 to	 the
functioning of planning institutions and marked a further step
towards decentralisation of planning machinery. Under this law,
District Commissions were given the final power of approving detailed
schemes within their districts [62]. The only scheme which now needed
the approval of the High Commissioner was the outline scheme [63].
District commissions - the long arm of the government - were
also given more powers to control the way planning law was
implemented. Under these powers they were able to control the
composition of local commissions in rural areas. The law enabled each
district commission to appoint a panel from which it could, from time
to time, appoint members of the rural local commission to serve for
particular meetings L6LJ. This was in addition to its power of making
permanent appointments. This was explained officially as a necessary
measure for the large regional (rural
—suburban) areas in which
representatives of different settlements could participate whenever
decisions relating to their localities were under consideration [65].
In fact, it is obvious that this power could easily be abused by
changing frequently the members, thus ensuring that the composition
of the local commission was free of members not following the
government line.
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The district commission was also given the discretion to order
that development control should not apply to certain areas, or should
apply subject to modifications [66]. This was explained as being
necessary to loosen the control in regional areas [67]. By law,
however, this discretion was not limited to such areas and enabled
the central government to manipulate the use of control over
development as a governing tool and a cover
	 for political
discrimination throughout Palestine.
Two years after this amending Ordinance, practical experience
led to yet another amendment of the principal Ordinance in l94l.
3.	 Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance l941 [68]
The major part of this Ordinance dealt with the enforcement of
planning law and followed the tendency of increasing control over
land development. As officially explained, the aim of the amendment
was "to increase the still inadequate penalty provisions" [69]. tinder
these provisions 170) court orders for demolition or interim stoppage
of building construction were regarded in rem and not merely in
personam. They also enabled the authorities to apply to the court
to vest with them the power to carry out an order of demolition or
any other relevant order [71].
It should be stressed that this intensive legislative and
administrative effort to combat illegal building activity in
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Palestine was generally fruitless. Development was one of the most
unruly areas of public life in Palestine; the enforcement of the law
was very weak and there was widespread unauthorised building.
This phenomenon had its roots in the political situation in
Palestine and the nature of its government. The Mandatory regime was
at this stage seen by both Arab and Jewish communities as an alien
imposition and an obstacle to the realisation of their respective
national aspirations. The control imposed by this regime on physical
development was seen by the Jews as a hindrance to the absorption of
Jewish immigrants by neglecting the needs of the Jewish community. It
was not surprising that the local Jewish authorities did not
participate wholeheartedly in the enforcement of planning law.
Indeed, they had an ideological justification based on national
interests for violating planning law. Unauthorised building activity,
in their view, was the same as illegal Jewish immigration: both
expressed revolt against the British government. The fact that poor
planning resulted in the deterioration of urban 	 and	 rural
environments was regarded as of secondary importance compared with
the necessity to provide housing and other facilities for the Jewish
population. The attitude and behaviour of Jewish local authorities
can also be explained in relation to their position in the political
power structure of the Jewish community, as described below.
The enforcement of planning law in the Arab . sector was also
very weak. There were often clashes between modern European planning
concepts and Arab traditions, and the Arab community could not see
the immediate advantages of orderly planning, but only the disruption
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it caused to their own methods of development. They were suspicious
of alien methods and their local institutions barely participated in
the enforcement of the law.
The restrictions on private building, imposed by the central
government of' Palestine during the Second World War in order to
satisfy military construction requirements
	 [72],	 were more
effectively carried out because of lack of building material. Thus
private development during this period came to a standstill.
At the same time there was a dramatic increase in investment by
the government and army, leading to the modernisation of the entire
country's road network and infrastructure.
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C.	 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PALESTINE DURING THE SECOND STAGE
Compared with the boom in land development during the early
1930's, most of the years of the second stage were marked by a sharp
drop in local development in Palestine. However, the post-war period
witnessed a rapid revival in the pace of building and land settlement
projects.
1.	 Development by the Government
Towards 1936 the Middle East became even more vital for British
strategic interests due to several events in the international arena
such as Italy's success in the Abyssinian War and Germany's moves in
Europe [73].
The resulting reassessment by the British of the strategic
value of Palestine led to the decision to construct military bases
for stationing the Imperial British Mediterranean reserves in that
country. This also Involved investment in a road network and other
infrastructure, particularly in the central area between Tel Aviv and
Jerusalem.
Paradoxically, Palestine benefited from the Second World War in
that the war resulted in large scale physical and economic
development of the country. All development activity was planned and
carried out by the military and government public works authorities.
It covered a nationwide communication network, airfields, military
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camps and other elements of infrastructure [711]. This development was
implemented without any regard to the statutory planning process
[75], but under special powers given to the authorities under new
laws. The development agencies of the army and the administration
operated according to their special considerations and interests,
presenting faits accomplis in the physical development of
Palestine. In many cases, adjustments of the statutory schemes were
necessary afterwards, but at the time the extensive government
development activities ignored the planning machinery created by the
planning law.
Eiring this stage, civil development was of minimal concern to
the government. Despite the publicity given to its activities in
housing improvements in the Arab sector [76], the administration did
very little to alleviate this problem. In the pre-war period, some 76
families from Jaffa were rehoused by the government and a promise
given to help private housing projects in Haifa with the provision of
access roads, water supply and sanitation.
A more comprehensive planning and development project was
prepared for the Arab villages of Palestine [77] in 19110, after a
directive from the Colonial Secretary and as part of the general
policy of pacifying the Arab population. It was a multi-disciplinary
project, covering themes such as physical
	 planning,	 housing,
sanitation, education, health, agriculture and afforestation. It was
largely funded by the local people themselves, with little
contribution from the government.. In the event it was of such limited
scope that it was of minor importance in the development of Palestine
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and living conditions among Arab villages remained very poor.
Despite its failure, the modern approach of this development
project which comprised many soclo-economic and physical aspects of
rural development was remarkable. It demonstrated the ability of the
administration to prepare a sophisticated scheme to deal with urgent
environmental problems. At the same time, the lack of further
projects of this kind illustrated the	 unwillingness of the
administration to commit itself to any meaningful development of the
country.
2.	 Development by Local Population
Between 1936 and the end of the Second World War approximately
111,000 legal and illegal Jewish immigrants entered Palestine [78].
This was a very small number compared to the number of Jews trying to
escape from Europe. It did, however, lead to a growth of 17.7 percent
in the total Jewish population of Palestine.
In the same period the non-Jewish population grew by 11
percent, largely due to natural increase. By 19148 there were about
1.25 million Arabs and 650,000 Jews in Palestine.
This population growth had a dual effect on land development in
Palestine. While the moderate population increase resulted in
relatively small investment in the building industry, the growth did
increase the demand for housing and put greater pressure on the
existing physical structure.
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In the years 1936-39 the sum invested by the private sector in
physical development did not exceed eleven million pounds sterling
[19]. This low figure compared with investment in the previous stage
reflected a sharp decline in private construction in terms of floor
area. This dropped from 1,214,608 square metres in 1935 to 223,639
square metres in 1 939. Further, from 1 9'0 to 1 91 4 the total floor
area built by the private sector was no more than 386,031 square
metres [80].
The years during the war led to further deterioriation in the
overcrowding and inadequacy of housing in the existing cities. In
19L 2-'t3 poor living conditions among both Arabs and Jews contributed
to an outbreak of bubonic plague in Haifa and in Jaffa, and a typhoid
epidemic in Tel Aviv. In an anti-plague drive many of the makeshift
unauthorised houses were demolished, though they were soon rebuilt
for lack of alternative housing [81].
The White Paper policy of restricting land sale to Jews reduced
the supply of available land. This, together with the wartime
inflation, led to sharp increases in the prices of urban and suburban
land. By 194I the price of land was two and a half times more than
before the war began, and development costs more than trebled due to
an increase of 350 percent in the prices of building materials [82].
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All the above factors hampered an orderly development of urban
areas and promoted further concentration of population in the cities
of Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Haifa, particularly on the central coastal
plan. From a national and regional planning point of view, this posed
a serious problem which, at the time, was neglected by the Jewish
national institutions.
The lone voices expressing concern over this matter were the
few professional planners, among them Eliezer Brutzkus. Brutzkus'
plan for physical planning at national and regional levels was
introduced as early as 1938 [83]. In line with Tischler's plan [514],
the underlying principle of this plan was that the dispersal of the
urban population was the key for the development of the country. In
order to achieve this objective of decentralised land settlement,
Brutzkus emphasised the need to develop new types of small urban
centres and semi-urban settlements throughout the coastal plain and
Jezreel Valley.
The various types of settlement under this plan would have
functional inter-relationships with both the big cities and the small
rural villages. A precondition for the realisation of this plan was
the reconciliation of Zionist-Liberal ideology of a free economy,
private capital and urbanisation, with the rural-collectivist
ideology. In view of the internal political structure within the
Jewish community, in which the Socialist-Zionist parties and their
ideology dominated, such reconciliation was not feasible.
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Thus Brutzkus' ideas, though they were an impressive vision of
modern planning, did not lead to any changes at this stage. The plans
of both Blintzlin and Tischler were not accepted in the pre—State
period by the Jewish central institutions, though they were to
influence the evolution of town planning in the State of Israel.
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D.	 TMN AND COUNTRY PLANNING BILLS 19Lt5 [85], 19'7 [86]
Towards the end of this stage of statutory planning in
Palestine, a new Town Planning Ordinance was in preparation. This was
designed to consolidate and amend the four existing Ordinances and
the numerous sets of by-laws and rules [87]. The proposed law was
first published in the form of a Bill in 195 and, after revision,
was republished as a Bill in 19'7. As these Bills reflected the
perceptions of the post-war period and influenced practice during
these years [88] as well as the future evolution of statutory
planning in Israel, they are worth describing at this point. It
should be stressed, however, that the proposed Ordinance was again
modelled on the English 1932 Act, though with many changes: some of
the most updated post-war English concepts were adapted to meet local
needs [89]. Thus the new drafts not only preceded chronologically the
English Town and Country Planning Act 197, they were also in some
respects more advanced that their English counterpart.
On the surface, the last version of planning legislation in
Palestine, as expressed in the Bill of 19117, was very different from
the first Town Planning Ordinance 1921. It had more parts containing
more sections, and included sophisticated legal definitions.
Nonetheless it remained a very similar tool with similar purposes of
regulation, local orientation and general intent to ensure control by
the Mandatory government over development of the land.
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The most important innovation of the 197 Bill [90] related to
the fiscal aspects of town planning; i.e. imposition of planning
rates. Other important proposals were in regard to planning
administration, statutory schemes and further restrictive measures to
ensure the implementation of schemes by development control and the
enforcement of the law. The Bill also included a uniform set of rules
which previously had been part of scattered subsidiary legislation,
varying from one district to another.
The planning perceptions expressed in the official statutory
system were again in sharp contrast to those of the Jewish sector.
The influence of the ideas of individual planners on the central
Jewish institutions were, after the Second World War, much greater
than before, and by 195 the Jewish Agency had begun preparing plans
and programmes for extensive land development which included a
markedly positive planning approach, in addition to regulative
planning measures. The major document dealing with planning was a
report on physical planning prepared by a sub-committee of the Jewish
Agency [91].
The Report's approach was that of integrated
physical-economic-social planning. It pointed out the basic factors
of a small country with diverse geographical regions, its economic
potential and the social requirements of both the existing population
and the expected waves of immigrants. Planning, concluded the Report,
would ensure optimal utilisation of resources to the benefit of this
growing society. For this, local planning orientation of city, town
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and village was insufficient. Planning required in addition regional
and national perspectives. The Report recommended compulsary planning
organisation at three levels (national, regional and local), together
with three types of plan. The assignment of land for various purposes
was seen as central to these plans: the main categories of land use
were residential, agricultural, industrial, recreation and land for
communications networks. Land assignment was to be carried out
through national policies which were referred to in the Report. These
included the dispersal of the population while creating a hierarchy
of urban and rural settlements, dispersal of industry, a modern
communications network, and recreation areas throughout the country.
Planning legislation was considered an important tool for the
realisation of proper planning and development. However, introduction
of the recommended legislation would have committed the Mandatory
government to the establishment of a Jewish State. A recommendation
to use fiscal legislation to advance planning objectives and urban
speculation in land was also included.
This Report was comprehensive and detailed. Of most importance
were the
	 ideologies and	 perceptions	 which underlay	 its
recommendations. These expressed a marked trend towards involving
representative institutions in the decision making and implementation
processes. With a view of a future Jewish State in mind, the Report
vested the main responsibilities and powers with the democractically
elected government and public administration. The Report also
expressed the central role to be played by rural settlement in the
development of the country, though it also advocated urban
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development asthe major tool for the absorption of new immigrants.
The main housing and construction agencies were to be the
governmental bodies and the public sector, which were preferred to
the private sector. Extensive powers to expropriate land and restrict
private rights were vested in these bodies. Here the anti—private
capital attitude prevailed.
The major Zionist principle in this Report of positive planning
and extensive development should not be disregarded. This Report was
a bridge from the first to the second era of planning under the State
of Israel, which enabled the implementation of planning along the
principles outlined in the Report.
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PART II
STATUTORY TMN AND COUNTRY PLANNING IN ISRAEL 19L8_19809S
Part II deals with the Israeli planning system,
	 paying
particular attention to its statutory branch. From 19 48 to the
1980's, this system underwent an interesting evolutionary process.
While its roots were in the Mandatory period, it developed into a
particularly Israeli product. bviously the revolutionary changes
experienced by the country since independence affected the structure
and content of its planning system and the way it was implemented. Of
particular importance to this analysis are
	 four groups of
contributing	 factors:	 physical—geographical,	 socio—economic,
p01 itical—admin istr ative and defence •
	 Their	 interaction with
statutory planning is analysed below.
The underlying theme of this part, which is that Israeli
statutory planning, as well as the planning system as a whole, being
a reflection of several ideological and political conflicts, was
designed and used as a tool for social control for the following:
1. To help the central government assume authority and control
over local authorities and populations.
2. To help the Ministry of the Interior gain status and power in
its relationship with the economic ministries as well as over
local authorities.
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3.	 To help local authorities wield power over their respective
populations for political and financial gain.
24•	 To help non—institutional organisations and individuals pursue
their factional and private interests.
The period under consideration covers about 35 years of Israeli
Statehood. This period is divided into two: 1948-1965 and
1965-1980's.. The year 1965, which saw the introduction of new Israeli
planning legislation repealing the old law, is the turning point in
the system.
Since independence of the State of Israel, the English planning
system was, to a limited degree, the model for the Israeli system.
Some of the developments in the English system which to a great
extent correspond, by coincidence, with the two stages of development
in Israel, may help evaluate the Israeli system and are referred to
below. There were and are, of course, still tremendous differences
between the two countries in respect of territory, population, level
of development and the nature of problems. Yet the planning systems
share many common characteristics which enable, if not a full
comparison, at least a glimpse into the machinery and the policies of
the English system as a means of evaluating the solutions offered in
Israel. It should be stressed, however, that there is no
universitality in the evolutionary stages of the planning laws in the
two countries. Furthermore, it is obvious that the mcmentum of past
events and the diversity of social, physical and economic structures,
have led to different paths of statutory development.
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CHAPTER 6. THE NEED FOR TOWN PLANNING AND FACTORS AFFECTING ITS
EVOLUTION
The new physical, political, soclo—economic, administrative and
legal circumstances prevailing in 198, when the State of Israel was
established, provided the setting
	 for the
	 introduction	 and
implementation of the Israeli planning system. A short description of
these circumstances is perhaps necessary for their relevance to an
analysis of the evolution of the planning system.
By the end of the War of Independence, Israel's territory
comprised only 21,000 square kilometres. This area covered most of
the territory of Mandatory Palestine to the west of the Jordan River,
excluding the central areas of Judea and Samaria.
The new boundaries created, amongst other things, new planning
problems. The narrow coastal plain, where most of the Jewish
population was concentrated, had become extremely close to the new
frontier. At its narrowest point, the border was no more than 15
kilometres from the sea. Tel Aviv was in easy firing range from the
hills of Samaria.
Jerusalem, the capital, was a divided city. Eleven percent of
Israel's population lived in the Israeli section, while only a
narrow, hilly corridor linked the capital and the centre of the
country. Very few Jewish settlements existed in the relatively remote
zones near the demarcation lines.
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In the southern half, the Negev formed a triangle of which the
apex was only 5 kiloinetres (3 miles) wide, on the shores of the Red
Sea. Egypt lay on one side of this apex and Jordan on the other. The
Negev was almost entirely unpopulated and had few roads. New Jewish
settlements had to be established in order to control the area
effectively. The same applied to the northern area, where the
desolated hills of the Galilee had little Jewish population and
contained mainly Arab villages [1].
These new geopolitical conditions added to the diversity of the
geographical regions, climatic conditions, vegetation zones and the
scarcity of natural resources (particularly arable land and water) as
described in Part I of this work.
The accumulated effect of all the conditions, combined with the
realisation since the war that
	 settlement ensures control,
contributed to the formulation of Israel's main planning policy. This
was to support the defence and security needs of Israel by maximal
deployment of new Jewish settlements in the zones near the armistice
lines and the scarcely populated areas. This policy advocated a
balanced development, rather than an exaggerated concentration on a
few urban and rural areas.
Notwithstanding the rapid development of the country up to
19148, on the threshold of its independence it still offered an
enormous challenge in regard to its town and country planning. The
centrally directed processes of populating, urbanising and
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industrialising the newly established state, which began in 19'8, not
only offered ample planning opportunities, but also made vital
rational planning at national, regional and local levels. In fact,
Israel became a laboratory for planning and development experiments.
In 19'8 the local population lived in three main types of
settlements: urban, rural and semi-urban villages [2]. In contrast to
the Arab population [3), the Jews were concentrated in urban
settlements. In 19'1 8, 83.9% of the Jewish population lived in the big
urban centres and only 16.1% in small rural settlements [n]. Any
further growth of the big cities presented a real threat not only to
national security but also to the standard of living of the urban
population. The Barlow Report [5] which pointed out the problems of
the highly congested cities was well accepted by the Israeli planning
profession. Thus the environmental aspects of life in the central
regions added weight to the decision to adopt a population dispersal
policy.
In line with this policy, a hierarchic structure of settlements
was also formulated. As previously mentioned, only the extreme types
of settlement of that hierarchy existed in 198 [6]. Medium and small
size towns outside the coastal area were almost non-existent.
Intermediate ranks of settlements were required in order to diminish
this uneven development. The hierarchy of settlements was intended to
provide a rational utilisation of land resources and an Integrated
development of urban and rural settlements. This became another
policy in the new planning system.
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Important as the physical and geopolitical conditions were to
the formulation and operation of the Israeli town planning system,
the task of absorbing Jewish immigrants had an equal influence on
planning. This became in fact the main means of achieving population
dispersal.
The new circumstances following independence in 19148 allowed
the opening of the country's gates to Jewish immigration. This
enabled the realisation of one of the fundamental tenets of Zionist
ideology, which was the building of a country open to all Jews, in
which they would be able to affirm their Jewish identity in
conditions of security and dignity. To achieve this, they had to form
a majority of the population. This ideology was reflected in the Law
of Return 5710 - 1950 [7).
In the first years of Israel's existence, the outstanding
characteristic of its population was the rate of its demographic
growth. Since 19148 the country's demography has changed dramatically.
Two processes contributed to the transformation of' the social
composition of the population within this short period. First was the
mass Jewish immigration and second the 19 14 8 Arab-Israel war. Between
May 19148 and December 1951 the Jewish population doubled, from about
650,000 to 1,3314,201 [8]. At the same time, about 500,000 Arabs [9]
left the country as a result of the war while only 156,000 remained
[10].
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Consequently a state previously composed of two major ethnic
groups was transformed into a more homogenous society dominated by a
Jewish majority. Whereby in the past the three major communities,
British, Arab and Jewish, had very different perceptions as to the
planning and physical development of the country, the new situation
offered great advantages for the formulation of a coherent and
consistent planning system.
The new immigration, however, led to radical changes in the
demographic characteristics of the Jewish community itself. Whereas
prior to 19148 the majority of the Jews (5I.8%) came from European
countries (known as Ashkenazi Jews) and only a minority came from
Asia and Africa (known as Sephardi Jews), the newcomers in the first
years of the State were divided more evenly between 33 14 ,971 Jews of
European and American origin (50.3%) and 330,1456 Jews from Asia and
North Africa (149.7%). Moreover, subsequent waves of immigration
tipped the balance in favour of immigrants from Asia and Africa.
Between 1957 and 1961$, a further 28 14,735 Jews settled in Israel. Of
these, about 57% were Sephardi Jews and only 143% were Ashkenazi. By
1965, out of a total Jewish population of 2,299,078,40.'4% were
Israeli-born, 28.3% came from Asia and Africa and 31.3% came from
Europe and America [11].
In addition to demographic characteristics, other factors also
demonstrate the social differences within the Jewish community. There
was a cultural and economic gap between Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews.
The latter were characterized by large families, strong clan ties and
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a greater affinity with Jewish tradition. Social tensions arose from
the Sephardi struggle against the predominantly Western—oriented
society. In addition, the community faced problems related to the
survivors of the Holocaust in Erope, who suffered from their
traumatic experiences there and had great difficulties in returning
to a normal way of life [12].
In view of this social polarity, the national goal
	 of
integrating the Jewish immigrants into one society, while blending
their contrasts, was an important aim in the processes of planning
and physical development.
The waves of immigrants could not be delayed until the
implementation of proper planning, nor could their numbers be
regulated by the State. There was a sense of urgency in helping
immigration, both from the immigrants' and the State's point of view.
About 85% of the immigrants arrived penniless and were totally
dependent on the State for housing and employment. The resulting
incessant demand for housing was met in every possible way [13]. This
included the provision of temporary and permanent housing in urban
areas and agricultural villages. At first all existing dwellings in
towns and villages, including British military camps and abandoned
Arab houses, were used [t4J, after which transition camps, consisting
of tents, shacks and huts, were erected to provide communal housing.
These too were soon filled to capacity and living conditions
deteriorated rapidly.
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In 1950 another temporary solution was provided in the form of
Ma'abarot, neighbourhoods which included dwelling huts and community
services. Such quarters were set up throughout the country, and by
1952 there were 113 Ma'abarot with a population of 250,000 [1L]. The
replacement of temporary housing, while providing dwellings for
further arrivals, was the core of planning and development
activities.
During the years of this first stage, about 250,000 dwelling
units were built by public housing companies; private builders
erected approximately the same number [15]. Probably some three
quarters of Israel's population lived, during these years, in flats
or houses erected since 198. Housing was merely one component of the
planning complex which led to the establishment of about 30 new towns
and 1450 new villages. These figures give some indication of - to use
Akzin & Dror's phrase [16] - the "high pressure planning" and
physical development which charact.erised the Israeli system.
Immigration had other sweeping effects, such as on Israel's
economy. During the first years of its existence, Israel faced a
severe food shortage. This necessitated an immediate increase in
agricultural production and the development of' industry. In view of
the paucity of agricultural land and the scarcity of water,
agricultural planning and control of the urban sprawl received a
great deal of attention, while less effort was put into industry in
these years. In addition, for established ideological reasons
agriculture was seen as more than just an economic matter. It was
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therefore given priority over all other economic measures and over
the use of land for habitation and recreation. The struggle between
the urban and agricultural sectors continued to be reflected in the
planning system. The prevailing ideological sympathy for agriculture
as an ideal way of life contributed to an explicit policy of
protection of agricultural land and, in general, a system which
favoured this sector out of proportion to its economic contribution.
Despite many adverse factors, the Israeli economy was marked by
its swift rate of growth in and since these formative years. The
increase in the GNP was necessary to maintain the shakily-based State
and to make possible the absorption of the large number of
immigrants. This growth in GNP was the result of an infusion of
labour and capital. The large investment, the increase in the work
force and in the capacity of the market led to the growth of total
per capita and production. However, largely due to special security
and social needs, Israel was, and still is, far from economic
independence and is constantly deeply in debt 117].
The heavy economic burden was obviously beyond the ability of
the local population and capital required for rapid urbanisation and
industrial isation came mainly from abroad through contributions,
grants-in-aid, loans, commercial credits, etc. However, as the funds
did not keep pace with actual need, planning was necessary as a means
of distributing scarce resources within the society. An integrated
approach to physical, social and economic planning was of supreme
importance. Whether such an approach was employed will be discussed
below.
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The strong dual tendency towards longterm planning on the one
hand, and improvisation on the other, which characterized the Jewish
community in Palestine [18] did not stop with the achieving of
national independence.	 the contrary, the objective needs and new
possibilities encouraged large
	 scale	 planning combined
	 with
pragmatism in development. However, the commitment to ideological
goals and social values, both old and new, were more in evidence In
planning than in the improvised activities. Since the ideological
dimension of planning provides an important insight into the Israeli
system it will be considered here.
The planning system gave rise to social intricacy and
ideological diversity. Some of the conflicts were rooted in the
pre-State ideological and political conceptions described in part I.
Others were the result of the social changes of the new era which
began in 19 $ 8. Different Images of the ideal society and the means of
attaining that society were expressed in the prevailing ideologies
and values. The most relevant of these to the nature, character and
content of the Israeli planning system are outlined here, and we
shall return to them when dealing wIth the various components of the
s ys tern.
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A.	 THE PERCEPTION OF STATEHOOD: NATIONALISM VERSUS FACTIONALISM
The many years of problem laden life in the Diaspora and under
foreign rule in Palestine created a strong desire for Jewish
sovereignty. The establishment of Israel led to an increasing
tendency to exhaust most of the possibilities offered by an
independent, democratic country. A condition of this was, of course,
the affirmation of the state's sovereignty and the government's
authority both internally and externally. With regard to the internal
aspect of such affirmation, there was an excessive use of the new
powers of the executive, legislature and judiciary. The use of these
powers demonstrated the transition from a non—sovereign community to
a fully—fledged state. In so far as town planning was a function of
the government, the concept of statehood explains the extensive
positive and restrictive planning activity carried out by many
government institutions and the legislative activity in the fields of
planning, housing, rehabilitation, national parks and others which
took place in later years. The new perception was of the national
good rather than old factionalist tendencies [19].
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B. ZIONIST IDEOLOGY IN THE ERA AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE
In 198 the most difficult part of the political struggle for
the realisation of the Zionist programme was over. Through the
signing of the armistic agreements and recognition by the United
Nations and other countries the Jewish State became a reality. The
emphasis of Zionism subsequently shifted to maintaining the State and
making it a centre for world Jewry. Values such as commitment to
national defence, pioneering effort in land development (particularly
the conquest of the desert), social equality and social integration
were all part of the new-old Zionism. A series of national planning
policies reflected many of these values. Under the influence of
Western individualistic tendencies, however, Zionist ideals became
more meaningful at an insitutional operative level than as a
catalytic force affecting individual behaviour, and the pioneering
motive declined. This development required extensive institutional
effort aimed at encouraging public involvement in national tasks. The
centralised effort to encourage public dispersal throughout the
country is only one example of this [20].
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C.	 REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY
The political success in the establishment of Israel, the
military victory, the social innovations and economic growth all paid
off for the political leaders in terms of trust and admiration of the
public. The ruling elite was given great credit for leading the
country to independence. In addition, some of the leaders had
charismatic authority.
In these formative years, care for the public good was regarded
as almost exclusively the realm of elected politicians and nominated
officials. Direct involvement of the public in decision making was
minimal, partly because of the state of war and emergency and partly
because of demographic changes. The free hand given to the
government, together with the pre—State community traditions, led to
the ideological concept of informality and functional flexibility of
administrative behaviour.
	 The	 prevailing	 principle	 in the
bureaucratic culture was of modus vivendi 121].
- 169 -
The institutional deviance from administrative rules acquired
legitimisation and led in turn to anomie and ambivalent feelings
towards definite legal norms. This explains much of the divergence
from agreed planning policies and statutory planning provisions by
both central and local government. The public at large and private
institutions attached little importance to the breaking of planning
laws [22].
Today there is growing pressure in Israel for a professional
bureaucracy and proper administrative behaviour, particularly in the
sphere of the environment and quality of life. Through the years the
concept of individualist democracy has become increasingly popular.
Administrators and politicians were placed under greater public
scrutiny. Pressure groups concerned with various issues were formed.
Everybody wanted a greater say in the way things were run. The
administrative process, however, is still very much in the hands of
the authorities and the level of direct involvement of the public in
decision making is still fairly low compared, for instance, with the
United Kingdom. In the planning system this means only limited
changes by institutional planning (i.e. planning by politicians,
administrators and professionals) towards a greater share in planning
by the general public.
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D.	 COLLECTIVISM VERSUS PRIVATE INITIATIVE IN PHYSICAL AND
EC0NX4IC E€VELOPMENT
For a great number of years, the concept of democratic
socialism dominated the ideological—political scene within the Jewish
sector. The powers of the State were seen as legitimate tools for
pursuing social progress and the welfare of the community. Besides
the State, several communal institutions continued to function in
their pre—independence capacities. The Jewish Agency dealt with the
absorption of immigrants and the establishment of rural settlements.
The Histadrut (the central trade union) played a significant role in
the creation of new industries and
	 big	 building	 companies.
Collectivism in the sense of public rather than individual effort
continued to be accepted as the best means for developing the
country. Here again, however, the growth and success of the private
sector in economic and political terms, together with the
inefficiency of public sector institutions, resulted in a shift from
collectivism to private Intitiative. The effect was felt mainly In
land development, where there was a greater reliance on market forces
[23].
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E.	 AGRICULTURAL WAY OF LIFE VERSUS URBANISATION AND
INDUSTRIALISATION
This ideological struggle is rooted in the pre-independence
period. However it was strongly influenced by new conditions. By 19'8
it became clear that absorption of mass immigration could only be
carried out through urban development and industrialisation. Lack of
arable land and water on the one hand, and the existence of modern
methods of production on the other, did not allow a large scale
absorption of immigrants into the rural sector. Despite this, the
agricultural way of life was still seen as the ideal form of the
realization of Zionist values. The orientation of the rural sector
was clear while pre-State, anti-urban attitudes continued to prevail
among politicians and planners alike. However, the urban sector
gradually acquired political strength and ideological legitimacy,
which in turn led to changing attitudes regarding the role of the
town in the emerging society. As a result, urban problems received
much greater attention [2k].
Since town planning is an inseparable part of the overall legal
and administrative systems, in Israel as well as elsewhere, a short
description of these in the early days of statehood is worthwhile.
The revolutionary phenomenon of the establishment of the new
state resulted in the cessation of the sovereignty and the legal
continuity of the existing system and the creation of a new Israeli
one 125]. However, this was only in formal terms. In the midst of the
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harsh first days of statehood, and in order to prevent any legal
vacuum, the new system remained in substance a continuation of the
old Mandatory one, with almost no modifications. The first statute,
the Law and Administration Ordinance 5708 - 19k8 [26] prescribed
that: "The law which existed in Palestine on ... 1 L th May l948
...shall remain in force insofar as there is nothing therein
repugnant to this Ordinance or to the other Laws which may be enacted
by or on behalf of the Provisional Council of State, and subject to
such modifications as may result from the establishment of the State
and its authorities". This reenactment of the previous positive law,
including the Town Planning Ordinance, sometimes created great
confusion, since some of the legal tools reflected the Mandatory
colonial philosophy which contrasted with the democratic nature and
Jewish character of the newly established State. The law was thus
subject to gradual transformation and slow adjustment processes,
first by means of interpretation and implementation and later by new
legislation. Since the previous statutory planning system was wholly
adopted by the Israeli legislature, it is important to consider
where, when and why a departure from the old provisions was or was
not made. This will be done below when amendment laws to the
Mandatory Town Planning Ordinances are discussed.
The constitutional jurisprudence of Israel is grounded in
Common Law conceptions. Under the principle of dispersion of powers,
the executive has the power to carry out in the name of the State any
activity which is needed for governing the country [27]. This
undefined power is subject to any law explicitly stating the powers
of the executive and to basic constitutional principles. Matters
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concerning foreign relations, national security and domestic policy
are, when not committed by statute to the executive, part of its
inherent and residuary powers to run the country's affairs 128]. The
particular aspect of domestic policy (i.e. town and planning country)
with which we are concerned here has been pursued in part in
accordance with specific statutes and in part under the general
powers of the executive. As a result two branches, statutory and
non-statutory, formed the official planning system of Israel.
The institutions of the new State were formally established
soon after the Declaration of Independence on May 1 14, 1914 8, though in
practical terms the transition to the new Israeli administrative
structure took place in the course of the first years of statehood.
The Law and Administration Ordinance 5708 - 19148 [29] established
central and local government institutions and defined their
responsibilities and powers. A Provisional Council was set up as the
legislator. It elected 13 members to be the Provisional Government
(Cabinet). These institutions acted until proper elections were able
to be held in 19149 [30]. These institutions provided merely a new
formal framework which was managed by the staff of the pre-state
Jewish communal bodies. In this way there was a continuity in the
political structure and the assumption of government was achieved
smoothly, without shaking the foundations of Jewish society [31].
As part of the central government machinery, 	 district
administration [32] (which corresponded to the regional level) was
reestablished within the previous geographical boundaries of the
districts 133]. In each district a planning	 commission was
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established and the districts inherited the old titles. Thus Gaza,
Sumaria and Loddy districts functioned in regard to that part of
their previous territory which was within the State of Israel. It was
only in 1953 that a new division of six districts and 14 subdistricts
was set up [ 3 L1 ]. (This was an adaptation of the administrative
boundaries to the new circumstances.) The new division only applied
to planning commissions at the district level while local commissions
continued to function within the local authorities boundaries.
The newly established governmental authority replaced the
previous British administration and thus assumed, among others, the
rights of the Mandatory government 135]. This included the ownership
of natural resources: water, minerals and extensive property rights
which were of paramount importance to the operation of planning and
land development. This legacy of public ownership of the national
assets was greatly welcomed by the new government and was legally
consolidated and enhanced through the years because it tied in well
with its ideology of collectivism [36]. The state became in fact the
biggest landowner. State domain land together with the area in
ownership of the Jewish communal bodies and land abandoned by Arabs
under government management [37], gave the government control of 93%
of the total area of Israel [38].
Since 1960 most of this land has been under the central
management of a statutory board, the Israeli Land Authority (ILA)
[39]. However it should be stressed that the 7% privately owned land
was mainly situated within the main urban areas and the coastal
plain, thus giving the private sector a far greater influence than
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the quantitative figure suggests. Nevertheless, the extensive public
owned land was crucial to the development of rural settlements. Even
the further growth of the big cities depended on the surrounding land
which was largely publicly owned [IO].
Just how important was the public ownership of land to the
accomplishment of positive planning can be realised when the Israeli
case is compared to the British one. For example, in England the
erection of the post-War new towns constantly involved local
opposition and thus endless legal fights in public enquiries ['Ii],
while in Israel new towns and rural settlements were established, in
general, by an administrative decision without the use of the land
expropriation law ['12].
Complementing the latter aspect is the dominant role played by
the central government and the public sector in Israel's economy.
Their active role and intervention is greater than in other western
countries. Israel's economy has been highly publicly directed and
state controlled. The government not only has extensive legal and
administrative powers to control the operation of the market but
also, by virtue of the considerable imported capital, it (together
with the co-operative sector under its influence) is the leading
force in the market. Government involvement is also revealed in its
share in the national consumption, national investment, ownership of
corporations and provision of employment. The government's indirect
powers regarding the operation of the market include control over
prices, subsidies and credits. It also includes administrative
constraints: licencing, control of imported goods, and so on ['13].
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Contrary to the situation in Britain, the central government in
Israel is generally charged with the provision and administration of
major public requirements such as housing, public works, education
and police. The local authorities have a secondary role in the supply
and regulation of services. In this sphere, the private sector is not
an important factor, though in some economic areas such as land
development it is a major force. The private sector, however, is
highly reliant on government decisions and actions. Thus the actual
ownership of the means of production has lost much of its importance
in circumstances of such extensive governmental involvement.
The political dimension in the operation of public
administration in Israel is of great importance to the understanding
of the planning process, since this decision making sphere is merely
part of the more general bureaucratic activity. Functioning patterns
of the administration in Israel during the formative years were
rooted in the pre-independence traditions of the Jewish communal
institutions as well as the British legacy [t].
Methods and procedures were adapted piecemeal to the new
conditions. The administration has been highly politicized because of
the extensive role played the parties. This means that the
border-line between legitimate political considerations in policy
making and political discrimination by favouring particular political
or social groups has been blurred [L5J• Since politicians in Israel
generally played a much more significant role in the decision making
process than the professional and administrators, the part of
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political considerations (in the narrow sense of party interest) in
that process was large [6]. Furthermore, the dispersal of political
power between many factions and parties (a feature which reflects
Israel's complicated social composition) and the
	 disintegrated
ideological perceptions has created a shaky balance within the
Israeli government. Only a measure of basic consensus and a strong
sense of pragmatism enabled a modusvivendi.
At the national level there has been a continuous need to form
coalition governments. These have been based on one senior partner
and a number of small parties as junior participants. The formation
of a coalition government often acted as a counterforce to an
integrated and consistent longterm planning policy. It involved
political bargaining and resulted in the dispersal of powers, areas
of responsibilities and resources between the coalition parties
['7i.
Once this was achieved, the cabinet has rarely intervened in
the operation of the various ministries,
	 which became very
independent and adopted a line of sectionalism. Membership in a
coalition provided a great advantage, especially to the small
parties. A government ministry was a source of political and economic
strength to the party of which the Minister was a member. Many posts
were filled by members of the party, since no clear rules were set up
for appointment of professional civil servants [48]. Thus the
dividing line between the state's administration and the parties'
institutions were not drawn. Considerations of party interest
influenced both government longterm policies and day to day
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decisions. In these formative years statutory powers and public
resources were seen as legitimate tools for advancing sectional
interests. As a result of this diffusion of powers among the many
ministries, public policy was not the product of conscious choice of
ends and means but rather the aggregation of a variety of interests
and viewpoints [t9].
As for local authorities, there the degree of politicisation of
the administration was even greater and lasted longer. As in the
pre-State period, the local services provided by these authorities,
together with their control powers, gave local political leaders and
parties many opportunities to use legal and administrative powers for
electoral gain. With the establishment of the sovereign State, the
local authorities lost the significance of their previous role as a
tier of' Jewish self-government which had been recognised under the
Mandate's legal-administrative system. The Jewish national
institutions of the past, which practically formed and manned the
newly established central government institutions, attempted to
downgrade the importance of the local authorities. This was
particularly successful during the first years of statehood, when
local authorities lost their independent political strength. Certain
local parties disappeared and their members were absorbed Into more
heterogenous national parties [50].
It should be noted that Mandatory attitudes of disrespect
towards the local institutions also prevailed among government
officials and affected centr al-local government relationships. The
population in the new towns was not encouraged to develop local
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political institutions but rather to depend on the support of the
national parties and the central government institutions. Here again
the arrogance of the veteran Ashkenazi establishment towards the
Sephardi immigrants affected the relationship between the central
government and the new towns [50A).
However, as a result of this situation in which the major
national parties dominated both central and local government, many of
the old conflicts disappeared. That is not to say that there was a
consensus between the two, particularly on matters such as town and
country planning. In such matters which concerned both central and
local government there was often a difference of opinion resulting
from the differences in national and local perspective. However, the
pressure of local authorities, often through the national political
parties, led to the supremacy of local over national interests.
Gradually local authorities acquired enough political power to become
an important partner with the central government In the
administration of the urban and rural environment. The political
relationship between these two branches of government strongly
affected the organisational structure of the planning machinery, the
formulation of planning policies and the way they were implemented.
As for the decision making process, there was at least one
characteristic which was shared by the two tiers of government, which
was the over—politicisation of the administrative process. Factional
considerations were common during the first years in both tiers, with
only a difference in degree of impact. The rule of law was still to
be affirmed in both the central and local government processes.
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There has been since then a considerable depoliticisation of
the civil service [51 ]. More and more attention was gradually given
to the interests of the public in general, rather than to sectional
or even personal interests. This process, however, took many years
and the habits of the pre-State community have not been entirely
eradicated.
Many factors contributed to this change in the bureaucratic
pattern of behaviour. Of particular interest is the role played by
the Israeli Supreme Court in its capacity as the High Court of
Justice [52]. This Court, and in fact the judiciary as a whole,
acquired a special apolitical status in Israel and commanded high
moral authority.
In the legal sphere there was no previous communal traditions
since the Jewish comunity was subjected to the general mandatory
legal and judicial systems. Thus the Israeli Courts adopted from the
start the British and inerican judicial norms and patterns which have
been totally independent. Under the law, the High Court of Justice
has been able to issue orders modelled after Common Law prerogative
orders, to review the decisions and actions of central and local
authorities and other bodies including
	 individuals exercising
statutory powers or enjoying public finance. It was its independence
and special status that enabled the Supreme Court to resist
deviations from the law on the part of the executive. Its firm
imposition of the rule of law on administrative bodies as well as on
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private individuals played an invaluable role in changing the pattern
of administrative operation. This Court gained much appreciation in
the eyes of the public as the defender of civil rights. Since Israel
has no written constitution, this task was obviously of particular
importance [53].
Besides the judicial control over the executive, another
institution which has strongly affected the operation of the
bureaucracy in Israel is that of State Comptroller. The latter
exercises administrative control over central. and local government
agencies and many public bodies. The institution of a State
Controller was established under a special law as early as 19149 [514].
The State Comptroller himself is appointed by the President on the
recommendation of the Knesset. He is independent of the executive
(whose operation he must inspect) and his accountability is to the
Knesset.
Compared with its counterpart institution in Great Britain, the
Israeli Comptroller has a much wider role. Besides carrying out
financial supervision from the accounting point of view, he must also
judge "whether the inspected bodies ... have operated econcmically,
efficiently and in
	 a morally irreproachable manner"	 [55].
Furthermore, he may examine "any such matter as he may deem
necessary" 156].
The Comptroller's main tool for effective control is the
publication of his annual report. He has almost no other
administrative powers to bring about a change in the mode of
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operation of the inspected bodies. The State Comptroller, however,
like the High Court of Justice, has acquired a reputation for being
apolitical and is greatly respected for his unbiased, though often
strict, criticism. His reports thus provide invaluable information as
to the way governmental institutions have been carrying out their
tasks [57].
In the following description and analysis of the operation of
planning administration, emphasis is placed on the findings, as well
as the general impact, of the High Court of Justice's judgements and
the State Comptroller's reports.
The geographical, social, ideological, political, economic and
security factors mentioned above created the need for, or influenced,
town and country planning. i the other hand, these pro-planning
factors were offset by anti-planning forces which were, at the early
stage of statehood, equally influential. Among the latter was the
pressure of the time factor and the need to find immediate solutions
to numerous problems,
	 an	 inherited	 pre-State	 tradition of
improvisation which was a common pattern in the operation of old
Jewish communal institutions, an internal political hindrance to the
formulation of longterm unpopular objectives which required immediate
sacrifice for their achievement, and psychological attitudes of basic
optimism which viewed predetermined plans as unneccessary. The result
was a mingling of planning and improvisation in physical development
as in many other areas of public life.
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So far we have mentioned various aspects of the circumstances
which prevailed in and since the early days of the State. We have
also indicated some of their planning implications. Against this
background we will proceed to deal with the planning system in its
two branches, statutory and non-statutory. Both will be considered
with regard to two periods: from 198 to 1965 and from 1965 to the
1980 'S.
Obviously it is most important to analyse the organisational
structure, the ideologies and policies in the implementation of the
non-statutory branch in addition to those of the statutory one. This
is so not only because they form part of the broad web of the Israeli
planning system, but also because a full understanding of the
statutory planning system requires not only an examination of what it
contained but also of what it left to other planning mechanisms.
However, it should be stressed that the term "non-statutory planning"
in this part of the work has a different meaning that it had in Part
I. Non-statutory planning in the Mandatory era referred to the
non-institutional activities of the local communities as opposed to
the official planning activities of the Mandatory government. In this
part, the term is used to mean planning activities by public
institutions, either under the general discretionary power of the
executive or under different statutory functions, rather than the
planning system as prescribed by, and executed under, the town
planning legislation. This means that during the period discussed in
this part, non-statutory planning still had some degree of formalism,
though a greater degree of improvisation has been added to it.
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CHAPTER 7. THE FIRST STAGE OF STATUTORY PLANNING 198-19ô5
A.	 THE MACHINERY OF PLANNING
The years of the first	 stage were marked
	 by the
institutionalisation of the planning machinery. The basic structure
of the planning organisation,	 including	 both statutory and
non-statutory machineries, can be illustrated by a simple diagram, as
follows:
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(National & Regional) 	 (Local)
Executive	 The Cabinet	 Minister of the Interior
Ministries/
Public Sector	 A	 A	 A
:	 I----------- ----1<-----------------------
! Supreme Planning I
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Physical Plan- : ------
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: Mm. of Interior: -----> 	 :	 Local Planning
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The diagram shows three parallel hierarchies of planning
institutions and the lines of communication between them. Of
particular importance was the physical planning unit under the
Ministry of the Interior which was established as the main
governmental body for physical planning and played a special role in
co-ordinating the different planning agencies.
The following diagram illustrates additional links established
between the planning machinery and development agencies:
Non-statutory	 Non-statutory
planning machinery	 planning machinery	 Statutory
under the	 under the	 planning
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The machinery of planning and its evolution were, to a great
extent, the result of the particular
	 political	 circumstances
prevailing in the early days of statehood; they were also strongly
influenced by the Mandatory legal legacy. This historical evolution
explains to a great degree the characteristics of the planning
institutions and the substance of the entire system.
1.	 Non-Statutory Planning Machinery
The preparations for the establishment of the administration at
central government level began a short while before the Declaration
of Independence 11]. A "Proposal for the Structure of Departments
Establishments and their Budgets" was drafted; this included 13
ministries, a number of which corresponded to the number of members
in the Provisional Cabinet. The proposal did not include a separate
ministry for planning, but a ministry which was to deal, amongst
other subjects, with town and country planning.
A Ministry of Labour and Construction was established and
entrusted to the left-wing Mapam party. It included housing, public
works, physical planning and other minor units concerned with land
development. JXie to his planning responsibilities the Minister of
Labour was put in charge of implementing the Town Planning Ordinances
[2).
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The first Minister of Labour, Mr. Bentov, was very sympathetic
towards planning and his encouragement was a great help in the
establishment of a planning department [3]. The fact that the
Minister was a member of the Mapam party and not the leading party in
the Jewish Agency, Mapai, meant that the newly established
organization was independent of the Technical Department of the
Jewish Agency and could bring in new people from outside the party
with fresh ideas and planning perceptions, including those not
previously accepted by the Jewish national institutions.
However, the affiliation of planning to a multi-function
ministry has not changed since 198. It reflects, to some extent, the
negative attitude of many politicians towards overall long-term
planning and the prevailing spirit of improvisation in favour of
short-term requirements. This structure, in turn, undermined the
authority of the planning department which depended on the
administrative importance and political status of the ministry to
which it was attached. One positive result of this organisational
affiliation, though, was that it ensured close contact between the
Planning department and the Housing and PUblic Works department which
ensured some consistency between planning and implementation. Given
the fact that the government-public sector was very active in the
building industry and the development market, particularly during the
formative years of the State, such a link was obviously desirable. It
did not, however, last very long.
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This planning body consisted of architects and engineers, and
was mainly concerned with the physical and aesthetic aspects of the
environment. It was to serve governmental bodies in the preparation
of plans for new settlements and neighbourhoods, dwelling house
constructions and other land developments. It was also to help and
ensure that local authorities and district administrations carry out
their statutory planning duties.
The allocation of functions implies that a broader scope of
comprehensive national and regional planning was beyond the scope of
this Physical Planning Department and was to be the task of the
government as a whole. However, from early days the planners
themselves adopted a broad line of planning activity; this meant both
regulative and positive centralised planning at national and regional
levels. Though their pressure to establish an independent Town
Planning Ministry did not bear fruit, the professionals - supported
by the first Minister - played an important role in the increasing
importance attached to systematic planning by the decision makers and
the general public J].
On the other hand, their emphasis on physical-aesthetical
planning, which was rooted in their training and experience, limited
the scope of planning and was to have long-term effects. It is
significant that the name "Physical Planning Department" has remained
until this very day.
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Soon after the establishment of the State and the formation of
the first elected institutions in March 19I9, planning machinery was
reorganised and the governmental "Physical Planning Department" was
divided between two ministries. The Ministry of the Interior,
responsible for local authorities, was to be responsible for the
implementation of local detailed planning under the Town Planning Law
and received the current planning division. The tasks of long-term
national and regional planning were vested in the Prime Minister's
office where the physical planning unit was to work in co-operation
with a national economic planning unit, also established at the same
time in the Prime Minister's office [5].
Since non-statutory national and regional plans were to be
filled in by local plans, some link was required at the
organisational level. For this purpose the Prime Minister was given
statutory powers relating to the declaration of local planning areas
and the approval of local outline schemes [6]. From a legal
perspective this was an extraordinary situation whereby two ministers
were given responsibilities for different aspects of the same matter.
The distinction between these two parts was rather artificial and
bound to create difficulties. Furthermore,
	 the	 administrative
structure of the planning units created a functional anomaly by
separating the machinery which dealt with local statutory planning
from that of the broader national and regional planning. In practice,
however, the personal links between the two divisions of physical
planning machinery were maintained, though this did not always secure
the consistency of statutory planning with non-statutory planning.
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The major innovation of this reorganisation was the attempt to
create a body for integrated national planning under the auspices of
the highest political status, the Prime Minister. This can be seen as
an attempt to move from a limited, sectional and technical service,
as physical planning was then conceived, towards a more comprehensive
approach of integrated planning as an important tool of government.
In reality this attempt failed. The Prime Minister's office was
devoted totally to security and foreign affairs and put aside
internal issues such as national planning. Hence this promising
organisational structure did not last long and was changed before it
produced any significant results [7].
By 1951 the two parts of the previous Physical Planning
Department, together with the legal responsibilities for implementing
the law, were reunited, this time under the Ministry of the Interior
[8]. This has remained the situation ever since. The department
worked on both statutory schemes (which were regulatory in nature and
locally oriented) and on non-statutory plans (national and
regional).
An evaluation of the physical planning machinery and its weight
in the Israeli public administration requires a glimpse into the
political arena. The Ministry of the Interior has been, since 19I8,
in the hands of a junior partner of the coalition cabinet. It changed
hands several times, though it was for the most of this stage under a
minister from the National Religious Party (NRP). The results of this
were: (1) the political status of this ministry (including the
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planning unit) was rather low; (2) the political changes hampered the
formulation and implementation of a consistent planning policy; (3)
the issue of physical planning within the ministry was given little
attention due to lack of interest on the part of the NRP; () the
Physical Planning Department itself was alien to the ministry since
it could hardly be manned on a basis of party membership.
The political situation also affected the
	 district
administration. The Mandatory district commissioners were responsible
for the co-ordination of all government activities in their
respective districts; the Israeli ones were merely representatives of
the Ministry of the Interior. They had no authority over the affairs
of other ministries [9] and thus with the shrinking power of the
district commissioners, the status of the district planning
commissions under their chairmanship also suffered. This was
particularly harmful since the bulk of governmental development was
exempted by law from statutory development control [10].
Although the responsibility for physical planning lay with the
NRP, the most important operating ministries and agencies were
controlled by the Labour Party. Inter-ministerial rivalry and
competition often took place which was also reflected in the
establishment by many governmental bodies of their own sectorial
planning units. Ministries with interest in physical development such
as those of Housing, Labour, Transport, Commerce and Industry,
Agriculture, and Defence, and public bodies such as the Israel Land
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Authority and the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency were
engaged in sectorial planning, parallel to that of the main
governmental planning unit under the Ministry of the Interior [11].
A spirit of activism, rooted in socialist perceptions, was the
cause of the governmental and public sectors high involvement in
physical development. Yet political gain and matters of status led to
the uncompromising stand taken by these agents. For example, the
responsibility for the main physical planning machinery was demanded
by executive ministries such as the Ministry of Labour and the
Ministry of Housing, but they encountered strong resistance from the
Ministry of the Interior. The arguement was of interest in itself. It
stressed the fact that because of the direct involvement of these
ministries in development activities they were, to some extent,
interested parties and thus lacked the total impartiality of the
Ministry of the Interior [12]. For reasons of political arrangement
the Ministry of the
	 Interior eventually obtained
	 overall
responsibility for physical planning.
A "Supreme Planning Council" was established to co-ordinate the
planning products of all these bodies and to formulate an integrated
national plan [13]. It began functioning early in 1951 as a
non-statutory inter-ministerial body and consisted of representatives
of the various ministries and public institutions under the
chairmanship of the Director of the Physical Planning Department. Its
power was affected, however, by the fact that it was regarded as part
of the Ministry of the Interior.
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Further inter-ministerial collaboration was attempted in the
early 1960's when the Fiysical Planning Department worked together
with the then newly established Economic Planning Board of the
Ministry of Finance on a national master plan Ilk].
The last non-statutory body for planning was a ministerial
comittee headed by the Prime Minister which was established in 1963.
It was set up to deal with the most important planning issue, the
dispersion of the population. This highly ranking committee was set
up because of the importance of the subject and the failure of lower
ranking bodies to create intergrated governmental strategies [15].
The problem of administrative co-ordination was given much
attention during this stage. As one of the key men in the Riysical
Planning Department wrote: "At first national planning frequently
confined itself to co-ordinating and combining the functional
requirements of various sectors on the physical level. It was the
beginning difficult to achieve full co-ordination between the
activities of the various Government offices and public agencies. An
additional obstacle to national planning was the lack of long-term
planning; planners had to rely on hypothesis rather than on
well-defined and well-formulated directives" [16].
Despite these attempts to integrate inter-ministerial planning,
the reality of a separation between the govenmental planning
machinery and its executive bodies, together with the absence of an
integrated body for organised urban development, were most striking.
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The process of development of new towns was named by one writer as
the "feudal's fight" [17]. It can be illustrated by a number of
examples: Kiryat-Gat was planned and constructed as part of a
regional planning project by the Ministry of Agriculture and the
Jewish Agency; Upper-Nazareth and Mitzpe-Ramon were established under
the auspices of the Ministry of Defence; Eilat was developed by an
inter-ministerial body; Arad was planned and built by the Ministry of
Labour and Karmiel by the Ministry of Housing; and for the planning
and building of Ashdod a public company was established.
Furthermore, in every new town many other bodies were involved
[18]. The financial resources came from various budgets after a long
process of administrative bargaining. The public land required for
these developments necessitated an arrangement with the Jewish Agency
and, since the 1960's, with a governmental body responsible for all
public land. The actual building projects were the responsibility of
the Ministries of Housing and Labour. With such a dispersal of
powers, responsibilities and resources, it is somewhat surprising
that 30 new towns were eventually created.
These organisational drawbacks were crucial to effective
planning. They were, among other things, an expression of
anti-planning and particularly anti-urban development tendencies
which had an ideological basis [19]. In contrast the rural sector
developed a comprehensive system to deal with the many aspects of the
physical, social and economic life of agricultural settlements. The
distribution of responsibilities for urban planning and the carrying
out of urban development by various bodies without arriving at a
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comprehensive implementation strategy had far-reaching effects,
particularly on the development of new towns. Since the effectiveness
of planning depended not only on the preparation of plans but also on
the ability to persuade the heads of the relevant ministries to
mobilise resources and to carry out development in accordance with
the plans, the success of the planning machinery under the Ministry
of the Interior was very limited indeed, considering the political
situation. Organisational problems were not, however, confined to
that Ministry, since even after the ministerial committee was
established and the government as a whole approved a set of
recommendations regarding the dispersion of population, the
implementation of these recommendations remained very fragmentary
[20].
The major reform of planning machinery did not come until the
introduction of new town planning legislation in 1965. This will be
discussed below with regard to the second stage of the Israeli
planning system.
When the evolution of planning machinery is compared with the
evolution of planning organisation in England during the l90's and
1950's, the similarities are striking [23]. The emergence of a new
town and country planning section in the Office (later Ministry) of
Works; the dispute over planning responsibilities between the
Ministry of Works and Building and the Ministry of Health; the
settlement of the dispute by a separation between the
responsibilities for long-term planning (given to the former) and
statutory planning	 (retained	 by the	 latter);	 the	 unclear
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organisational boundaries between physical planning functions and
social and economic planning; the creation of the Ministry for Town
and Country Planning in 193 independent of that of Works so that
planning authorities would appear to be entirely impartial in their
judgement as to the right use of land; and the reformed structure
which again in 1951 vested planning with a multi-functional Ministry
(the Ministry of Local Governmental Planning and later the Ministry
of Housing and Local Government) which remained in charge of planning
for a very long period until 1969; the separation between planning
machinery and implementation agents in terms of industrial location,
agricultural use, health and labour; the ultimate result that
although there was a ministry responsible for planning the
formulation of a comprehensive planning policy and its implementation
were in fact the responsibility of the Cabinet as a whole [21].
The similarities between the two countries proves the
universality of the complexity involved in fitting planning
responsibilities into the organisation of government. The relevant
organisational problems of institutions, powers and responsibilities
for statutory and non-statutory town and country planning,
development control, socio-economic planning, positive implementation
and above all of co-ordination between all the relevant bodies, were
raised in both systems. The range of possible solutions was found to
be almost unlimited. Nonetheless the actual decision as to the,
structure of planning machinery was heavily influenced by the
different politial perspective, not only of the two countries but
also within each country at different times.
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2.	 The Statutory Planning Machinery
The statutory planning machinery was re-established soon after
the declaration of the State. During the first period this machinery
not only followed the Mandatory organisational pattern but also
consisted, to a great extent, of the personnel previously staffing
the statutory planning commissions, largely because the planning
commissions had included many Jewish officials. From the structural
and personnel aspects there was a great deal of continuity in the
planning decision making bodies which had a conservative affect on
the functioning and planning products of the statutory machinery.
The hierarchy of the three-tier structure was maintained. At
the highest planning level the powers of the Mandatory High
Commissioner were vested, for most of this stage, in the Ministry of
the Interior, aided by the Physical Planning Department in that
ministry. Since this department also dealt with broad planning
aspects, the Minister's decision making power could, in principle, be
used to make local plans compatible with national and regional
policies. In reality the co-ordination between non-statutory and
statutory planning through the Minister's decisions was very
limited.
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The second (and most important) level of planning organisation
was the District Planning Commission. Since the Mandatory
decentralised approach was maintained, district commissions were
re-established in every administrative district [22]. From 1953
onwards there were six district commissions in Israel [23]. In every
district, the Planning Department established a bureau to assist
district and local commissions. These bureaus were also intended to
add to the consistency of statutory planning with national and
regional planning. Despite these	 attempts,	 the	 problem of
inconsistency between the two remained unsolved.
As described in Part I, the functions of the district
commissions were threefold, relating to legislation, administration
and adjudication. Yet the real task was to control the planning
process at the local level. District commissions mainly considered
planning proposals submitted by local authorities and private
individuals, rather than being responsible for the actual preparation
of schemes, and their methods were highly criticised at this stage.
Such criticism of the planning administration was very similar to the
criticism voiced in England [2't]. In both countries the planning
institutions were said to be concentrating on insignificant local
issues of land use rather than on an integrated regional planning
policy. The decision making process was cumbersome and overloaded.
Delays brought planning into disrepute and since it required the
administration several years to consider important schemes, by they
time they were approved they were often out of date.
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This criticism was valid in Israel not only during the first
stage but during the second as well.
At the bottom of the hierarchy were the local commissions.
Their number grew rapidly with the development of new urban and rural
settlements and the establishment of new local government
institutions. The boundaries of the local planning areas did not
follow the administrative sub—district division but corresponded more
to local government boundaries. This resulted in an abundance of
planning commissions, each responsible for a very small territory and
population. By 1 965 there were no less than sixty—six 	 local
commissions [25].
	
ch a fragmented machinery, the result of
political pressure for local self—assertion, created an irrational
structure and malfunctioning machinery.
By contrast in England and Wales there were only 15 planning
authorities in 1962, of which 9 had a population of one million and
only five a population of less than 600,000 [26]. Yet even in England
the system was criticised on the grounds that the smaller authorities
were poorly staffed and badly structured, thus unable to carry out
planning properly [27]. Espite the criticism, however, only a few
adjustments were made in England during these years [28]. It was not
until the early 1970's that a major reform was introduced.
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A much more compact organisation than that which existed in
Israel could have been structured if the plan [29] which was prepared
as early as 1951 would have been followed. J.kider that plan, Israel's
territory was seen as having four main urban zones of influence,
corresponding to the main cities: northern zone centred around Haifa;
central zone centred around Tel Aviv; Jerusalem zone centred around
the capital; and southern zone centred around Beer ieba. These zones
could have been applied to the district level of the planning
machinery. Further, the plan proposed a sub-division of' the country's
territory into 2k planning regions which could, at a later stage, be
reduced to 16. This sub-division could have been applied to the local
level of the planning machinery. This new map-based division was
aimed at serving a balanced development of all parts of the country
and of supporting a policy of integrated urban and rural development
by providing a common platform for planning. Given the ideological
and political differences which prevented collaboration in physical
development in the past, the new structure was promising.
In fact the statutory planning organisation did not follow the
concepts proposed in this plan. The course pursued was strongly
affected by the political and administrative relationship of central
and local government which, in turn, led to the gap between national
and regional non-statutory planning and the locally oriented
statutory planning.
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The fragmented division of local commissions led to financial
difficulties and inefficiency in the implementation of their town
planning functions, particularly noticable in the slow pace of scheme
making 130].
Given the highly politicized local authorities, the exercise of
development control by local commissions (particularly when these
were identical to the municipal councils) provides a striking example
of financial and political utilization of administrative power. The
main financial incentive for the manipulation of planning powers
resulted from the Mandatory legacy which ensured that betterment tax
form part of the local authorities' budget. The commissions were
often tempted to increase building densities (as demanded by private
developers) for the resulting increase in the rate of the tax.
In addition, the stringent provisions regarding control over
development, by which local commissions' permission was required for
every minor building operation or change of use, provided the
opportunity for social-political control over the commissions'
clientele. Some authorities went further and used their development
control powers as a source of income by imposing permit fees without
any legal basis 131].
The main defect in the local authorities' operation was in the
enforcement of the law where again political considerations induced
both action and inaction in taking steps against unauthorised
building.
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3.	 Representative Democracy and the Statutory Planning
Machinery
The Reform in District Commissions - the 1954 Amendment [32)
In 1954 the composition of the district planning commission was
changed. Three significant points are worth stressing here. Firstly,
the reform expressed some change in the relationship between central
and local government and between government administrators and
locally elected politicians. These changes resulted from the raising
of the status of the local authorities within the planning machinery.
Secondly, this reform also related to the inter-governmental
relations regarding the activity of town and country planning; it was
directed at improving the mode of operation of the government/public
sector through the extension of ministerial representation in
district commissions. Thirdly, the organisational reform affected the
concept of planning and the scope of issues it covered. These points
require some elaboration which will be made while describing the
actual provisions of the amending law.
The 1954 reform changed, to some extent, the hierarchal
structure of planning institutions. The situation whereby the central
government, at the top level, had total control over the planning
activities of local government, was changed to allow a more balanced
equilibrium between central and local government. The membership of
district commissions was expanded to include representatives of both
central and local authorities. Each commission was to consist of
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thirteen members rather than five [33], though the majority still
consisted of central government appointed officials. This majority of
9 out of 13 was made up by the district commissioner as chairman, a
professional town planner, and officials of the Ministries of
Defence, Finance, Agriculture, Transport, Health, Labour and Justice.
The remaining four new members were appointees of the Minister of the
Interior, chosen from a list of candidates recommended by the various
local authorities within each district L3(]. The only legal
limitation to these appointees was that candidates had to be neither
central nor local government employees [35]. This, in practice, meant
that unpaid local elected members could be appointed, representing
the local people in the planning process. In other words, the concept
of representative democracy was given substantial expression at the
expense of the appointed administrators.
The law also prescribed that the Mandatory practice of inviting
a Town Engineer to a district commission's sessions whenever issues
which might affect the relevant town were discussed should be a
binding provision; such invitation was made compulsary rather than
discretionary. The law also conferred upon the engineer the right to
be heard before a decision was made by the commission, adding to the
participation of the local institutions in the planning process
[36].
To understand the full significance of the 1954 provisions, it
should be remembered that local authorities had demanded a greater
share in the planning decision making process ever since the
enactment of the first Ordinance in 1921 [37]. The denial by the
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Mandatory government of this participation was continued after the
establishment of the State of Israel; it was not until political
changes in the coalition government and the appointment of ex-Mayor
of Tel Aviv, Mr. Israel Rokach, as Minister of the Interior, that
this reform was introduced.
The 195 reform had a marked psychological effect on the
operation of the planning machinery. The central government, and
particularly the administrators, could no longer work behind closed
doors and thus lost the administrative freedom which had led to lack
of effective control by both the local people and the general public.
The new participation of "outsiders" made the decision making
process, from the government's point of view, a more vulnerable
affair. It is significant that together with the expansion of the
commissions' membership, new provisions regarding standards of
conduct were introduced. These provisions [38] prohibited the
participation in the commissions' sessions of any members who had an
interest in any matter under discussion. In addition, an obligation
to keep confidential matters discussed by the commission could be
imposed on the members.
It can be argued that the inclusion of these provisions was
indeed overdue and was done on the occasion of the amendment of the
law. It can also be said that the extension of the membership of the
commissions made such rules of conduct necessary. I would suggest
that the inclusion of these provisions had more to do with the change
in the customary pattern of operation of the planning administration
than simply with the objective needs of' imposing desired standards of
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behaviour on public officials.
The 1954 reform was a move from the old secretive style of
government towards a more corporate bureaucracy and open government.
The new integrated central-local government body led to a change in
the balance of planning powers. If in the past the operation of
planning administration had been described as central government
"versus" local authorities and local people, this reform can be
described as central-local government "versus" local people. This
broader governmental organisation formulated a new modus 	 vivendi
for its participants, giving a greater share in the decision making
process to local institutions which became partners (albeit junior
partners) in the administration. This arrangement still deprived the
non-established public and the private property sector from any real
participation in the planning process. This may be seen as a
statutory expression of the supremacy of representative democracy
over public participation and individualism.
It should be pointed out that the change in the status of local
institutions within the planning organisation was not made by
allocating greater powers to local planning commissions, but resulted
from the inclusion of a few local representatives in the main
decision making bodies; i.e. district commissions. The local planning
commissions still retained only an advisory role to the other
planning institutions.
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The 1954 reform established a common platform with free
communication lines between the various governmental ministries
interested in land development. This platform differed from the
Supreme Planning Council in its statutory basis and allowed a more
practical and effective process for the making of binding planning
decisions. Given the problems of inter-ministerial rivalry and the
political and functional conflicts regarding the respective roles of
these different agencies, this could have been a major step towards
integrated governmental policy of land development in the respective
districts. The broad composition could have been utilised to improve
the consistency between the non-statutory sectional planning policies
of the various bodies and the statutory planning product. It could
have narrowed the gap between statutory schemes and 	 actual
governmental implementation which took place in every distr ict. It
could also have helped to realise the national plans which were
formulated by the Supreme Planning Council at the district and local
level, since the same ministries participated in both planning
institutions.
However, despite the potential concealed in this structure,
very little was done in these areas. The ministries took their
membership as as matter of status, administrative pride and even more
as a source of political influence on the commissions' clientele. For
their own development projects they generally accepted the decisions
of the commissions only as long as they fitted with their own
policies. They were able to do this because they were not subject to
statutory development control in their development activities.
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Infighting between the different bodies brought statutory policy
making virtually to a standstill and crucial decisions 	 were
postponed.
The third aspect of the amendment of the law in 195k was a
result of the two effects mentioned above, reflecting the
organisational structure on the product of the machinery. Since
different bodies, each concerned with a different facet of urban and
rural planning and development, were cast together in every district
commission, the scope of the subject matter was significantly
broadened. Aspects of physical, economic, social, political and
security considerations were likely to be involved, even though the
planning product was expressed in the traditional regulatory form of
physical land use. Similarly, since local representatives 	 now
participated in these decision making bodies together with central
government members, preferences of the local public and of the local
institutions which represented that public, in addition to the views
of administrators and professional planners, were likely to affect
the discussions. Planning became less imposed from above and more a
combination of views of the two government levels.	 the other hand,
the growing power of the local representatives made it more difficult
for the government to impose national policies, which again led to a
gap between statutory and non-statutory planning.
From a general perspective, the 195k reform introduced no more
than a limited change in the overall structure of the planning
machinery which continued to operate in the same manner until the new
planning law of 1965.
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The main problems of planning machinery were: (1) the plethora
of planning institutions without any one recognised authority for
making final decisions; (2) the lack of co-ordination between the
many governmental public planning agencies; (3) the lack of
administrative teeth and political backing and influence over
planning implementation of the Physical Planning Department of the
Ministry of Interior; (k) the lack of influence of the governmental
planning institutions over the
	 statutory planning machinery,
particularly at the local level; and (5) the over-politicisation in
the local planning decision making process.
Problems of unco-ordinated activities between the various parts
of the executive power, of inter-departmental rivarly and of
overlapping authority were not limited to the development of new or
old towns, nor to Israel. The overcoming of such problems is one of
the most difficult tasks of any government, and the problem grows
with the increase in new areas of governmental involvement in a
welfare state. In England, the tension between the 	 executive
departments and the Ministry of Fbusing and local government, and
between the planning institutions dealing with economic planning,
transport planning, urban and regional planning were by no means less
than in Israel (39]. In the second part of this work we shall see how
these problems were dealt with in both countries. In the case of
Israeli town and country planning, the unco-ordinated activities of
the governmental/public bodies were particularly harmful; firstly
because of the big share of the public sector in the building
activities and the development market; secondly because of the
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dependence of the new immigrants on the absorption machinery which
led to a paternalistic attitude towards the newcomers; thirdly
because of the conflicting ideologies as to the ideal form of human
habitation (urban versus rural) which affected the approaches taken
by different bodies in land development; and fourthly because of the
political struggle between the many bodies for actual resources and
practical powers and responsibilities to achieve their different
pragmatic goals.
By the early sixties it was realised that the absence of a
recognised body with final authority in planning and implementation
was a major drawback of the system. Further, in view of the dynamic
changes experienced in the country during these years, the statutory
planning organisation was in a state of stagnation, as were many
other administrative institutions. The gap between the existing
structure and a desirable functional machinery was filled by informal
arrangements, which often ignored the rigid planning rules as set up
in highly detailed statutory plans or even in the law itself. The
administrative pattern had the character of anomie which, though it
was not rooted in the whole system but was merely a means of
providing flexibility and enabling the implementation of development
projects, did deviate from legal norms and the rule of law, requiring
the intervention of the High Court of Justice and the State
Comptroller.
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B.	 FOLICIES, PLANS AND PRACTICE DURING THE FIRST STALE
Israel's planning policies were rooted in the pre-State legacy
and influenced by contemporary values, ideologies and perceptions of
prevailing conditions. These policies are discussed here in relation
to both statutory and non-statutory plans. The non-statutory branch
was largely a positive planning system in the sense that it was
concerned with actual development projects carried out by the
government and the public sector at national and regional levels. It
was designed as a macro-planning system with a comprehensive outlook
[I0]. In parallel, the statutory branch was traditionally
conservative, dealing with regulative micro-planning at the local
level. Together these two branches constituted multi-level planning
at national, regional and local levels. This has been characteristic
of the Israeli planning system since the early days of Statehood.
This systematic approach, from the most general to particular,
reflected the Zionist enthusiasm for building a new independent
State.
From the very start and despite an atmosphere of crisis,
transition and rapid change, the government clearly articulated its
planning policies. This contributed to the institutionalisation of
the planning system during the first stage.
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The major planning policies of Israel were described by the
Minister of the Interior in the Knesset Lt1]. They can be outlined as
follows:
1. Location of the population throughout the country while giving
priority to absorption of immigrants in the sparsely populated
areas of the Negev and the Galilee.
2. Location of industry, development of communications networks
(including air and sea ports) and a water supply grid in
accordance with the needs of the population dispersal policy
and at the prescribed stages of priority.
3. Consolidation and extension of the rural settlements.
IL.	 Protection of agricultural land as a national resource and
prevention of urban sprawl.
5. Crystallisation of urban development while tending to economise
on land, costs and services.
6. Prevention of speculative trade in land by integrating planning
and municipal physical policies.
7. Rehabilitation of slums and inner city areas.
- 212 -
8. Widing physical development in Arab villages while considering
their special character.
9. Conservation of sites of architectural, historical, religious
and national importance.
10. tvelopment of national parks and natural reserves.
These policies are elaborated below while describing the
preparation of plans during this first stage.
1.	 National Policy for the Dispersion of the Population
As early as 19L 9, on the occasion of the establishment of the
first elected Knesset and Government, Israel's planning and
development tasks were outlined, formally incorporated in the "Basic
Principles of the Government Programme", and approved by the Knesset
[2].
The government declared that it would adopt a four—year
development plan whose general tasks were to double the country's
population by means of mass immigration and to achieve intensive
development. For such development, social, economic and physical
objectives were defined. The most relevant here was the first
paragraph which stated the objective of "a rapid and balanced
settlement of the underpopulated areas of the country and avoidance
- 213 -
of excessive urban concentration" [43]. Other paragraphs emphasised
the development of particular areas such as Jerusalem and its
corridor, the Negev, and several other towns in the north of the
country [44]. The government also mentioned developments tasks
relating to housing, employment, agriculture, afforestation, the
setting up of a communications network, industry and tourism.
Fnphasis should be placed on the terms "balanced settlement" on the
one hand and "excessive urban concentration" on the other. The
interpretation of these was crucial to the formulation of the
country's main planning policy; i.e. dispersion of population. This
was done in a series of non-statutory national plans which were
prepared in 1949 and in later years.
The first plan (1949) [45] was to cater for a population of two
million. It was a preliminary plan for the distribution of the
population and industry, location of housing projects on the basis of
that distribution, setting up of a communications network and
establishment of national parks. This first national master plan
advocated tw3 far reaching principles which originated in pre-State
planning conceptions among Jewish planners. Firstly, Tischler's
regional-focal approach was adopted [46]; thus planning regions were
used as territorial units of certain size and population which
provided a pattern for overall national planning. Secondly, Brutzkus'
arguement for the creation of a hierarchy of settlements through the
establishment of regional centres and small and mediun sized towns
was accepted [47]. The main drawback of this plan, however, was that
it was prepared before a proper study of the physical, social and
economic conditions had been completed.
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By 1951-52 the national plan was given a more articulate and
elaborate form [RB], though its underlying principles remained the
same. It set the number of 2, 650, 000 people as a target for which it
strived to plan. Of this number, 22.6% were to live in agricultural
settlements while the vast majority were to be guided to new urban
settlements away from the big cities.
The national plan consisted of a set of maps and explanatory
statement. It provided the framework for more detailed regional and
local planning. It contained a numerical population target for each
of the regional units which in turn were broken down into estimates
for the growth of individual urban and rural settlements [9].
The policy of population dispersal, pursued in the 1951 and
following plans, was basically an adaptation of the Barlow Report of
1939 [50). This policy was so well received by administrators,
planners and politicians that it became the theme of the entire
planning system in Israel. The circumstances prevailing in Israel
were to some extent similar to those during the post-war years in
Britain. As pointed out in the Barlow Report, the rapid growth of
London was strategically dangerous and had social and economic
disadvantages. This was clearly also the case with Tel Aviv and its
surrounding towns. Particularly in the context of the War of
Independence, the population dispersal policy was seen in a broad
sense as one of the primary objectives of national security. Thus in
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However, as the above table shows, the percentage in population
of the coastal districts of Tel Aviv and Haifa fell to some extent,
while the southern and northern districts gained in Jewish
population. The population in the district of Jerusalem fell while
that of the central district grew. These tendencies did not follow -
indeed to some extent contradicted - the intentions of the planners.
The overall picture by 1966 was a far from balanced development of
the country as a whole.
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The effect of the above-mentioned plans on the actual dispersal
of population is difficult to assess since its implementation was not
in the hands of the planners but depended on the goodwill of the
economic and executive ministries and public bodies.	 Various
interpretations of this policy were given by these different
institutions; the result was a mosaic of opinion, often without
correlation to physical development.
Governmental activities of the first few years, when closely
examined, give the impression becomes clear that the population
dispersal became a goal in itself, even transcending the welfare of
the settlers. The policy exercised by the authorities was a major
tool for social and political control over the new settlers. New
immigrants rather than the veteran population constituted the main
human source for achieving the dispersal policy. They were guided
from the centre to the more remote new settlements where they were
supplied with basic necessities.
Although economic considerations at the initial stage prevented
people from moving back to the central towns, later a new process of
migration from the periphery to the centre took place. This left the
remote districts at a rather low level of social, economic and
physical development. In the atmosphere of collectivism and extensive
governmental intervention, a suggestion was made in planning circles
to impose legal restrictions on the freedom of internal migration,
but this was quickly rejected on the grounds that it was inconsistent
with the democracy of the State. Though administrative attempts were
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made to restrict the growth of Tel Aviv and its metropolitan
surroundings, these failed due to a lack of political determination
to resist the pressure for development in these areas. For the same
reason even the statutory machinery of development control was of no
help.
In 1965 the government approved a recommendation "to use town
planning schemes, staggered in 5-years stages, as an instrument to
control and regulate urban and industrial development" 153]. in
essence this meant a new attempt to halt further concentration in the
central areas, particularly in Tel Aviv and Haifa, by restrictions
imposed through statutory schemes. Since the link between national
and regional policies and local schemes was almost non-existent
before 1965, little use, if any, was made of the existing legal tools
in pursuing the policy of population dispersal. Instead the general
administrative means and discretion to run the country's domestic
affairs were considered sufficient for the task.
2.	 Regionalist Approach and Hierarchy of Settlements
Coupled with the primary policy was a regionalist approach
which advocated the creation of a structure of settlements according
to rank 15k]. This was aimed at replacing the existing primary
structure in which settlements were generally divided between the few
big cities and a large number of small villages. The national master
plan of 1951 155) prescribed five different types of settlement to be
developed throughout the country. These ranged from small
agricultural settlements of 500 people through rural service centres
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of about 2,000 people, urban-rural centres of 6, 000-12, 000, medium
sized towns of 20,000-60,000 and ultimately to the big cities of over
100, 000.
Under the plan, L5% of the total urban population was to live
in big three cities while 55% was to live in medium and small towns
throughout the country. This proposed structure followed the thoughts
in the 1920's of Lewis Mumford [56], Christaller's "central places
theory" [57] and others. This approach, rooted in European regional
practice, emphasised the ratio between the size of a settlement and
the area for which it can provide services. This was adapted to local
conditions in Israel, despite the view of many that the intermediate
ranks of relatively small service centres had no place in such a
compact country as Israel [58].
Under the national plan, every region was to include a regional
(new) town, a few urban rural centres, several rural service areas
and many small villages. The new towns were to be alternatives to the
three main cities, thus breaking the direct economic, cultural and
service links between the single villages and the big city.
The national plan prescribed a new geographical division of the
country Into planning regions. This division was of substantive and
organisational significance. As pointed out, the territory of Israel
was divided into 2I regions and classified under t major zones. This
division was based primarily on the agricultural factor, to which
social, historical, administrative and communication factors were
added. The relatively limited number of regions corresponded to the
- 219 -
requirements of a more modern planning system. The plan strove to
create self-contained regions in terms of demography, economic
opportunity, social and cultural standards, and government
administrative institutions.
More important was that the regionalist approach advocated
harmony between town and country life or, as Professor I-Iashimshony
described it, a "feeling of solidarity between farmer and town
dweller" [59], which he viewed as characteristic of an era of
national stress. The atmosphere of crisis in Israel during the harsh
days of the War of Independence gave rise to a strong sense of social
solidarity, of which this integrated planning approach was a result.
Professor Cadman similarly describes the post-War English
planning system as a reflection of the conviction that "the sense of
collective goodwill that lay behind the war effort would surely spill
over into peacetime" [60]. The combined effort in the rebuilding of
Britain was to be shared by the public and private sector. As he
explains, owing to political and economic influence this envisaged
co-operation between the two sectors turned out to be a conflict and
subsequently became a bargaining process between the public and
private sectors.
In Israel, however, that apparent integration was conceptually
dominated by a rural ideology, particularly evident in the most
famous regional planning project of the "Lachish Region" north of the
Negev [61]. This project was carried out after 195k-55 under the
Ministry of Agriculture and the Jewish Agency. It involved a
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composite regional plan of about 30 small villages, 6 rural service
centres and one regional town. Though ostensibly it followed the
urban-rural integrated concept, a close look at the planned function
of the town reveals the dominance of the rural ideology. The town,
called Kiryat t, was rightly described as a "rural town": it was
planned to live for and from the surrounding agricultural settlements
rather than as a town in its own right. Its function as a centre for
the major processing plants of the agricultural produce of the region
was given the most emphasis, while other functions such as a centre
for administrative, commercial and cultural services received only
secondary attention.
Similarly, rural ideology dominated the intermediate levels in
the hierarchical settlnent concept. The planning of the small
rural-urban centres and the regional towns could be classified as
ruralisation of urban life. Their planned function was similar to
that of Kiryat Gat; namely to serve the hinterland and thus be
totally dependent on the rural sector.
Even the internal planned structure of the new towns combined
rural villages and urban settlements. Emphasis was placed on
decentralisation and low density, separate neighbourhood units, green
belts, open spaces, large plots of land and even agricultural farms
as an auxiliary source of employment 162]. These components were
adopted from the British concept of "garden cities". Fbward's ideas
fitted in well with the rural ideology prevailing at that time.
However, this ideological basis was not sufficient to ensure planning
success due to the fundamental differences in the geographical,
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social and economic circumstances between Israel in the early fifties
and Frope of the 19th century. The new towns lacked the intensive
and dynamic style which characterises urban life and were thus aptly
named by one writer as "semi-agricultural hybrids". The dispersion of
buildings proved very costly in 	 terms of construction	 and
maintenance; green areas required large investment and	 large
quantities of water which were unavailable, and the distances between
dwelling houses, public centres and place of work proved very
inconvenient [63].
As a result of these early years, there was a significant
change in policy towards a crystalisation of the various parts into
more coherent towns, intensification of land use through higher
densities and less open spaces, together with more heterogenous
housing aimed at achieving social integration. Neighbourhoods were
populated on a basis of profession and place of work rather than on
the immigrants' country of origin.
3.	 New Towns
As for the implementation of the hierchical structure of
settlements and the policy of regionalism, about thirty regional
towns were established during this stage [6'L]. Some were entirely
new, others were based on old urban nuclei, and a few emerged from
the temporary immigration camps and Ma'aborot.
When the new towns are looked at as components of the regional
policy it can be seen that the results were not encouraging. The
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rural sector continued to develop its settlements independently,
maintaining its links with the big cities. The social and economic
gap between these towns and the older rural settlements grew wider
and the value of the new towns for the development of the rural
region was minimal [65]. In these circumstances the envisaged
rural-urban integration was unworkable and the regional policy could
not be accomplished.
Furthermore, the new towns - besides being the prime tool for
population dispersal and regional policies - were also the major
method of absorbing immigrants, though even in this respect the
results were far from satisfactory. Although some towns did grow
steadily, others were stagnant, and even those which showed some
success suffered from serious setbacks. The low standard of housing
and educational, social and cultural facilities, the lack of a proper
economic basis and an exaggarated reliance on the surrounding
agricultural settlements were all particularly harmful. These
affected the social structure of these towns which became
predominantly populated by Sephardi Jews. Thus not only did the
population process of the towns develop haphazardly, but the social
and economic disadvantages added enormously to the state of crisis in
many of these new towns. Those who left the towns were mainly the
young, the more skilled and the better educated. One writer [66] was
led to the conclusion that the national tasks of dispersion of the
population and social integration were contradictory.
A committee set up to examine the policy of population
dispersal [67) found that towns below a certain number of inhabitants
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(10,000) could not function properly. This acted counter to the prime
tenets of the policy of a hierarchy of settlements. The committee
found that in the conditions of Israel, the small towns failed. They
were in economic and social decline, in a constant struggle for
survival and were thus a heavy burden on public funds. By 1965 the
government approved the recommendation "to abstain from the creation
of additional new towns while devoting every effort to the
consolidation of those already in existence."
Consolidation of the Rural Settlement
As discussed above, linked with the policy of regionalism was
rural planning or the physical layout of rural settlements which is
part of the overall agricultural planning. This branch was the most
experienced and advanced, yet the national plan of 1951-52 and
subsequent plans dealt with its aspects only briefly. This was due to
the fact that agricultural planning was the realm of a rival planning
agency, the rural sector. The national plan thus only summarised the
detailed sectional planning which was produced by the rural
institution.
In 199-50 the rural sector published its own plan 168]. This
was the work of a joint committee for rural settlement planning which
consisted of representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and the
Jewish Agency.
On a national level this plan set up a target of 66,000 farm
units by 195L1. These were to be created in new settlements which
- 22 -
would comprise a population of 520,000 (26% of Israel's population
target of 2,000,000 as set up by the 199 national master plan).
Dispersal of the rural population was one of the main principles of
this plan. With this in mind, the plan took into account the
availability of free agricultural land, water resources, irrigation
schemes and, not the least, the country's security needs. The latter
led to the erection of settlements in frontier zones. The plan did
not provided a detailed indication of the location of each settlement
but merely a table of farm units and their distribution between the
various geographical regions.
No less than 3t5 new rural settlements were established in the
short period between 1948 and 1953. From l954 to 1965, regional
projects and other developments added another 70 settlements [69].
Most of these were moshavim (co-operative settlements) and the rest
were kibbutzim (collective settlements) and other types. This
massive agricultural settlement brought with it not only social and
economic change but also made a huge contribution to the dispersion
of settlements, creating a new map of Israel.
The planning of rural settlements and agricultural production
was closely connected with planning and execution of major national
projects regarding water utilisation, which took place during the
first stage [70]. It was also connected with the improved methods of
irrigation and soil conservation. However, far beyond the economic
aspect, the striking part of this facet of planning was in its social
sphere. Rural settlement in Israel was an experiment in social
planning. The settlement or inexperienced, untrained and often
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unmotivated new immigrants was performed directly from the centre by
the absorption authorities. In a similar method of settling the new
towns, the immigrants were taken "from the ship to the farm" so as to
remove the temptation of settling in the metropolitan centres. Since
immigrants were located as groups in rural villages, this determined
their political auspices and the allegiance of their members, at
least for the first few years. This centralised social engineering
resulted in a situation where the immigrants were highly dependent on
the administrative and political institutions [71].
Though, as stated, the rural sector showed a high level of
proficiency in agricultural planning which resulted from the many
years of intensive rural development under central management, this
sector showed little desire for collaboration with the urban sector
in land development. The rural sector obviously accepted the
supremacy of the national objective, yet gave its own interpretation
to the tasks of security, absorption of immigrants, dispersal of
population, etc. Since this sector regarded itself as the true
realisers of Zionism and as the leading social and economic force in
achieving Israel's national goals, it developed - or rather continued
- its independent approach to land development. Its organizational
links with the Ministry of Agriculture and the Jewish Agency [72]
ensured direct control over public land, water resources, financial
means and large economic corporations, together with influence over
the immigrant absorption machinery enabling it to direct new
immigrants to predetermined new villages. All these promoted the
creation of an almost self-contained sector. Its ideological and
political conceptions continued to feed its anti-urban attitude and
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it required heavy political pressure and professional and
administrative authority, together with the backing of public
opinion, to get this sector to operate according to a unified policy
of regionalism. These prerequisites barely existed during this stage
and instead the government was committed to a policy of expansion and
consolidation of rural settlements, while no parallel care was shown
for the development of urban settlements 173].
At the local planning level the rural plan created seven
different types of agricultural farm of which each, though they had a
common basis of the old "diversified model" 17k], gave priority to a
different product. Their agricultural production was directed to meet
the food shortages of the first few years. Two major innovations were
the creation of a new type of "working farm" suitable for the hilly
country, reflecting the urgent need to facilitate development of the
hilly regions of Galilee and Judea (the Jerusalem corridor), and the
planning of agricultural settlements which were to be populated
wholly with inexperienced new immigrants. This indicated the role
rural settlements played in the immigrant absorption 175].
In 1953 a further agricultural plan was prepared for the
following seven years 176]. This plan introduced some important
modifications to the pattern of farms. It advocated a greater
specialisation in agricultural production in the light of different
regional conditions, replacing the "diversified model" which mostly
suited the shaky security conditions of the pre—State period and the
first years after independence. In that era, every settlement had to
have all the means to survive in isolation. With the growing
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confidence in Israel's ability to defend its borders, settlements
could start relying on other villages and economic sectors for the
supply of their necessities, without the need to be run as an
autarchy [77).
This change to specialised agricultural production is an
example of economic influence on physical layout in integrated
planning. The new villages were planned differently: in the past,
each dwelling house was planned to be in close proximity to the farm
unit and fields, resulting in a dispersed village; the new concept
planned the village in line with a zoning system, achieving some
degree of separation between dwelling houses, farms units and fields.
The result was a more compact village with easier access to communal
buildings.
5.	 Protection of Agricultural Land and Prevention of Urban
Sprawl
In pursuance of the policy of extension and consolidation of
rural settlements, a policy of protection of agricultural land was
formulated to ensure the availability of land for the rural sector.
The establishment of rural villages in remote areas, on land owned by
the State, required administrative rather than legal measures to
protect agricultural land. In other areas, particularly near the big
cities of the coastal plain where there was growing competition
between rural and urban sectors on land suitable for both, the case
was different. Here additional legally binding powers were required
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to restrict the sprawl of towns into the scarce resources of arable
land. The protection of agricultural land thus became national policy
under the government decision of May 1953 [78J.
A "Committee for the Protection of Agricultural Land", a
non-statutory inter-ministerial body, was set up to consider means
for preserving arable land for agricultural use. The most readily
available tool for accomplishing this task was the town planning law
and, under the government decision, the statutory planning machinery
was required to assign arable land for agriculture and to submit to
that committee any development proposal or scheme which put
agricu],tural land at risk.
The decision of the committee was regarded by planning
authorities as administratively binding and it could also ask the
Minister to use his approval powers in accordance with national
policy. However the committee had no direct statutory powers; neither
did it always have the political backing to ensure the protection of
agricultural land. The result was a delay in the process of urban
sprawl rather than its prevention.
The country's economic needs added weight to the policy of
protection of agricultural land, rooted as it was in ideological
conceptions of rural life. The rapid development of urban and
semi-urban areas on the coastal plain was at the expense of
agricultural land and threatened important branches of agricultural
production such as citrus. Yet large plots of land within those
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settlements remained undeveloped. Economical utilisation of urban
land also required the confinement of urban growth and the prevention
of urban sprawl into agricultural land.
The protection of agricultural land on the coastal plain was
also instrumental in pursuance of the policy of population dispersal
into the outlying districts in the north and south. In reality,
however, the restrictions of transformation of agricultural land into
building lots resulted in a sharp increase in land prices and, in
turn, in speculative gains rather than any significant migration into
other districts.
6.	 Geographical Distribution of Industry
An important aspect of the population dispersion policy was the
geographical distribution of industry. In Israel industry was
developed gradually during the years of this stage. Growing defence,
social and economic needs led to a shift of emphasis not only from
ruralism to urban ism but also from agricultural production to the
development of Industry.
In 198 industry composed about 20% of the GNP and about 20% of
the total labour force [79]. There were about 1,400 industrial
enterprises, most of which were small and developed by the private
sector. These enterprises were generally "footloose"; i.e. they could
be located in any district since they were largely independent of
local raw material and mineral resources. They did however require a
communications network, water, drainage, electricity and manpower,
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which brought them into the vicinity of the big cities on the coastal
plain rather than to less development districts. the other hand,
the high cost of land in the central areas and the congestion which
limited further expansion, together with the advantage to some
industries of being close to raw material, were factors making
industries more willing to move to the more remote areas [80).
When the population dispersal policy was formulated, a similar
distribution of industry was designed to facilitate the absorption of
immigrants in the outlying districts, particularly in the new towns.
The plan of 1951-52 was built on a forecast of industrial growth and
prescribed the relative share of each region in that growth [81]. A
balanced development of the country was to be achieved through this
planned distribution.
In order to provide for a proper infrastructure and services
for industries in the pre-determined districts, the national plan
entered the realm of micro-planning by prescribing in detail a model
of an industrial estate. The model was to answer the special physical
needs of industry which could not always be provided, even in the
central districts [82].
The above over-emphasised the physical aspects of industrial
planning and design without proper consideration of economic factors.
The encouragement of industry in underdeveloped areas merely through
the planning of industrial estates was naive or, rather, illustrates
the inherent inability of the Physical Planning Ipartment to
accomplish much without political and administrative backing. The
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root of the problem lay in the organisationa]. structure of the
government. The responsibilities and the means of developing industry
were in the hands of the economic ministries and not in those of the
Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry was
not involved in the preparation of the national master plan of
1951-52, nor was it represented in the Supreme Planning Council.
Given the political conditions, it is not surprising that the
Ministry did not take any substantial steps to implement the policy
of distribution of industries during the first years.
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry first published Its own
industrial development plan as late as 1957 [83]. This was not an
Integrated physical-economic-social plan, but only economic. Further,
it was not an overall comprehensive industrial plan but rather a
collection of seperate targets for industrial investment. Emphasis
was placed on particular projects in various sectors in order to
improve Israel's capacity to produce the basic needs of the local
market. Thereafter a forecast of industrial development between
1960-65 was published as part of the general economic planning of
Israel [8I]. This included an outline of industrial policies with
regard to the various sectors.
In practice, substantial government aid to industrial
development did not begin before the mid-1950's. Since then, during
the first and second stages, Israel has undergone an accelerated
process of industrialisation.
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Under the ideology of collectivism, public enterprises were
regarded as the most suitable means of achieving a high degree of
industrialisation. Publicly owned companies were established in
various branches of industry, particularly in production based on
locally available raw material or skilled human resources [85]. At
the same time enormous efforts were made by the government to attract
private capital from within the country and abroad. This, in turn,
gave rise to the ideology of individualism in the economic life of
the country.
Though the country eventually developed a strong private sector
which led to ideological-political change towards individualism, the
initial stages of industrial development were marked by the
ideologies of collectivism and representative democracy. These are
clearly seen in the formulation of a special legal framework called
the Encouragement of Capital Investment Law 5710 - 1 950. First
enacted in 1950, the law underwent several amendments during that
decade [87]. Notably the law stated only vaguely the criteria for
granting "approved enterprise" status, a status which could lead to
many economic advantages [88]. Other parts of the law were also
significant in the extensive discretion vested with the
administration [89].
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This law is also of relevance in the context of the policy of
distribution of industry. As the consolidated version of 1959 [90]
stated, its objective (Sec. 1) is "to attract capital to Israel and
to encourage initiative and investment of foreign and local capital
with the view to ... (3) the absorption of immigration, the planned
distribution of the population over the area of the State and the
creation of new sources of employment".
However, none of the main planning documents of the Ministry of
Industry and Commerce dealt with the geographical dispersal of
industry, nor were they in accord with the policy of regionalism
formulated by the Physical Planning Department. The result was a lag
between Israel's physical and industrial development. The new towns
lacked the most importance source of employment for their
development. This had extensive economic and social effects on the
towns. For example, the rates of unemployment and employment in
relief job schemes was, during this stage, much higher among the new
towns of the north and the south than those of the central areas
[91). With the lack of political pressure and public opinion to force
collaboration between industrial planning bodies and physical
planning agencies, no integrated planning emerged during this stage.
By the end of this stage, the government had approved a
recommendation to stagger government support for Industrial and hotel
investment in accordance with the population dispersal policy. This
entailed restrictions on public and private investment in the coastal
plain, either directly by general legislative measures or by means of
statutory planning schemes (92].
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7.	 Communications Network as a Tool for Balanced Development
A new communications system with an orientation determined by
the shape of the country and changed conditions was crucial to a
policy of balanced development. This was a precondition for the
realisation of the national plans for population and industrial
dispersal, since it provided the required access to underdeveloped
areas. A rational communications outlook meant an integrated system
of roads, railways, new ports and airfields. Such a system was
prescribed only in broad terms in the master plan of 1951-52 [93].
The plan laid down a network of routes with different functions; two
communication centres for the north and the south; extensions to the
railway system; and planning for the construction and improvement of
ports and airfields.
The main objective was to provide a basic communication link
between the central districts and those of the north, south and
Jerusalem.
In 19118 there were only 1,600 kilometres of paved roads and 121
km of useable railways within the boundaries of Israel. The rapid
development of the country was such that by the mid-i 950's there were
2,500 km of roads and 365 km of railways. A new port was built in
Eilat and the planning of a second deep water port on the
Mediterranean, at Ashdod, had been started. Yet these answered only
part of the country's growing needs [911].
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The Minister of Transport was the main authority in the area of
communication planning. It was his task to prepare detailed plans for
the national	 network, though its implementation was the
responsibility of the governmental Public Works Lpartment of the
Ministry of Labour.
A set of statutes concerning roads, railways, construction and
improvement was inherited from the Mandatory government [95]. It
enabled the authorities to carry out development projects while
expropriating land and restricting the use of adjoining land
independently of the Town Planning 'dinance and its institutions.
As explained in Part I, these Mandatory laws did not provide
for public participation in the communications network, neither
through "public inquir y" nor "object ion" • Only an aggrieved landowner
had any standing in regard to compensation. This legal position was
regarded by the Israeli authorities as advantageous, enabling rapid
and efficient implementation of plans. Motivated by the ideology of
representative democracy, they were concerned with the development of
the communication network and not with the long process of public
participation.
In fact there was very little public opposition to the
country's physical development projects during the first stage. There
was a universal belief in the need for rapid development which, in
turn, nourished the acceptance of the executive authorities as the
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sole arbitrators as to the form, content, location and priority in
national development projects. 	 ly during the second stage was there
some vocal opposition to that conviction.
Qi the other hand, there were many internal wrangles between
the different authorities concerning communication policy making and
allocation of powers and responsibilities. Not only was national
communication planning dispersed among the various central government
bodies, but communication planning at the local level was also
divided among district and local statutory planning institutions
while the actual execution of the local roads was mainly in the hands
of the local authorities.
	
the whole there was great ambiguity as
to who was responsibe for what. Go-ordination between the many
institutions, despite the existence of an inter-ministerial committee
established in 19 4 9 196], was extremely limited.
In 1957 the State Comptroller indicated [97] that there were
major drawbacks	 in the communication	 policies	 and their
implementation and he recommended the establishment of a special
authority with overall responsibility for the roads and
communications network. Even this was not given enough attention.
Long-term communication planning co-ordinated with general physical
planning was neglected for a number of years, while needs grew
rapidly without available investment.
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In the early 1960's the International Bank of Reconstruction
made available a large loan for road construction. A five-year
construction plan for major highways was prepared, though it was made
by the economic Planning Board and the Physical Planning Ipartment
was not actively involved [981.
By the end of this stage, communication planning reflected a
mosaic of policies, often contradicting one and the other. Israel
lacked a clear national communication plan to back its other physical
planning policies.
8.	 Parks, P&fforestation and Landscape Preservation
In accordance with the tradition of preservation which was
manifested in the Mandatory planning system, the Israeli national
plan also gave rise to environmental values regarding natural and
historical amenities. The plan of 1951-52 encompassed a section on
the planning of national parks, nature reserves and forests, and the
preservation of historical and cultural sites and holy places [99].
The plan was based on a survey conducted during the first two years
of Statehood. This section of the national plan was revised in 195k
and 196k [100].
The provisions in these non-statutory plans were again largely
negative in the sense that they aimed at preventing certain uses in
areas designated for preservation: they did not provide for direct
- 238 -
positive development of parks, forests or recreational areas. In
order to give effect to the prescribed restrictions, local statutory
schemes were gradually adapted to these national schemes.
The policy of protecting the landscape and preserving the
country's heritage was sometimes in conflict with the prevailing
attitude of the supremacy of physical and economic growth. As
mentioned, the pressing needs of the growing population, particularly
during the first stage, led to strong emphasis on the supply of basic
needs, even at the expense of the quality of the environment. Only a
strong conviction in the long-term importance of the development of
recreation areas within the country's natural and historical
attractions could counter the rampant physical development prevailing
in Israel.
The clash between these conflicting values is of special
significance since it also gave rise to some participation of the
general public in the decision making process. As noted, such
participation during the first stage was minimal, so that public
involvement in this matter was exceptional. In 1953 a "Society for
the Protection of Nature" was established by university students,
mainly attracting Israeli-born young people. The Society was very
active, not only in preventing the destruction of environmental
values but also in positive actions such as the development of nature
reserves [lOfl.
Another body established in the same year, the "Society for
Landscape Improvements", made significant contributions to the
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restoration of historical sites. The two societies were linked and
were supported by the Ministries of Agriculture and Tourism
(respectively), though they were regarded as voluntary organisations.
They succeeded in mobilising the general public to pay more attention
to environmental problems and subsequently to direct involvement in
the planning process L102]. This landscape preservation policy
provided an opportunity for a breakthrough in the traditional
planning process exercised by elected and nominated members within
the existing legal-administrative framework.
With regard to these particular issues, the second stage began
earlier than 1965 with the enactment of a special legal framework
which was begun with the National Parks and Nature Preservation Law
5723-1963 [103]. However, development in this area will be discussed
as part of the second stage.
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9. The Perception of Statehood and Authority in Statutory
Planning Law Enforcement: The 1951, 1959 Amendments
Notably, the first Israeli amendment to the Mandatory planning
law with regard to enforcement provisions was in 1951 [1014]. The
amending law prescribed a change in the rate of fines for
contravention of planning law. The fine was not only updated in view
of the changes in the value of currency, but was considerably
increased as a deterrent. In addition, a penalty of imprisonment was
introduced, which had not existed in the Mandatory law. Gbviously
this was expected to act as an even greater deterrent to potential
offendors.
In 1959 [105] the rate of the fine was once again updated by an
amending law which, at the same time, introduced some further new
provisions regarding law enforcement. Among these were the powers to
issue "administrative stop orders", i.e. orders requiring an interim
stoppage of building activities, issueable by certain planning
officials, before formal prosecution is made. The breaking of such an
order could lead to an administrative order of demolition. It should
be added that the "administrative stop order" was valid for only
seven days unless confirmed by the Court. It was also subject to the
right of appeal to the Court and if the order was voided the
aggrieved person was entitled to compensation. Nonetheless, the new
provisions were another step towards the growing powers of the
bureaucracy in planning matters.
These new provisions in law enforcement were influenced by the
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scope of illegal construction activities during this stage. This was
a grave problem even in the pre-State period and had not been
resolved even when unauthorised building was regarded automatically
as a criminal offence 1106]. After 19148, the growing activity of
physical development, particularly in the coastal districts, brought
a sharp increase in unauthorised building [107]. This phenomenon not
only frustrated attempts at proper planning but also threatened the
authority of the institutions exercising development control. It may,
therefore, be regarded from the broadest perspective of law and
order, including the authority and legitimacy of the government.
Israel had been socially polarised with immigrants from many
backgrounds. The constitutional order and supremacy of the State's
institutions had to be imposed upon dissident and separatist groups
and individuals. The concept of a sovereign State thus required
ensuring that the law and government orders were obeyed. Since the
growth from a coninunity to a society was accompanied by a decrease in
the effectiveness of legal social control mechanisms, an atmosphere
of complete laissez-faire sometimes prevailed. This atmosphere was
nourished by assumptions of independence and the prolonged war.
Such an atmosphere was evident also in the treatment of the
environment. As one writer [108] stressed, the root of the neglect of
environmental questions lies in the culture of both Eastern Europe
and Arab countries, from where most Jewish immigrants came. In these
cultures "the streets or the domain of the public has not been felt
by the individual to be his responsibility". The new enforcement
provisions were probably intended not only to ensure the quality of
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the environment, but also to contribute to the general objective of
improving law and order.
Given the general public attitude towards the environment, it
is understandable that despite the legal provisions which viewed
unauthorised building as a criminal offence, such action did not
evoke moral condemnation; i.e. it was not popularly stigmatised as
criminal 1109]. Furthermore, some justification for this illegal
action was found in the growing demand for housing which was only
partially met in the central districts and by the fact that plans
were often obsolete and did not answer real needs in a period of
accelerated immigration and growth.
Paradoxically, the new law enforcement provisions which were
aimed at ensuring the authority of the planning institutions and at
imposing law and order in the sphere of physical environment were
also counter-productive due to the way the authorities themselves
used their powers. As during the Mandatory period, the task of law
enforcement was vested primarily in the hands of the local
commissions. Though the district commissions had default powers to
act where local commissions failed to act, they rarely intervened
1110].
In general these planning authorities were reluctant to enforce
the laws and unwilling to bear the political cost of assuming
policing functions regarding compliance. They intervened only when
put under considerable pressure by the press or important civic
groups [111]. Enforcement on a selective basis made those legal
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powers yet another source of political gain and destroyed much of the
legitimacy of the authorities' actions.
Planning law enforcement during this stage therefore continued
to be totally ineffective and one of the most disorganised areas in
public life.
10.	 Collectivism and Individualism in Statutory Planning:
Rearrangement of Plots of Land - The 1957 Amendment
In 1957 new provisions regarding combination and repartition of
plots of land in a detailed scheme were introduced [112). The initial
ideas underlying these provisions were not new: they were first
raised in the 19110's [113]. They probably reflected the outcome of
the dual struggles between the ideologies of representative and
participatory democracy on the one hand, and of collectivism and
individualism on the other.
The new provisions first stated in a general way that a
detailed scheme could impose "the reconstruction of plots by the
alteration of their boundaries or by combining two or more original
plots held in separate ownership, in common" [1111]. The older section
had presumably been aimed at merely minor changes in the boundaries
of plots: this was not the case with the 1957 amendment. Several new
sub-sections which were added by the Israeli legislator to the
Mandatory provisions portrayed a different picture, enabling total
replanning of built, as well as unbuilt, areas and profound changes
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in the existing division of the land.
The law prescribed few guidelines [115) for this significant
reorganisation of the division of plots. These were: (1) New plots
had to be allotted as near as possible to the place where the
allottee's previous plot was situated; (2) The value of the new plot
(or share in the plot) was to be as similar as possible to the old
plot's relative value to other neighbouring plots; (9) When the newly
constituted plots would not allow the maintenance of such relativity
in land values, an adjustment by payment was to be made. Thus an
individual owner who would gain by the new allotment of land whose
value was more than his previous land would be asked to pay back the
excess, while another individual whose new plot was of less value
would be entitled to compensation for his loss.
The principle of maintaining relative land values between the
various landowners did not mean that the value of the land, aS a
whole, could not decrease or increase as a result of the preparation
of the new plan. In either case the land was, in theory, subject to
the general rules of compensation or betterment tax respectively. In
practice, however, since replanning required extensive land for
public use, ccmpensation was set off with betterment tax.
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These provisions typified an increase in the planning
authorities' powers of intervention in private property rights. Such
intervention, supposedly in the interest of the general public,
reflected the dominance of the ideologies of collectivism and
representative democracy. Collectivism was expressed in these
provisions which attempted to overcome the old problem of speculative
division of land that hampered proper planning and development. It
was also expressed in the enabling of large scale positive
development by public enterprises on the new accumulated plots. The
extensive new powers of the authorities allowing them to impose the
rearrangement of plots also reduced to a minimum the bargaining power
of the small landowners whose land was originally located in the
middle of an area designated for new development. Representative
democracy ideology was also expressed in different ways with a new
provision which distinguished between the executive and judicial
powers in matters of rearrangement of plots of land. Under the
amending law [116] the district commission had the final say in
prescribing the new division of plots while the court could only
review questions related to the value of the land for purposes of
compensation.
In the clash between collectivism and individualism the
amending law was not however totally one-sided. As described, the
principle of maintaining the existing shares of land (between the
public and private sectors and within the private sector between
individual owners) was fundamental in the reorganisation of plots.
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The law also allowed the advocates of individualism some
leeway. The old institution of objection to a proposed scheme
continued to be the formal method of participation of an interested
person in the decision making process. In addition to this the
amending law gave the right to an individual landowner to require the
local authority to purchase his land when placed in joint ownership
[117]. This had a far reaching effect due to the financial
difficulties of the local authorities and it acted as a counter to
their willingness to impose that provision.
11.	 Representative Democracy, Collectivism and 1kblic
Participation
In line with the Mandatory tradition, though not with its
underlying colonial ideology, the statutory planning system during
the first stage did not provide for discussion or consultation with
the general public, but merely for a natural justice type provision:
those whose interests might be affected by a statutory scheme were
given the right to lodge their objection. However, the publicity
given to the fact that a process of scheme preparation was under way
was minimal [118], and many were unaware of the new planning
provisions until after the scheme had been approved and implemented.
Even when those interested used their right and objected to a
proposed scheme, they often found that by the time the proposal
reached this stage they could hardly influence the substantive
content of the scheme. The authorities for their part did not
demonstrate, save in minor parts, a willingness to revise their
proposals in view of the objections.
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This state of affairs was encouraged by the prevailing ideology
of representative democracy. It also reflected the early phases in
the evolution of Israel's politics. During the first phase, the
political parties not only helped appoint candidates for the
legislative and executive institutions and played a role in
formulating a general framework for public policies, but they also
performed the role of pressure groups [119]. They dealt with matters
of concern to very small groups and represented them before the
decision making institutions. The parties did not leave much room for
non-institutional public activity and the political system did not
encourage such development.
Further, the heterogenous social composition of Israeli
society, with a high proportion of immigrants from a variety of
backgrounds, helps explain the weakness of non-institutional pressure
groups and the lack of public demand for more involvement in planning
decision making. The process of urbanisation was, by and large,
characterised by a lack of social organisation at the level of
neighbourhoods and quarters [120]. This again reinforced the status
of the formally elected institutions as the sole representatives of
the public.
The prevailing ideology of collectivism and anti-individualism
also prompted the unwillingness of politicians, administrators and
planners to broaden the circle of participants in the planning
process. The existing participation of retailing interests was
regarded as counter to the general public good, and it was assumed
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that an extension of the circle of participants could lead to further
pressure from groups with selfish motives. Planning remained almost
exclusively in the hands of official institutions.
This position was also indirectly supported by the High Court
of Justice in an interesting case dealing with phsyical planning of a
kibt5utz [121]. This case explicitly expressed the reflection of
collectivism in the legal position regarding the question of who was
responsible for determining the future use of the land. The answer
given by the Court vested the right to initiate planning proposals of
a kibbutz with the official institutions rather than with the
settlers themselves. It is the irony of Israeli statutory planning
that such a judgement was made in regard to physical planning of a
kibbutz, since this type of planning has always been an example of
intensive participation of the affected community in the planning
process. The Court stressed the collective ownership of national land
as a reason for preferring the official public institutions over the
settlers themselves.
In comparison, public participation under the Fiiglish system
during the same period was different only in the awareness of the
need for such participation. In practice it was very similar. In 1946
Lewis Silkin, the then Minister of Town and Country Planning, stated
that "the people whose surroundings are being planned must be given
every chance to take an active part in the planning process ... In
the past, plans have been too much the plans of officials and not the
plans of individuals, but I hope we are going to stop that" 1122].
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Despite this statement, the 1947 Act and subsequent legislation
during this stage did not reveal any expectation of public
participation in the plan making process. In England as well as in
Israel the submission of' objections by people whose interests were
affected by a proposed plan was the core of public participation.
However, in England the procedures involved a public inquiry or
private hearing, while in Israel there were informal hearings of
objections by the district planning commissions. Beyond these legal
technicalities it can be assumed that differences in the levels of
administrative and legal maturity between the two countries, and the
tradition of an apolitical civil service in England as opposed to the
then over—politicised bureaucracy in Israel,
	 created	 entirely
different processes of public participation in the two countries.
Each process viewed in its local circumstances led to growing
criticism, though the criticism in England bore substantiQ3. fruits
during the 1960's when the issue of participatory planning was
recognised, administratively and statutorily.
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C.	 PLAN MAKING DURING THE FIRST STAGE
1.	 National Planning as a Process
The formulation of a new master plan in 19 149 was not just a
single act but turned into a continuous process; a new plan was
published every few years. The 1951-52 plan was revised in 1954 and
in 1957-58 a new plan, approved by the Supreme Council, was
published. This in turn was updated in 1961 and 1963 [123).
These successive non-statutory plans had much in common: they
were based on similar ideologies, identified the same type of
problems, shared common objectives and prescribed a similar policy of
population dispersal and balanced development of the country as a
whole. However, the underlying principles and values did not form
part of the plans which were merely the practical implementation of
these parent elements. Based on the country's map, the plans
portrayed the desired distribution of population by prescribing the
target population for every region and town. They indicated in broad
terms the location of industries, agricultural areas, communications
networks, parks and nature reserves and other planning aspects of
national importance. The regulative aspect of land use at national
level was the core of these plans. They did not deal directly with
economic and social planning but merely with the effects of
socio-economic policies on the use of land. This correponded to the
prevailing conception of physical planning among professionals.
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Since the implementation of these plans was in the hands of the
various governmental agents, the planners themselves regarded the
plans as "working hypotheses" and general guidelines 112k]. This
view, according to one critic 1125], resulted in the tendency of
planners to follow the reality of physical development rather than
try to change or control it. In this way they contributed to the
further growth of the central districts and moved away from the
original policy of population dispersal.
2.	 Regions of Priority
Complementary to the national plans was a plan in which the
various geographical regions were categorised according to a
hierarchy of six priorities for public investment and directed
development. This was aimed at strengthening the policy of population
dispersal. It clearly indicated that the southern and northern
regions, and in them the newly established towns, were the preferred
areas for public development. The first plan of this kind was
prepared and approved by the cabinet in 1955 and in 19614 a new
updated plan was prepared as part of the national master plan 1126].
These plans also dealt only with the physical aspects and did
not elaborate the social and economic factors of planned regional
priorities. Again this was a result of the organisational structure
of, and the division of powers between, the planning bodies and the
ministries responsible for econanic development. The fact that each
governmental body was left to decide the priority to be given to each
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region made the very concept of a co-ordiriated governmental policy
futile.
In 1965 the committee which dealt with the implementation of
population dispersal recommended more integrated governmental
activity in order to overcome the gap in the development of' the
various regions 1127].
3.	 District (Regional) Plans
Following the national plans, a general set of district
(regional) plans for the districts of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa
were prepared after 1951 1128]. These were broad outlines and aimed
at applying the principles defined by the national plan. These
blueprints gave some indication as to the way land was to be used in
the respective regions. Following the Mandatory planning legacy
regarding the functional basis of the different regions, the first
district (regional) plans prescribed that Haifa was to be the
industrial, commercial, communication and administrative centre of
the north and Jerusalem was to continue as the cultural, spiritual
and political centre, while undergoing extensive demographic,
econnic and physical growth in the town itself and in the Jerusalem
Corridor. The Tel Aviv region was to be restricted in its growth and
the surplus population directed to the periphery 1129].
These plans were not regional in the sense of positive planning
under the policy of regionalism as explained above. They also
differed from plans following the rural-urban integrated planning
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policy, as described in reference to the Lachish project. They were
simply non-statutory negative planning provisions and guidelines for
statutory local schemes. These schemes were small-scale and failed to
fulfill the expectation of covering the whole map of Israel with a
second tier of non-statutory regional plans.
Local Plans
National and regional policies were to be realised at the local
planning level. However, local statutory planning during the first
stage was in a state of total chaos. In view of accelerated physical
and economic development and dramatic social changes, the old
pre-Independence schemes (when they existed) became obsolete, not
reflecting the new national and regional policies. A new set of
outline and detailed local schemes were required if planning was to
have any influence on reality.
The enthusiasm of the planners in the early 1950's to provide
extensive local schemes was very promising. They envisaged systematic
planning of the growth of towns according to the population targets
set up by the national plan. New local schemes were to elaborate on
the functional links between towns and other settlements in each
region. Special emphasis was to be placed on improving housing
standards, rehabilitation of slum quarters, building of a better
communications network, open spaces and green belts. The new schemes
were expected to move from conservative, architectural-oriented
Mandatory planning to a much more comprehensive and positive
approach. It was hoped that this approach would also remedy the
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ill-effects of the disorderly developments and speculative
utilisation of urban land, both characteristic of the pre-State
period.
In reality very little was done to formulate new local outline
schemes which would give an overall picture of the future development
of urban areas. The preparation of such plans in the light of the
general policies was left to the local statutory planning machinery.
The only exceptions were that of Jerusalem and the new towns, which
were planned by central government planning agencies rather than by
local authorities [130]. In fact only a few local commissions were
engaged in systematic planning [131]. Improvisation, or rather
hand-to-mouth planning, was much more common, and most of the work
was devoted to detailed planning of particular neighbourhood where
public pressure and, more often, private developers, demanded it.
Most statutory plans were no more than variations of old plans with
regard to particular parcels of land [132]. They often provided for
higher densities and relaxation of building limits, as demanded by
private developers. Even the more comprehensive post-Independence
schemes were still prepared under the 1936 Ordinance, following the
early Mandatory traditions of rigid land use maps and emphasising the
architectural-aesthetic aspects of town planning. Zoning was employed
as the prime tool for regulating physical development. These plans,
intended first and foremost as guidelines for the exercise of control
over building activities, soon became out of date and were unable to
serve their original purpose.
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The neglect of local planning in many urban areas can be partly
explained by adherence to the pro—rural and anti—urban ideology. As
pointed out, the dominant attitude among governmental ranks favoured
agricultural settlement in frontier zones, or at least new urban
settlements in these areas. The growth of the big towns in the
central regions was regarded as an obstacle to the accomplishment of
the main planning objectives and thus received little government
attention. The local authorities lacked any vision, willingness and
technical staff to produce their own comprehensive plans, and their
strong dependence on the central government left them without the
powers and means to carry out large scale development projects.
Housing, public works, industrial and commercial development were
usually the tasks of the central government or the realm of the
private sector. In fact the local authorities had few functions in
these areas and their main resource was development control. The
fewer updated statutory schemes there were, the wider was the
discretion of local commissions in exercising the power of
development control which, as pointed out, enabled them to use power
to achieve political and financial gain.
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D.	 THE LEGAL-ALMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM AND THE PLANNING SYSTEM
The Israeli planning system was built on Israel's democratic
political culture. The part played by each of the three branches, the
Knesset as legislator, the Government as the executive, and the
judiciary (particularly the High Court of Justice) were well evident
in planning.
1.	 The Legislator
The legislator made the initial act of carrying over the
Mandatory Town Planning Law, the most practical method of avoiding a
legal vacuum, while making some adjustments to the law. However, the
legislator did not work systematically according to a pre-conceived
wholesale reform but responded to pressures to tackle certain
aspects, while ignoring others. The result was a piecemeal change in
the existing law, turning it into a disorderly mixture of Mandatory
and Israeli concepts and ideologies, and the impact of statutory
planning on the overall development was - if not negative -
unimportant.
Why was the expected reform in the dynamic sphere of town and
country planning delayed for such a long time? Why was the huge gap
between legal tools and actual development needs for which these
tools were designed allowed to continue?
These facts are particularly difficult to grasp in the light of
the fact that the planning legislation was largely the product of the
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1930's and was already regarded by the mid19 1 0's as inadequate by
the Mandatory administration, the Jewish communal institutions and
professional planners alike [133).
The explanation for this legislative omission requires a
distinction between formal and substantive causes.
Formally, the preparation of the new planning law was not
neglected. Planning legislation was on the agenda since the fourth
stage of the Mandatory rule, as described in Part I [13i. In 19k9,
the Minister of Labour and Construction, then responsible for town
planning, set up a public committee to prepare new legislation [135].
the basis of this committee's report, a detailed proposal was
prepared in 1953 by the Ministry of the Interior, which then was in
charge of planning matters [136]. After some years of elaborations, a
draft Planning and Building Law 5917-1959 [137] was submitted to the
Knesset. This bill did not even have a first reading since, owing to
a political crisis, the Knesset was dissolved. The formation of a new
coalition brought political changes in the Ministry of the Interior,
resulting in further examination of the proposed law, and a revised
version of the bill was submitted in 1962 [138]. The Knesset dealt
with it extensively and, in 1965 (after almost twenty years of
preparation), a new Israeli planning law was promulgated.
These were the overt events which delayed and then led to the
promulgation of the new law. However, behind this process there were
more substantial reasons for the long "pregnancy" of this Israeli
law.
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First, the objective conditions of constant crisis and
emergency obviously influenced the priorities of the executive and
the legislator. There were so many compelling problems requiring
solutions that only a firm conviction of the importance of the
pattern of planning in general, and of planning law in particular,
could have led to the introduction of well thought out planning
legislation. Such a conviction did not exist among many of the ruling
elite in Israel and a new planning law was considered by them to be
of secondary importance.
Second, the ideological conflicts, political rivalry and
clashes of interests to which the preparation of new planning
legislation gave rise did not encourage a determination to create a
new legal framework. A common tendency to avoid controversy by means
of inaction was applied and the old planning law served as a measure
of status quo between conflicting attitudes.
Third, the existing legislation served the bureaucracy well to
a great extent and, since there was only limited professional
pressure and almost no public demand for comprehensive reform, the
old system was maintained. The existing law allowed the central
government, particularly the Ministry of the Interior, to control
local development. It was thus a source of political influence. At
the same time it allowed executive ministries to pursue their
development projects free of statutory control. The law was also a
source of political strength for local authorities, mainly through
their control over development.
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Fourth, the informal administrative patterns of non-statutory
planning provided a favourable alternative to legal tools. This also
fit well into prevailing anti-planning attitudes which advocated
pragmatism and flexible methods' in the bureaucratic work of the
central and local administration.
For all these reasons, the Israeli planning law remained
largely unchanged during the first stage and its characteristics were
generally those of the Mandatory law. The law remained paternalistic,
allowing the authorities to impose planning from above rather than
encouraging the emergence of planning from the local will. It was
also conservative in its regulatory land use approach, as opposed to
an approach advocating comprehensive and positive planning; it was
interventionist by entering excessively into the realm of private
property rights; and of limited scope, since it dealt merely with
local planning.
Although various ideologies and values have been given as
factors influencing the different provisions of the law, the most
convincing manifestation is that of collectivism-socialism as opposed
to individualism-liberalism.
2.	 The Executive
The executive under the rule of a coalition headed by the
Labour Party was generally motivated by democratic-socialist ideology
and was extensively involved in planning and physical development. As
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described above, the executive made more use of its non-statutory
discretionary powers than of statutory powers. The dramatic physical
development of Israel cannot therefore be attributed to any efficient
planning law, though it was related to the general legal system. This
system, which enabled a flexible implementation of physical
development by the government and public sectors, played an important
role in this area. The indefinite power of the executive to run the
country's affairs was subject both to explicit statutes and to
democratic principles. Pn example of the former is the Town Planning
Ordinance which explicitly prescribes the powers, rights and duties
of all the participants in the planning and development process. This
law, which gave wide powers to the administration, provided the
framework for statutory local planning only. In the fields of
national and regional non-statutory planning and government
development, the executive's general discretion prevailed.
Given the highly politicised nature of the Israeli bureaucracy,
this system allowing wide discretionary powers had a very negative
effect, with built-in incentives to manipulate resources	 for
political and sectional ends.
In addition, the other limitation on the general power of the
executive - democratic principles - provided only a loose constraint
and was applicable mainly when the rights of an individual were at
stake. An example of this is the application of the Common Law
attitude that the individual is at liberty to do whatever he wishes
so long as it is not forbidden by law. Hence the government, in its
non-statutory planning and development activities, could not impose
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limitations on pr ivate property owners.
3.	 The Judiciary
The judiciary during this formative stage had the important
role of determining the democratic tenets of Israel, which was
particularly the task of the High Court of Justice. Here the Court
was not engaged merely in law application or textual interpretation,
but in actual law making. General principles were also defined by
this Court in the areas of constitutional and administrative law,
which obviously influenced the operation of the town planning
machinery. In addition the Judiciary played a more particular role in
planning associated with the interpretation and application of the
town planning legislation.
The Court was not asked to deal with issues related to the
exercise of non-statutory national or regional policies, nor to deal
with governmental involvement in the physical development market. It
may be assumed, however, that had such matters been referred to the
Court, it would have refused to consider them under the "doctrine of
justiciabiity" and the requirement of "standing" [139]. In the first
years of statehood, the High Court of Justice showed a relatively
high degree of self-restraint. In a set of decisions, the Court
repeatedly confirmed the principle that domestic policy, as well as
defence and foreign affairs, were in substance matters for the
political-administrative institutions rather than for the Courts.
Similarly, the Court ruled that substantive planning decisions were a
matter for the planning machinery and that the Court was neither a
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further instance of appeal nor a supreme planning body for
re-examining such matters [140].
The Israeli Court was following the well-established line in
the English system [141] which had been adopted by the Mandatory
courts [142], whereby matters of planning policy as well as other
questions of vires were left to the discretion of the planning
authorities. The inevitable result was that such matters could not be
challenged in court. In Israel this self-restraint was explained
[143] as an adherence to the constitutional order; i.e. the
separation of powers between the branches of government. It also
reflected the Courts' functional inability to decide such matters for
lack of experience and clear guidelines.
In 194 8, in one of the first cases considered by the High Court
of Justice [144], President Justice Zemora said: "the task of this
Court is to make sure that the law will be obeyed and that the
executive power would not act in infringement of the law. Thus as
long as the executive power is acting within the framework prescribed
by the law, it is not in the power of this Court to examine the
nature of the action." This expression of a conservative vision of
the Court's role was also reflected when the High Court emphasised
that planning matters "are wholly within the province of the planning
authorities and it will not interfere with the exercise of their
discretion in cases in which they have acted	 lawfully" [145].
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This narrow attitude of the Judiciary regarding its role in
reviewing administrative actions or, more specifically its
non-interference in planning decisions, considerably supported the
planning administration. Thus the Court promoted, even
unintentionally, the concept of paternalistic planning which was
motivated by the ideologies of representative democracy and
collectivism. It contributed to the self-confidence of planning
authorities and discouraged, if only psychologically, direct
involvement of non-organised public in what appeared to be solely the
concern of the executive power [1L6].
In HCJ 16/50 Igra Rama V Tel Aviv t4.inicipal Council [1I7],
Justice Agranat made some general comments on the statutory planning
system:
is well known, when the Mandatory legislator enacted the
Town Planning Ordinance 1936 (with all its subsequent
amendments) he strove to accomplish certain objectives with
regard to the public good. For example, the improvement of
public health and protection of public hygiene, development of
roads in certain areas, the improvement of housing conditions,
beautifying neighbourhoods, etc. He tried to carry out this
objective (sic) at the expense of the individual's freedom to
develop his land as he wished; that is, at the expense of
private property rights ..." (18].
Here the Court classified town planning law under the domain of
public law as distinct from private law. Thus without a specific
statutory right, any neighbour or aggrieved person had no standing on
which to challenge the authorities' decision. Planning application,
the Court added, is a matter between the local authority and the
applicant. The remedy of an aggrieved neighbour would be in the
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sphere of private law, by direct proceedings between the two
neighbours, which would take place in the ordinary courts rather than
in the High Court of Justice [1149].
The practical result of this judgement was that it freed the
planning authorities from defending in Court the bulk of their
decisions regarding the granting of planning permission 1150].
Subsequent judgements of the High Court of Justice continued
the same trend of protecting the extensive discretion of the planning
authorities. In HCJ 327/60 Rafaeli V Jerusalem District Planning
Commission [151], the Court upheld a local commission's decision to
refuse a planning permit even when the reason given by the commission
was invalid though other lawful reasons existed to refuse that
permit.
In another case 1152], the Court did not entertain a motion by
a petitioner who claimed that because of discrimination his planning
application was refused while a similar application by somebody else
was successful. The Court rejected this petition on the ground that
"a grant of undesirable 'relaxation' in one case could not possibly
justify the award of a similarly undesirable permit" [153].
Similar results emerged from the Court's rulings on other
provisions of statutory planning. For example, the Court gave an
almost free hand to local authorities to determine the right time for
implementing plans which designated land for expropriation for public
purposes [1514]. In one case [155] involving 12 years of delay in
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carrying out expropriation and in another [156] 114 years, both were
regarded by the courts, in the circumstances, as not unreasonable
periods of time, while affirming that the authorities were the bodies
to determine priorities in public expenditure.
These cases also helped prcmote representative democracy
ideology in planning. Furthermore, the Court not only helped
institutionalise the authority of the planning authorities, but also
promoted the powers of the public bodies in charge of administering
national land. By supporting these representative bodies, the Court
reflected the superiority attached to national over factional
considerations.
This tendency is revealed in HCJ 14/55 Em Harod V The Minister
of the Interior [157]. This case involved a conflict between two
kibbutzim (rural settlements) regarding a piece of land, Planning
proposals for that land which had been submitted by one kibbutz to
the planning authorities had been approved and supported by KKL, a
body of the Jewish Agency which administered national land, and the
formal landowner. The proposal of the rival kibbutz, the petitioner,
was not supported by KKL. This fact became crucial in determining the
legality of the planning procedures. The final statement of Justice
Vitkon had wide and general application. He said:
"Thus, that tiring technical dispute on planning procedures
involves an important and substantive question with great
significance to the rural settlement in our land. The question
is: who determines the future of this land; KKL (Jewish
National Fund), the legal landowner, or the settlers who settle
on It. This Is the main question and we think that the answer
is not in any doubt. KKL land is a national property and the
decision is in the hands of its executive. This answer does not
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derogate from the rights of those who are called to cultivate
the land and to grant a redemption for the land. This is the
only answer which not only is consistent with the legal
position but also with the basic principles of national
settlement as were formulated as early as in the Fifth Zionist
Congress. With due respect to the settlers' wish it can not
stand against the wish of the institution in charge of
settlement affairs" [158].
Occasionally the High Court of Justice did adopt a bolder
attitude towards its role in reviewing substantive as well as
procedural aspects of planning decisions. Several examples in which
this attitude is manifested point to another impact the Court had on
the planning system relating to the protection of the individual's
proprietry rights against planning authorities when they acted
improperly. Here the Court's attitude was of considerable help to the
liberal ideology of individualism against socialist collectivism and
to a greater extent the ideology of participatory democracy against
representative democracy.
The fundamental dilemma inherited in regulative planning, the
conflict between public interests and private rights, was in fact
resolved by the law in giving supremacy of the former over the
latter. Since Israel has no constitution, the mere act of the
legislator in re-enacting the Town Planning Ordinance was sufficient
to assert the legality of planning provisions (159]. However the
Court did try to minimise the polarity of the conflict by advocating,
wherever possible, a policy of balance between the two interests.
In many cases the individual had to be protected when the
authorities exceeded their powers. For example, in HCJ 192/6I Shemtov
Argaz V Jerusalem District Planning Commission [1W], a proposed
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scheme was deposited in 195k and the procedures for its approval were
not carried out for ten years. During that time the petitioner, who
owned a vacant plot of land in the area covered by this scheme, was
unable to use the land which had been frozen. Under Prt. 18 of the
1936 Ordinance, there was a minimum period before which the
authorities could not make the final decision of approval. Fbwever
the law did not prescribe a maximum period within which a decision
had to be made. Thus, since the landowner could not move the planning
commission to carry out the procedures, he lodged a petition with the
High Court of Justice. The Court in this case applied the principle
that an authority should act within reasonable time, particularly
when individual rights are involved. The Court therefore ordered the
commission to make up its mind as to the future of the area.
In another case the local community rather than the individual
needed the Court's protection. In CA 120/60 Halperin V Kutchinski
[161], the Court reviewed planning permission which had been granted
for the erection of a cinema house in the midst of a quiet
residential area. Planning permission had in fact been granted to the
particular landowner to help him save his investment. The Court held
that the authorities had not paid proper attention to the interests
of the public, in fact the interest of the residents of the immediate
neighbourhood, but gave preference to the interest of an individual
landowner. The Court repealed the permit on the grounds that it was
issued on the basis of irrelevant considerations.
A third impact of the decisions of the High Court of Justice on
the planning system through its intervention in substantive planning
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can be seen in other cases where the Court stressed that statutory
town planning should be confined to its physical land objectives
1162]. This emphasis led to the evolution of the planning system
along conservative and traditional lines which, together with other
reasons, prevented town and country planning from becoming the
pivotal factor in the development of a comprehensive system of
national planning.
In the Em Harod case, Justice Vitlon expressed a common
attitude that the provisions of town planning law are largely
"technical problems". In several other cases the court quoted Art.
12(1) of the Ordinance, which stated the "general objectives of
securing proper conditions of health, sanitation and communication,
and amenity and convenience in connection with the layout and use of
land". These, in the Court's view, were the sole objectives for which
planning could be exercised.
In HJC 180/51t Histadrut Harokchim Beyisrael (Israel
Pharinaci st s' As soc iat ion) V Tel Aviv Di str ict Pling Commission
[163], a question of the validity of a kind of economic consideration
in statutory planning was raised. In this case the local commission,
on the initiative of the Fharmacists' Association, tried to introduce
a scheme prohibiting the opening of new pharmacies within a certain
distance of any existing pharmacy. The district commission refused
the proposed scheme. Here the Court per Justice Bernzon held that any
restrictive condition in a statutory scheme had to be related to the
general purposes as set up in Art. 12(1). Interference with free
competition in the pharmaceutical trade so as to protect (or
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otherwise benefit) existing pharmacies was regarded as outside the
scope of a statutory plan [16$].
This judgement did not, however, bring this particular subject
to a close. Since the Pharmacists' Association was a determined
pressure group, it achieved its economic aim through direct
legislation. In 196 the Pharmacists Ordinance was reformed and it
included a provision which stated that "A pharmacy shall not be
opened at a distance of less than 500 metres from an existing
pharmacy" [166). This development is an example of an alternative way
of prescribing planning norms. It also indicates a legislative
reaction to an unpopular judgement [167). Through this legislation
the freedom of employment was superseded by other considerations.
Pnother expression of Justice Bernzon's strict rein over the
scope of physical planning can be found in HCJ 188/63 Batzul V The
Ministry of the Interior [168]. In this case Bernzon held that
social-religious considerations as to the public peace were outside
the scope of planning. The circumstances of the case were related to
a stormy public debate over whether to allow the breeding of pigs and
the sale of pork in israel. In the event, a law was enacted
prohibiting pig breeding except in specific areas [169]. Planning
permission for the erection of pig sties in one of these areas was
the subject of the case.
The petitioners, religious t&slems, opposed the grant of the
permit on the ground that it offended their religious beliefs and
their way of life, and this might lead to breach of the public peace
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in the neighbourhood. The Court per Justice Bernzon held that even if
all these assertions were true, the District Planning Commission
could not take them into consideration since it must consider only
planning and sanitation principles. The exact meaning of what
constitutes relevant policy considerations was not provided but the
ruling out of social and religious considerations inevitably led to a
very narrow definition of the scope of physical planning.
The nature and form of the statutory scheme was also affected
by this result. In the Pharmacists' Association case, Justice Bernzon
accepted the assertion that "nothing is allowed to be included in an
outline or detailed scheme which cannot be shown on the map of the
area" [170]. This virtually emphasised the map rather than any
principles which might have been expressed in the regulations
accompanying the map. Such a form of statutory scheme corresponded to
the physical land use nature of planning as it was conceived not only
by the Court but also by the contemporary planning profession.
Despite the strict view of physical land use planning which
dominated this stage, there was a growing tendency advocating the
broadening of the scope of planning considerations, which became more
evident in the second stage. This tendency gave legitimacy to some of
the factors which in practice influence decision making in planning.
In the case FICJ 261/63 Megidovitch V Northern District Planning
Commission [171], which again related to the issue of pig breeding, a
proposed outline scheme permitted the erection of only one pig
slaughter house in the area covered by the scheme. 	 Planning
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restriction in this case was explained as following governmental
national policy which limited the number of slaughter houses, of any
kind, in every sub-district or region. Considerations of public
health were said to be the grounds on which this policy was based,
since it would allow effective vetfnary inspection. The petitioners
were refused a permit for the erection of a second slaughter house in
that area.
The petitioners claimed, on the basis of the previous case,
that the planning authorities were exceeding their powers by
considering not only the physical effects of the proposed building on
the neighbourhood, but also the effect of the business and the danger
that inefficient inspection might cause to the general public health.
Considerations of the way trade and industry was performed, it was
claimed, fell in the realm of another authority under a different
law. Justice Landau rejected this assertion and affirmed the decision
of the planning commission, applying an ambiguous criterion of
reasonability in determining the scope of planning authorities'
powers to act in pursuance of the statutory planning objectives.
Prt. 12(1) of the Town Planning Ordinance 1936, said Justice Landau
1172], "was phrased in very wide and general terms. Thus the scope of
provisions which are allowed to be included in a scheme should be
interpreted broadly so as to enable the accomplishment of the
objectives set up in the article."
Nonetheless, he moved only a little from the physical nature of
planning considerations, ruling that "proper conditions of health and
sanitation" include not merely matters directly connected with the
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building (the slaughter house) and its surroundings but also the
effect of a lack of inspection of the production process in those
premises, and that the potential risk to the health of the consumers,
wherever they are, is a legitimate consideration. Implied in this was
a move from the rigid form of land use map towards planning policies
which are not necessarily confined to specific physical-spatial
boundaries.
It is interesting to compare this ruling with the case of
Fawcett Properties V Bucks C.C. [173] in the English court, from
which Justice Landau adopted the criteria of "reasonability". Fawcett
is, in Prof. Jowell's words, an example of the "strict interpretation
of the legitimate scope of planning by the Court" [l7I]. Here Pearce
L.J. ruled that an authority which acts "from some housing or public
health or social consideration other than the town planning authority
would be taking the wrong matter into account". However, in Israel
Justice Landau took a different view as to the scope of public health
considerations.
Further expression in this direction can be found in CA 577/66
Volochwinsky V Ofer [175]. Here Justice Sussman ruled that the
planning authorities were allowed to take into consideration the
economic viability of a proposed scheme in order to satisfy
themselves that the scheme could be implemented. Though he held that
such consideration should be additional and subsequent to the basic
considerations regarding the physical planning aspects, this ruling
was indeed a change from the traditional line pursued by the Court
and the planning profession alike.
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A further impact of the Court on the planning system was with
regard to the way statutory planning was applied to the physical
development market or, more specifically, the differences between the
privileged mode of operation of the public (governmental) sector and
that of the private sector. The High Court of Justice heavily
criticised the legal position which allowed public development to
operate above the statutory planning restrictions. This was
particularly striking because private developers and individuals were
subject to highly stringent planning provisions.
HCJ 19L/56 Mirrof V Director of Housing Department [176]
demonstrates the injustice of this legal situation. The petitioner
had built himself a house in accordance with the restrictions imposed
by the local scheme. He obviously expected his neighbours to comply
with the same restrictions so that the low density character and
amenity of the neighbourhood &uld be preserved. However, his
expectations proved false when a large housing estate was built on
neighbouring land by no other than the Housing Department of the
Ministry of Labour. The public housing project infringed on several
(though minor) aspects of the statutory scheme. Yet the Court ruled
that in view of the general principle prescribed by the
Interpretation Ordinance (Sec. I2), the inevitable result was that
planning legislation, not explicitly imposed on the State, did not
bind the activities of government departments [177].
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In another case [178], Justice Landau hinted at his opinion on
the State's privileged position, symphathising with a petitioner
whose application for change of use had been refused. In - the
circumstances, the petitioner could not use his land for agriculture
because his crops were constantly damaged by children living in a
neighbouring housing estate. That estate had been built by the State
on agricultural land, without any regard to the planning
restrictions.
The view of the Court as to the injustice caused by the legal
position was in addition to the outcry of private developers against
unfair competition from government agencies in the development
market. The practical effect of the criticism was that this situation
was largely changed during the second stage [179].
By criticising the privilege of the government, the Court not
only undermined the supremacy of the administration, but also
supported the advocates of liberalism and individualism.
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CHAFFER 8. THE SECOND STAGE OF STATI.TrORY PLANNING 1965-1980'S
In 1965 an Israeli Planning and B.iilding Law was enacted [1].
It should be remembered that each new Israeli law which replaces
Mandatory legislation is seen as an expression of the State's
sovereignty. The new planning law was considered by some as
particularly significant, since it replaced a law which had come to
symbolise British restriction on Jewish settlement and development
[2]. With its enactment, a new era in the evolution of Israel's
planning system was opened. It is therefore appropriate to describe
briefly the general context in which the law was put into operation.
The years of the "second stage" brought considerable change to
many aspects of life in Israel. Demographically, Israel grew from
2, 598, LIOO at the end of 1965 to 3,977,900 by the end of 1981 [3]. The
Jewish sector grew during this period from 2,299,000 to 3,320,300
[a]. Though this growth in the Jewish population was very high, the
proportion of new immigrants was much smaller compared with the
previous stage. The proportion of Israeli-born citizens increased
steadily, thereby creating greater social stablity within the
population as a whole.
The Jewish sector was still dominated by a high proportion of
urban population in 1965 at 81.8%, which rose to 90.3% by 1981 [5].
Though the rural sector continued to play a very important role in
the political, social and economic spheres, albeit less than
previously, at the same time the urban sector and local institutions
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increased their political power. The new towns not only became an
ideologically legitimate mode of Zionism, but also a source of
political power for the "old" immigrants [6].
Compared with the early years of Statehood, Israel's existence
became much more secure during this stage. This was particularly true
after the Six ty War in 1968. However, Israel still has considerable
defence problems, as the Yom Kippur War of 1973 demonstrated;
physical development and the establishment of new settlements have
remained closely linked with national security, acting as a means for
solving defence problems no less today than in the pre-Independence
period.
Israel's economic and physical development continued rapidly
and Israel can now be classified as one of the developed Western
countries rather than as a "Third World" type developing country.
The process of urbanisation and industrialisation led to great
improvements in the standard of living. Israel's society, in many
respects, can be characterised as a consumer society. Yet with the
appearance of affluence, the gaps between different socio-economic
classes widened. Political pressure from the lower classes brought
public attention to the old mechanisms of allocation of resources
and, as a result, the government concentrated more on the welfare of
the public as a whole. This was expressed particularly in the
develorment of higher public housing standards, the rehabilitation
and reconstruction of inner cities and slum areas, and the
consolidation of the development of the new towns.
- 277 -
In internal politics, the status of the political parties
decreased. Their role in issue initiation and policy making was
weakened, while statutory and administrative institutions took over
many of these tasks. The rule of law has generally prevailed over
factional interests and the country's democractic maturity was
demonstrated with the fundamental change of government after the 1977
elections. However, as is often apparent in the sphere of planning,
inter-ministerial rivalry and factional interests are still part of
the administrative decision making culture.
Though representative democracy is still dominant,
non-establishment public pressure groups have become part of normal
political life. This had been manifested in protest movements after
the Yom Kippur War and recently after the War in Lebanon.
Of great significance is the major change in public awareness
of the necessity to preserve the quality of the environment and
prevent ecological catastrophes. The environmental issue was, in
fact, created during this stage, and it has strongly affected social
and economic life, as well as greatly influencing the operating of
the planning system.
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Finally, the institutions of State Comptroller and the High
Court of Justice became very influencial and highly respected by both
government and public alike. They have gained more confidence and
have intervened in matters which were previously the sole realm of
the executive authorities. They have not hesitated to voice their
criticism whenever the authorities exceeded their powers and have
remained sources of strength In the safeguarding of individuals'
rights [7].
With this general background in context, we shall now consider
the introduction and operation of the Israeli planning system during
the second stage.
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A.	 THE MACHINERY OF PLANNING DURING THE SECOND STAGE
Planning machinery underwent several changes under the new law
of 1965. The major institutions under the new statutory structure are
illustrated in the following table.
:	 : The	 : Plan Making
	 : Decision making
:	 : Subject	 : Institutions	 : Institutions
* : National	 : National Board
	 : The Cabinet
planning	 :
: * : District	 : District	 : National Board
:	 : (regional)	 : Commissions	 :	 :
planning	 :
: * : Local planning : Local Commissions 	 : Minister of Interior! :
:	 :	 :	 : District Commissions :
: * : Development	 :	 : Local Commissions!
:	 : control	 :	 : District Commissions :
+ : Planning of
	 : Special Commissions : Minister of Interior!
:	 : special areas :
	 : Minister of Housing
: + : Planning of
	 : Joint Commissions : Joint Commissions
joint areas	 :	 :	 :
+ : Protection of : Committee for the
	 : Committee for the
:	 : agricultural	 : Protection of
	 : Protection of
:	 : land	 : Agricultural Land
	 : Agricultural Land!
: :	 :	 : Appelate Committee
: + : Planning of
	 : Territorial Waters : Territorial Waters
:	 : sea shores	 : Committee	 : Committee!	 :
:	 :	 :	 : Appelate Committee
* Regular planning issues
+ Special planning issues
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1.	 The Nature and Character of the New Machinery
The change in planning machinery is characterised by the
"legalisation" of administrative bodies created during the first
stage. Statutory planning institutions such as the Cabinet, the
National Planning Board, the Committee for the Protection of
Agricultural Land, and the special planning commissions are all
rooted in the centralised administrative perceptions and practices of
the past. Their transformation into statutory bodies was a means of
raising their status and thus their effectiveness, overcoming the
organisational problems evident during the first stage.
Not all of the old institutions were transformed into statutory
bodies and the sectional planning units in government ministries and
public agencies continued to operate. The non-statutory branch did
not thus disappear. Though the law subjected all governmental
development activities to the control of the statutory machinery, and
the importance of the non-statutory branch was seemingly minimised,
its role was sometimes greater than that of the statutory branch,
particularly in matters of extraordinary national importance such as
the replanning and development of the Negev in 1979-1980 after the
Peace Agreement with Egypt and evacuation of Sinai L8].
In fact, beyond the scope of limited physical planning law,
non-statutory planning institutions have continued to play an
important role. Furthermore, since the Six ty War of 1967, a great
national effort in land development has been taking place In the
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administered territories outside the jurisdiction of Israeli planning
law in which non-statutory planning agencies play an important part
[9 3.
In conclusion, despite the changes made in 1965, statutory
planning during the second stage remained only one part of a
comprehensive system in which non—statutory agencies are still of
great social, economic and political importance and, at times, even
more effective than the statutory planning bodies.
The new statutory machinery was characterised less by its
innovative approach than by its continuity with the past [10].
Planning decision making institutions at all levels were still
dominated by the central government and the Mandatory type central
government control over local planning, a control which fit well with
socialist ideology and political reality, continued to prevail.
Nonetheless, following previous tendencies, local authorities
significantly increased their share in the planning machinery and
those authorities which were politically and professional equipped to
initiate local planning were able to exercise considerable influence
in the planning process.
Non—institutional ised public participatory planning remained
very weak and planning in Israel was still imposed from above rather
than encouraging public initiative. This reflected the general
prevalence of representative over participatory democracy, though
here too there was a tendency towards more representation of public
organisations in planning institutions, which resulted in a greater
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public awareness and involvement in the process.
The structure of the planning machinery (as well as other
aspects of the system) still revealed signs of favouring the rural
sector over the private sector, depriving the latter of significant
participation in the decision making process. The public good was
still regarded as related to rural ideology in Zionism, while private
capital and profit oriented activities were often regarded as
inconsistent with the public interest.
These characteristics are further elaborated in dealing with
the various planning institutions, their structure, composition and
functioning during the second stage.
2.	 Plan Making Institutions
a.	 The National Board for Planning and Building
At the top of the three tier structure of plan making
institutions was the National Planning and Boilding Board. This Board
was the successor to the non-statutory Supreme Planning Council. The
statutory cloth given to this body can be seen as part of the general
attempt to raise the status and thus the influence of planning
institutions.
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On the basis of accumulated experience in the functioning of
the planning machinery during the first stage, the law prescribed in
detail the composition, powers and responsibilities of this Board. In
these the legislator showed its desire for a high-ranking,
prestigious, pluralistic and effective body, capable of dealing with
the onerous burden of national planning.
Pluralism The new law was innovative not only by creating the
Board as a statutory body, but also in the wide and diverse
membership aimed at achieving consensus among, and co-ordination
between, the many forces operating in the field of planning and
implementation.
The Board is composed of members who can be classified under
five major groups: (1) Representatives of the Ministry of the
Interior (which also has the chairmanship of the Board); (2)
Representatives of executive government and public sector bodies; (3)
Representatives of local authorities; (14) Professionals in matters of
planning and physical development from both the government and
non-government sectors; (5) Representatives of the general public
[11].
Here the legislator attempted to provide a platform for broad
participation in the preparation of national policy. The Board's
composition includes national and local politicians, administrators,
professionals and laymen, all representing a wide spectrum of points
of view. Twelve different government ministries express the various
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aspects of government fields of interest in planning. Local leaders
from the big cities, towns and small urban and rural settlements
present the views of different localities. frofessionals from
disciplines such as town planning, architecture, engineering,
landscape architecture, sociology and environmental studies [12]
provide a potential for inter-disciplinary planning, while there are
non-official representatives of different social groups such as
amenity groups, women's organisations, academic institutions and the
young generation.
Many sectors wanted to be represented on this Board, either as
a matter of prestige or simply to protect their interests. It is
interesting that the demand for representation put forward by the
private developers' association was rejected, probably due to the
collectivist and anti-private sector attitude of the authorities
which viewed this sector as conflicting with the public good [13].
High Ranking Body Effective operation of any social
institution very much relies on the capability, status and influence
of its members as individuals, as well as its composition as an
entity. The legislator, in regard to the National Board, attempted to
create a high-level body to meet the requirements of modern national
planning and ensure its effective implementation. Members under the
law include: Cabinet Ministers or their representatives (in practice,
senior officials of the various ministries are appointed); heads of
local authorities including the mayors (ex officio) of the three big
cities or their deputies (in practice, the heads of the authorities
are appointed); professionals in planning and building matters (in
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practice senior government officials and eminent experts in their
respective fields are appointed); and public representatives, usually
by eminent public figures. It was hoped that a respectable
composition of the Board would have the confidence of the Cabinet
when it came to approving the Board's proposals and, even more
important, the support of the executive bodies responsible for their
implementation.
Division of Power Under the law, the Board has 32 members
[1 14], of whom about one-third are central government representatives
(politicians or	 administrators),	 one-third	 represent	 local
authorities, and one-third are professionals from government and
non-government ranks and representatives of public organisations.
Central government has the greatest share in membership, as
well as the final say through its power of approval of the Board's
proposals. Ibwever, as mentioned above, central government was not a
homogenous body in this sphere, but was divided into various
executive ministries and several government planning agencies. The
creation of a statutory Board affiliated to, and under
	 the
chairmanship of, the Ministry of the Interior led to an improvement
in the status of that Ministry within
	 government circles.
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Furthermore, the discretion of the Minister of the Interior to
appoint various members of the Board was potentially an additional
source of power and in practice this strongly affected the real
powers of the Board.
The other ministries participating in the. Board were not
explicitly detailed in the law but were to be decided upon, from time
to time, by the Cabinet.
Local authorities were well represented, reflecting the
increased power of local institutions, not only in their particular
localities but also in Israeli politics as a whole [15].
Experts in various fields concerned with planning were given an
important role as members in their own right. In addition to
professionals as members, the Board was allowed to appoint technical
advisors on a permanent or temporary basis. The inclusion of so many
experts in addition to politicians and administrators reflects the
move from the pattern of improvisation in decision making towards a
more modern and advanced concept of planning, requiring professional
knowledge.
The public at large was represented under the law through a few
members with full rights. These members of voluntary social
organisations were not necessarily representative, nor unified in
their approach, and being the smallest group on the Board their
influence must be relatively small 1163. Nevertheless, the inclusion
of such members reflected a move towards participatory planning in
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Israel, with a potential for public opinion to play a direct role in
the planning process [17].
The Board's Statutory Functions and Actual Functioning Under
the law, the Board's functions were related 	 to legislation,
administration and adjudication. Section 2 states that the Board is
"to advise the government as to everything relating to general policy
in the implementation of this law, including matters of legislation,
and to carry out other functions assigned to it by this law and by
other laws."
Of the other functions assigned to it by law, the most
important was the preparation of a national outline scheme to be
submitted to the Cabinet for approval [181. Other functions related
to regional planning; i.e. the approval of district outline schemes
[19). In a few cases, the Board acted as an appelate tribune with
regard to district commissions' decisions [20].
Though it was not explicitly mentioned in the law, an inherent
task of the Board was to co—ordinate and integrate the planning of
the various planning agencies to formulate a consistent national
policy. This was of utmost important in view of the experiences of
the first stage.
In practice, this statutory body has not been more successful
than its non—statutory predecessor. The Board was still identified
with the Ministry of the Interior; thus its influence on government
and public agencies was rather weak. As a result it took the Board a
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considerable number of years [21) to reach agreement on the drafting
of national schemes and to receive the Cabinet's approval. Even after
such schemes had been given legal force, their implementation still
required the co—operation of ministerial bodies and they remained
open to interpretation by these executive agencies.
The functioning of the Board heavily depended on the
professional capability and functioning of the Planning Department of
the Ministry of the Interior. As the State Comptroller pointed out
122], "the Planning Department, centralising, as it were, the
activities of the nationwide Board, has a pivotal role in the sphere
of nationwide and regional planning". However, in his report for the
year 1967 [23], the State Comptroller came to the conclusion that the
"Department failed to act adequately in the sphere of nationwide and
regional planning, or systematically and sufficiently to activate the
local authorities with a view to furthering and accelerating the
updating of revisions of local town planning" (sic). The Department's
functioning has not significantly improved in the years since that
report. Hence the capability of the 	 National Board,	 both
professionally and administratively, Was often disputed by rival
planning agencies, including those of the executive ministries 12k].
This obviously downgraded the status of the Board and weakened the
effectiveness of its operation.
The low status of the Board as a national planning institution
can be illustrated by the example of the re—planning project of the
Negev in 1979-80. This project resulted from the Israeli—Egyptian
peace treaty of 26.03.79, in which it was agreed that Israel would
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evacuate the Sinai within three years of the date of the agreement.
Israel's defence forces had to be re—deployed in the Negev as a
result. This was a very large—scale operation in Israeli terms. It
involved tens of thousands of people, vasts sums of' money and
tremendous physical development which had to be completed within a
very short period of time. In addition, it was not just a matter for
the defence forces. Since such development would have far—reaching
effects on the future of the southern district and the country as a
whole, the civil sector had to take part in the planning and
implementation of this re-deployment.
In practice, this involved the construction of a new military
infrastructure (e.g. airports, army barracks, roads) which would also
be used in part by civilians; extension of the existing new towns to
provide for the additional population; establishment of new rural
villages for the populations of dismantled villages of' north Sinai;
and provision of new sources of' employment and services.
A comprehensive (physical, social, economic and defence) plan
was obviously required for this huge project. This was not carried
out under existing statutory bodies (the National Board or the
district commission), but by non—statutory ad hoc bodies [25]. The
statutory planning machinery, although represented in these bodies,
had to go along with the reality which was being spontaneously
created.
The main body behind the planning and execution of' this
development was the Ministry of Defence. Each of the various
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executive ministries contributed in its own sphere but, as the State
Comptroller concluded 126), the civil sector lagged behind the
military sector in planning, budgeting and implementation. The result
was that unco—ordinated activity led to irreversible facts.
In other words, the National Board and indeed the rest of the
statutory institutions were left aside and expected to adjust their
schemes in view of facts which were created, without much chance of
influencing them. The political affiliation of the Board to the
Ministry of the Interior, and the inter—ministerial rivalry still
dominant in Israel's administration, were the key elements in this
state of affairs.
b.	 District Planning and Building Commissions
The second tier of planning institutions comprised the district
planning commissions, operating in each of Israel's six districts. As
explained, this adminstrative division of the country goes back to
the early 1950's. During the second stage, this division was subject
twice to review by government committees 127]. Both came to the
conclusion that the existing division was obsolete in view of the
physical changes in the country and the independent sectional
organisations of "field administration" which many ministries had
adopted. They concluded that the number of districts should be
reduced to achieve more homogenous districts suitable, among other
things, for proper regional planning. However, due to lack of
political support these recommendations were not implemented 128].
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District commissions had a composition similar to that of the
previous stage [29J. The main changes followed the tendency towards
increased share of local authorities and local people in the planning
decision mEking process. The status c( local authorities had grown
steadily during the first stage and they often demanded the repeal of
the old colonial type measures of control over their affairs by
nominated bureaucracts of the central government. 1 On the other hand,
they were criticised for a la& of political maturity in the handLing
of the ir ta ka and of over—p ol it ic isa t ion in the ex e re is e of the I r
powers. PPthabJy as a measure of compromise, the district commissions
remained the main bodies in the decision making process in local
plainIng, while representation of local authorities fri these bodies
was increased [30
An additional member of the district commission was that of a
professional planner who, by law, was not be an employee of either
central or local government. This member was expected not only to add
to the professional capability of the commission, which was dominated
by administrators and local politicians, but also to express an
independent opinion, thereby representing the general public [31].
Although the draft legislation had suggested a reduction in the
number of district commission members (32], under the law the number
actually grew to 15. Consequently the district commission became a
platform for many Institutional and factional interests and attitudes
through both central and local government representatives. However,
the final say remained with the central government by virtue of its
majority in the commission. The general public had almost no direct
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involvement, except in the traditional form of objections to planning
proposals.
This broad composition of the district commission was a
hindrance to efficient planning decision making. The law, therefore,
provided for sub—commissions to deal with certain planning matters,
hoping thereby to improve the functioning of the commission 133].
Statutory Functions and Actual Functioning. Among the new
functions of district commission, the most important was the
obligation to prepare a district (regional) plan, to be submitted for
approval by the National Board [3L]. The legislative powers to make
by—laws were taken from the districts and vested with the Minister,
so as to achieve a unified set of regulations for the country as a
whole 135].
No significant changes were made in the other administrative
and adjudicative functions regarding local planning. The district
commission rather than the local authority remained, as during the
Mandatory period, the main decision making body in the sphere of
local planning. Accordingly, the law maintained 	 the district
commission's powers of supervision over the exercise of planning
powers by the local commission.
In practice, very little was changed in the functioning of the
district commission during the second stage. District schemes were
rarely prepared, and there was almost no comprehensive regional
vision guiding the process of planning decision making. The district
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commissions were vested with so many duties regarding local planning
that their ability to deal efficiently with the wider, as well as
with the more specific, planning aspects has been very limited. The
result, as the State Comptroller pointed out [36], has been a lengthy
and inefficient decision making process. As a consequence, the
commissions' functioning also influenced the growth of unauthorised
building activity. Furthermore, their supervision of development
control, as exercised by the local commissions, has been almost
non—existent. As the State Comptroller remarked, they lacked the
means (not to mention the political determination) for proper
inspection and acted at random without any systematic control [37].
Considering the nationwide scale of unauthorised building
activity, the State Comptroller suggested giving the National Board,
rather than the district commissions, more powers and means to deal
with the enforcement of planning laws [38].
c.	 Local Planning and Building Commissions
The third tier in the hierarchy of planning institutions was
the local commission. In general, the structure of local planning
areas, the composition of local commissions, their powers and their
responsibilities were left unchanged by the new law. The Bill had
proposed a reform g the composition of local planning commissions in
municipal areas, whereby the local commission was not to consist
solely of the municipal council, but was • to be composed of both
central and local government representatives, together with some
representation of the local public [39]. In other words, the proposal
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suggested a return to a structure similar to that which had existed
under the early Mandatory period. This proposal, backed by the
planning profession, was a reaction against the over-politicisation
of the planning process by the local commissions, and against
manipulation of statutory powers for local factional interests.
However, with the rapid process of urbanisation in Israel and the
growing political influence of the local authorities, the attempt at
such a fundamental change failed.
On the other hand, the previous 	 composition of' local
commissions, particularly with regard to small towns	 and
neighbourhoods, continued to entail central government
representation, and though they were made members only in an advisory
capacity EkO], two of these representatives could appeal jointly
against the local commission's decision to the district commission
[141].
During this stage the fragmented and outlined division of local
planning areas also remained the same. Not only was no attempt made
to reduce the number of local commissions, but their number actually
increased ['2]. In view of the growing political strength of local
authorities, no authority would have agreed to surrender its planning
powers, so that a proposal to reduce the number of commissions would
have failed anyway. On the other hand, central government still did
not want to loosen its control over the local authorities. The result
was a stalemate in the structure of local planning commissions.
- 295 -
By comparison, in England the 197Q's saw major reforms in local
government which also affected town planning powers. These came about
after a series of reports on issues relating to local government
[t3]. Under the Local Government Mt 1972, a two tier structure of
county and districts was introduced, involving the amalgamation of a
host of small authorities [i4j. Furthermore, the complexity of
environmental problems led to the introduction of a corporate
management system and overall policy planning in local government
[ 115]. Although these changes did not pass without criticism [116],
they did show a degree of open mindedness and readiness to make an
effort to produce a more efficient governmental system.
The local government system in Israel was also reformed in the
mid-1970's [117]. The main innovation was the provision for direct and
personal election of mayors and council chairmen. However the
organisational measures which the new law introduced were of far less
importance for the local planning process than those in England [118].
The organisational changes introduced by the Israeli planning
law were the establishment of a special planning sub-committee within
a municipal council and the division of tasks between it and the full
quorum of the municipal council [119]. A more substantial change can
be seen in a new provision which enabled the local commission to
delegate its development control powers to the chairman of a local
commission, together with the city Engineer [50]. In such a case,
these two people could grant or refuse planning permission, subject
to the provision of the statutory scheme. Such exercise of
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development control by an elected member and a professional planner
may appear to be a good solution. However, in the political context
of the Israeli planning system, whereby this could deprive the other
members of their source of influence, this procedure was hardly ever
employed [51].
As mentioned, in town planning areas which include territories
of several local authorities, the old composition of local
commissions (i.e. a combination of central and local government
members) remained largely unchanged [52]. This reflected, to some
extent, the difficulties of small settlements to deal professionally
and efficiently with the issue of modern planning. Due to their
political weakness they were not allowed aid, except in the form of
central government patronage. This type of local commission was
sometimes chaired by the District Commissioner or his representative,
and its members were nominees of the Minister of the Interior, chosen
from candidates recommended by the various local authorities. Two of
these nominees were no be members of local councils, 	 thus
safeguarding some representation of the non—establishment local
public. Here the legislator passed a provision which had been
rejected in the cases of other planning institutions, whereby the
Minister could replace his nominee " if he sees a reason justifying
this" [53]. This is an important provision which, in political terms,
could give the Minister a tool for indirect control over the way
members exercise their power. This provision was introduced only in
regard to this commission probably due to the lack of political
pressure to the contrary.
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The influence of rural ideology on the statutory construction
of local planning commissions is noteworthy. While dealing with the
designation of local planning areas, the legislator prescribed that a
Minister's order which declares a local planning area shall not
include the territory of a Regional Council (i.e. a local council
which consists solely of the rural sector,
	
Kibbutzim	 and
Moshavim,,) with "areas of a local council other than a regional
council or of a Municipality" E5I]. The separatist attitude of the
rural sector and their anti-urban attitude was, it is argued,
reflected in this provision.
Statutory Functions and Actual Functions. Local authorities'
functions remained mainly in the sphere of planning initiatives and
the exercise of development control. The law re-affirmed the
obligation of the local authorities to prepare an outline plan and in
addition prescribed a maximum period of three years from the date of
the law coming into force to complete the plan 155]. This differed
from the previous provision which, although it made the preparation
of such schemes obligatory, left the time in which to do this to the
discretion of the district commission 156]. ThIs measure was designed
to accelerate the preparation of outline schemes, which had been very
poor during the first stage 157].
Detailed schemes could be Initiated by the local authorities
themselves or adopted from the scheme of a private individual 158].
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The process of scheme preparation remained highly politicised
in the area of factional politics, were lengthy and inefficient, and
the preparation of outline schemes was rarely completed before the
legal date. Though there have been great improvements in the
preparation of updated outline schemes in recent years [59), some of
the most important areas still lack such schemes 160]. On the other
hand, there have been an abundance of small scale schemes, reflecting
the market pressures for actual development.
Development control powers of the local commissions included
existing aspects of planning permits and law enforcement. The new law
followed the general tendency to increase the powers and raise the
status of the authorities; it granted local commissions wider
discretion to deviate significantly from an approved scheme by means
of giving (in some dases without further approval) special building
permission called "relaxation" and "non—conforming use" [61). Though
this was aimed at providing a measure of flexibility in planning,
these special permissions have been used extensively for political
purposes and are used as bargaining instruments between the
authorities and developers.
More stringent provisions were introduced for law enforcement,
enabling the authorities to combat unauthorised building activity
more efficiently. Despite this, law enforcement remained extremely
weak during this stage and, though several times the High Court of
Justice [62) and the State Comptroller [63] were forced to criticise
strongly the local commissions for their exercise of development
control, the situation was not improved.
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d.	 Special Planning Institutions:
Special Commission and Joint Commission
Frameworks for two new institutions were designed as a result
of the experience of the first stage. These bodies were the "special
commission" and "joint commission".
A Special Commission could be established on the initiative
of the Minister of Housing in areas where the government or the
public sector intended to carry out major physical development for
any of the following three cases: (1) building a new town, (2)
consolidation of an existing "new town", (3) development of new
neighbourhoods within any type of settlement 16U.
During the first stage there had been organisational chaos in
regard to the establishment of new towns. No clear rules had been set
up for their planning and, as a result, planning initiatives,
procedures and their implementation were determined by different
government bodies, varying from one case to the next. The subsequent
transfer of planning responsibilities to the local population had
been determined quite arbitrarily.
Since government development was subject to the new law, an
attempt was made to provide a unified planning body for the task of
extensive public development.
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The special commission is a compact body, smaller than a
regular district or local commission, yet with the powers of both
these institutions for a maximum period of five years [65]. It is
dominated by central government representatives, with only four local
authority representatives [66]. Ostensibly the introduction of such a
body is a measure of efficiency, providing considerable relaxation in
the lengthy procedures involved in passing through the regular
machinery.
The creation of a special commission to replace the regular
institutions may also be seen as a method of appeasing the
governmental public executive agencies after having subjecting their
activities to the rule of the regular statutory machinery and
including the rule of local authorities. In this respect, the law
provided them with some privileges in cases of large	 public
development projects.
Such has been the potential use of special commissions for the
creation of new towns. This use remained theoretical during this
stage, since no new town was actually been established in territory
under the jurisdiction of Israeli law [67]. The special commission
was also a theoretical institution in cases of establishing single
neighbourhoods in existing towns. In practice, when the government
planned such neighbourhoods, it. often used the regular institutions
and procedures rather than declare the neighbourhood a special
planning area.
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The special commission was utilised in existing new towns where
public construction continued for purposes of extension and
consolidation. In such cases the entire town was declared a special
planning area and a special commission set up. This ensured central
government control over planning decisions at local level by virtue
of public investment in these new towns. Since the local people were
under-represented in such commissions, this statutory body can be
regarded as an instrument of central government patronage, enabling
control over local institutions and the population of new towns and
maintainence of the traditional dependence of new towns on the
government.
The Joint Commission was suggested in the final stages of the
Mandatory period 168). This measure was a potential for achieving
more co-ordination and thus efficiency in dealing with territories
and comprehensive issues concerning more than one district or local
area 169). This measure followed the lines expressed in the
Association of Towns Law 5715-1955 [70). However, in view of the
fragmented geographical division of districts and local areas, and
the difficulties in creating greater bodies through amalgmations of
existing institutions, joint commissions have been largely ad hoc
bodies for solving problems in the border areas between neighbouring
authorities.
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e.	 The Statutory Committee For the Protection of Agricultural Land
This body was the legal institutionalisation of the
non—statutory body operating during the first stage 171]. Its
creation was linked to the prevailing rural ideology, as well as to
Israel's economic needs, as described above. It entailed a two—tier
structure of first instance committee and appelate committee while
its composition gave strong representation to central government
ministries and the rural sector and only one representative to the
urban sector [72].
This body was organised with the National Board, staffed
largely my members of that Board and hence allowing implementation of
national policy at local levels.
The powers of this committee relate to the safeguarding of
agricultural land against urban sprawl and it exercises supreme power
of development, above the regular planning machinery. In other words,
any land which is declared agricultural land by the committee cannot
legally be apportioned for other uses in any scheme or planning
permit unless the committee gives its consent [73].
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Urban growth on the periphery of the main cities is thus
largely under the control of this joiflt committee. In addition, the
comm&ttee may decide to suspend, repeal or alter approved schemes
which provide for building on agricultural land as long as the actual
development has not taken place L'1].
However, as the State Comptroller pointed out [75], there is a
considerable gap between the committee's formal powers and its actual
use of these powers. In practice, agricultural land has often been
used for other puposes without the consent of the committee;
moreover, no action was taken by the authorities to stop such
development. Nonetheless, compared with the first stage, the legal
status and statutory powers granted by the new law considerable
improved the implementation of the policy of protecting agricultural
land.
3.	 Decision Making Institutions
a.	 The Cabinet as a Planning Decision Making Institution
The new law gave the Cabinet as a whole the power to make the
final decision concerning national plans. This procedure, which also
existed during the previous stage, was very reasonable since the
ultimate responsibility for Israel's planning lay with the elected
government and officially the government was the ultimate planning
authority.
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The maintenance of this procedure as opposed to vesting the
ultimate power with the Minister of the Interior (who is responsible
for the implementation of the law) or with the National Board, fitted
well with the logic of the new structure of the planning machinery
where the Minister of the Interior was formally the chairman of the
National Board [16] and therefore could not be above the body of
which he was a member. Further, if the Board were to be the ultimate
decision making body, this would mean subjecting the central
government to a body including a majority of local authority
representatives and nominated members. Hence the procedure which left
the ultimate decision with the Cabinet was the best of all
alternatives.
This structure also reflected soclo—political reality in
Israel. Placing the Cabinet as the ultimate planning authority was
designed to achieve effective planning. A combination of political
(Cabinet) approval and legal backing (statutory schemes) seemed
necessary if plans were to be accepted by the various ministries,
public agencies, local authorities and the general public. It j.s true
that since the law imposed the regular development control processes
on government physical development activities, the problems of
inter—ministerial rivalry which led to inconsistent planning were
formally resolved by the supremacy of the statutory planning
machinery (affiliated to the Ministry of the interior) over the other
government and public sector planning agencies. However, the reality
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was very different, even in the sphere of regulative planning. At
times, the executive ministries ignored the statutory procedures and
created "established facts" in land development.
For example, development of the Tel Aviv beach front was
fostered jointly by the Ministries of Finance and Tourism, together
with the support of the Municipality, at times of vacuum in the
statutory planning policy, because the relevant statutory outline
scheme was only in preparation. The big hotels which were erected as
part of this controversial development project became "established
facts" with which the eventual scheme had to reckon.
Worse, the development of the Omriya area of Jerusalem by the
Ministries of Housing and Tourism took place in contradiction to the
Jerusalem statutory scheme [77].
In the sphere of positive planning, where co-operation between
the executive agencies was required for implementation, the political
struggle between the different ministries and public agencies still
dominated the scene. For plans to be realised, the political
determination of the Cabinet as a whole and legal seal of the schemes
was not always sufficient. In this respect, the situation during the
second stage was not much different from the first. Positive planning
was still dispersed among various agencies and co-ordination was
weak. Consistent policy of positive planning at a national level
barely existed.
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b.	 The Minister of the Interior
Despite a growing awareness during the second stage of
environmental issues, no Ministry was established to deal exclusively
with the many inter—related environmental policy aspects. The
political structure of a coalition government in Israel limitd the
changes for reorganisatlon of central government.
Among the Cabinet Ministers, the Minister of the Interior
remained in charge of general implementation of the law. However,
with the growing involvement of other Ministries in the planning
process, this Minister was but one of many with statutory powers
under the new law.
Most of the tasks of establishing planning institutions was in
the hands of the Minister ot the Interior. In this way he was able to
influence indirectly the end product of the planning machinery.
Though in some cases the law limits the Minister's discretion to
appoint members to planning commissions, it still leaves him with
wide powers to decide who fills crucial posts, such as the
Chairmanship of the National Board, its professional planners, and
membership of the district and some local commissions 178].
Nevertheless, the Minister can be held only nominally
responsible for Israel's national and regional planning policy. As he
only appoints some of the members of the National Board and as
national schemes are approved by the Cabinet as a whole and district
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(regional) schemes by the Board, his directly responsibility is
doubtful. He cannot, for example, give substantive guidance to a plan
making institution as such, but merely to his representatives who are
often a minority on the commissiQn. In this respect the legal
situation is very different from most cases of ministerial
responsibility; for instance, it differs from the responsibility of
the Environmental Secretary in Britain, who is in charge of
implementing the law and thus has the final say under the town
planning legislation.
The Minister of the Interior does have other legislative,
administrative and adjucative powers with which he can influence more
directly the planning process and its products.
It is the Minister who devises planning and building
regulations. These regulations concerning procedural and substantial
planning matters are usually of universal application, though the
Minister can also make regulations for a particular district or
locality 179]. The important task of subsidiary legislation was thus
taken from the district commissions and vested, as with most laws,
with the Minister responsible [80].
Unlike his position in the first stage regarding	 local
planning, the Minister of the Interior became the supreme authority
only in regard to schemes which propose to change, suspend or repeal
local outline schemes. This arrangement was rather peculiar in the
context of the new law, since it created disymmetry in the structure
of the planning machinery. As the regular planning institutions were
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built on a three tier structure, it might have been more logical to
vest the responsibility for local planning as a whole with the
district commissions or with the National Board. The National Board
rather than the Minister could have ensured more consistency between
pational and local planning [81]. Nevertheless, decision making
powers were distributed among several institutions, and the Minister
of the Interior got his share, enabling him to exert direct influence
also on local planning levels, where political and social groups and
individuals showed great interest.
By comparison, in England the growing attention paid to
environmental issues led to a major central government reorganisation
in 1970, under which the Department of the Environment was created
[82]. This Department, unlike the Israeli Ministry of the Interior,
was vested with the responsibility of framing national policy,
together with control over some implementation agencies. It was
originally based on the old Ministries of Transport, Housing, Local
Government, and Public Building and Works [83]. In matters under his
responsibility, the Secretary of State for the Environment was
directed towards producing consistent government planning and
development activity in some of the inter-connected aspects of the
environment. However, it has only been a partial solution since other
Departments,	 such as Trade	 and	 Industry,	 still maintain
responsibility for issues which are fundamental to urban and regional
planning [8I]. Considering that the English system lacks a formal
inter-departmental institution for the formulation of co-ordinated
national policy and for integrated implementation, the position of
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the Department of the Environment as the supreme planning institution
is highly dependent on the political backing it receives from the
government.
By contrast, the Israeli statutory system, which provides for a
National Planning Board under the chairmanship of' the Minister of the
Interior, is - at least on paper - more advanced. Yet experience has
shown that political backing is often much more important than the
official statutory co-ordinative institution per se.
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B.	 PLANS, POLICIES AND PRACTICE DURING THE SECOND STAGE
1.	 Statutory Schemes
Under the new law the hierarchy of' schemes was structured in
four tiers: national, regional (which relates to districts), local
and detailed [85J. It was based on the deductive principle, which
means that plans are prepared on the basis of working from the
general to the particular. The national outline scheme was concerned
with the whole (geographical) area of the State. Each district
outline scheme provided the details necessary for the implementation
of the national scheme in the district. Local outline schemes for
each local planning area elaborated on the distrct scheme with regard
to their area. At the lowest level, the detailed scheme went into
precise particulars regarding a section of a local area. Planning
permission in Israel was not, in principle, an additional tier in the
creation of plans, but merely the first stage in planning
implementation. It must therefore adhere to approved schemes.
The plan making process envisaged by the law was thus a
sequence of four types of plans. In theory this meant that each plot
was to be covered by four plans at increasing levels of generality.
In practice this was not achieved. The law itself did not even
provide for the establishment of the full structure. First, plan
making was made compulsary only at two levels, the district and the
local. The preparation of a national plan and detailed plans was
discretionary. Second, even if the preparation of plans at all levels
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were assumed to be obligatory, the statutory timetable for the
preparation of these schemes makes it unrealistic. The requirement
for district schemes to be prepared within five yars of the law
coming into force, together with the requirement that they should
elaborate the national scheme, could not be fulfilled unless a
national scheme were to be prepared in a much shorter period of time.
Again, the requirement for local schemes to implement the district
scheme could not be carried out when the former has to be prepared
within a period of three years, while the latter had a five year
period in which to be submitted.
In addition to the legal anomaly, the long delay in the
preparation of schemes while interim decisions were being me
resulted in a completely different process of scheme making than that
envisaged by the law. National schemes were few and far between
during this stage. They barely provided any guidelines for the lower
level planning. District schemes, save the case of the district of
Jerusalem, were non-existent. Local outline schemes were begun to be
prepared Systematically only in the late 1970's, and in view of the
rapid development were often out of touch with reality. Amendments to
outline schemes did not stem from comprehensive re-planning, but
rather constituted sectional changes. Detailed schemes too covered
only limited parts of the municipal area, providing merely for
specific development projects 186].
The result of the above was that links between the four tiers,
as well as between schemes of the same tier, were very weak. Schemes
were often prepared independently of one another, 	 hence the
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inconsistency in the plan making process. Furthermore, the gaps in
scheme preparation led to a patchwork of old and new schemes and an
incomplete structure of planning. Consequently, the plan making
process was generally an attempt to catch up with actual development
rather than a preliminary guide to market forces.
However it should be mentioned that the introduction of the
statutory four tier structure had many advantages. On the one hand,
it was a reflection of the growing awareness of the importance of
planning on a larger than local scale, and on the other it acted as a
catalyst to the actual engagement, though still at a low tempo, of
multi—level planning.
The Form and Nature of Statutory Schemes The law did not
define "planning", nor did it give an adequate definition of the word
"scheme". What it did was to prescribe lists of subjects to be dealt
with by each of the four types of scheme, leaving the way they were
to be dealt with to the discretion of the authorities. The main
drawback of this is that the general principles of a strategic nature
were concealed in a host of detail. Thus the issues which appeared in
regard to the top tier of the national scheme were basically similar
to those appearing all along the structure, down to the detailed
scheme. In this way the borderline between minute control over local
projects and the formulation of a wider national policy was not
explicitly laid down in the provisions of the law 187]. Again, the
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national. scheme could, by implication, deal with a matter which was
basically a subject for a detailed local scheme [88].
The pattern of lists of physical subjects for which land was to
be assigned was based on the way the Mandatory legislation had
conceived the scheme in the 1930's. Thus despite the replacement of
the primary planning legislation by a new law, the old regulations
which prescribed technical guidance as to the preparation of maps
(plans) were maintained 189].
The concept of a scheme as a fixed and rigid picture of future
physical development based on maps and written regulations was not
only continued in regard to local level planning, but was also
applied (in general) to the level of national and regional planning.
The old legislative perception of a scheme as a tool for prescribing
normative provisions in the environmental sphere, particularly in the
area of development rights, remained the dominant perception in
Israel [90]. It is thus asserted that the English-type structure
plan, mainly aimed at the establishment of general planning policies,
differs fundamentally from the Israeli outline scheme. Despite the
wide discretion given as to their form and content, it would be
mistaken to interpret the intention of the legislator as covering
this type of scheme. The following grounds are given to show that
structure plans do not fit into the notion of planning as developed
under the Israeli system.
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First, a plan concentrating merely on general policies would be
regarded in Israel as too theoretical, abstract and merely an
expression of wishes. The old—established and still prevailing sense
of pragmatism in Israel means that policies are expected to be
applied "in the field". The old fixed and rigid type scheme which, in
theory, is more suitable for ensuring certainty in the system,
corresponds to the expectations and desires of the executive agencies
and the public at large.
Second, the formulation of general planning principles
inevitably results in bitter conflicts between social groups who
differ in their ideologies, values and interests. Since the early
days of Statehood, attempts have been made to evade this type of
in—fighting. One notorious example of this evasion was the attempt
and failure to formulate a constitution for Israel. Though national
physical planning is of a much more limited scope, formulation of
such planning policies in a legally binding form runs the same risk
of endless controversy. This is just as true of any attempt to
formulate general regional and local planning principles.
Third, a structure plan is bound to vest much greater
discretion with local authorities in the application of general
principles of particular schemes and development control decisions.
Considering the current Israeli political 	 situation,	 central
government would not allow such delegation of power while few local
authorities would be able to bear such responsibility.
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While the above illustrates why, beyond any legalistic
interpretation, a structure plan is alien to the existing Israeli
planning system, it should be added that a conceptual change in the
system towards structure planning is not undesirable, at least at
national and regional levels. Furthermore, in view of the gap between
statutory concepts of the four tier structure and actual reality in
scheme making, it is clear that existing statutory schemes have not
served their purpose. Instead, discretionary powers have been used,
without any strategic guidelines or clear long—term policy but in
accordance with short—term needs and interests. This situation, while
enabling greater flexibility, certainly lacks the desirable certainty
in the system.
Contrary to the view expressed here, an assertion that the
existing statutory outline schemes could, and should, be used in a
similar way to that of the British structure plan is expressed by
Rachel Alterman in her article "The Planning and Building Law and the
Local Plan: A Rigid Regulation or a Flexible Framework?" [91]. This
article recently influenced a new ruling by the High Court of
Justice. In HCJ O/8O Tieg V Haifa District Planning and Building
Commission 192], Justice Tirkel adopted in general the views of
Alterman. He expressed his opinion that outline schemes should
incorporate planning policies and principles, and thus provide the
flexibility needed for dynamic planning. He went on to say that
planning commissions may, and should, take into consideration social,
economic and ecological objectives, as well as those of physical land
use. However, Tirkel's view was merely an obiter dictum and thus
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only part of the debate on the nature, character and scope of
statutory planning in Israel.
2.	 The Policy of Population Dispersal During the Second Stage
The policy of population dispersal during the second stage
continued to be the leading policy in Israeli planning.	 The
geo—political, ideological, social and economic objectives of this
policy were still valid, since the first stage had produced only
partial success in terms of a balanced development of the country as
a whole. Though it was clearly a policy of the utmost national
importance, the legislature did not prescribe it as binding as he
did, for example, in regard to the policy of protection of
agricultural land. Section L9 stated:
"The national outline scheme shall lay down the planning for
the whole of the area of the state and inter alia
(7) make a forecast of changes in the distribution of the
population of the State; determine the stages in which those
changes should proceed and the desirable timing of those
stages; estimate the future size of existing settlements; and
determine the location, type and size of new settlements."
As this sub—section shows, the content of the policy of
population dispersal was left totally to the discretion of the
authorities. The law did not provide an outline for the universally
accepted objectives of the wider development of the northern and
southern districts and the halting of further growth in the coastal
districts.
The legislator did not clarify the meaning of "forecast" and
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"estimate" in that sub—section; even more ambiguous was the term
"desirable timing". It would seem reasonable to assume that, since
planning is more than merely the submission of information regarding
a projected population, the statutory "forecast" and "estimate" would
include elements of guidance. Yet the nature and scope of such
guidance is not defined in the law. All that can be gathered from
other parts of the law is that the legislator shows a rather
conservative approach in planning by expressing it almost exclusively
in physical terms. Yet the wording of the above—mentioned
sub—section, which is somewhat exceptional, could give some leeway
for socio—political and economic considerations, since without such a
comprehensive perception of the physical, social and economic
factors, national planning could not live up to its name.
As for the actual tools for achieving the objectives, it is
doubtful whether the means prescribed by the statutory scheme for the
accomplishment of the policy of population distribution could be
other than physical land provisions.
In practice, the first 193) - and so far the only - statutory
scheme for population dispersal. was approved in 1975 L91ti Its
preparation by the Physical Planning Department of the Ministry of
the Interior in collaboration with the Economic Planning Authority of
the Ministry of Finance, the Housing Ministry, the Ministry for
Government and Industry, and the Joint Center for Rural Planning gave
hope for a comprehensive and unified government policy. The scheme
forecasted a population of five million by 1992.
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The National Board laid down the basic principles upon which
the scheme was to be prepared. The Board explicitly stated that a
balanced distribution of population throughout the country should be
considered in accordance with security and economic requirements, the
social objective of absorption of new immigrants, consolidation of
the rural sector, and the protection of agricultural land and the
national, landscape.
These considerations underlay the core of the scheme, which is
a detailed numerical table of the future growth of population in each
district and local area. However, they also led to the formulation of
general aims and strategies, broader than those of' traditional
physical land use planning. This statutory national scheme thus came
much closer to the British-type Structure Plan than any other scheme
prepared under Israeli law.
This statutory scheme re-stated the general aim of population
dispersal through an increase in the Jewish populations of the
Galilee, Negev and Jerusalem, while special emphasis was put on the
consolidation of the existing new towns. At the same time, the scheme
proposed to restrict the growth of the coastal districts of Tel Aviv,
Haifa and the centre.
The scheme listed three groups of measures to be used to
achieve these objectives. The main problem, however, was that these
were not clearly defined or expressed as binding policies.
The first group, classified under physical planning means,
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included the exercise of control over statutory national, regional
and local schemes, thus ensuring their consistency with the above
objectives; utilisation of the statutory powers for the protection of
agricultural land, thus restricting urban growth; and a broad policy
of restrictive planning and development in the coastal and central
districts. These measures were within the boundaries of the statutory
planning system and, in theory, at the disposal of the planning
machinery.
However, the scheme continued to list broad eonomic measures
which are generally outside the realm of physical planning but within
the powers of the executive bodies 1
 The scheme recommended
distribution of industry and employment in accordance with the
national preference for regional development; allocation of greater
resources to the outlying regions, construction of transportation and
public housing in accordance with the scheme; improvement of the
standard of living in the development regions through improved
educational and cultural facilities and health services; government
grants and loans to local institutions and individuals, and so on.
Thirdly, the scheme recommended administrative reform at
government level to ensure greater coordination and efficiency in the
working of government and public bodies. These measures also lacked
definition.
As mentioned, the inclusion of socio—economic—administrative
strategies were not so much changes in their status but merely
recommendations. They cannot be considered as binding policies; in
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this respect, too, the actual position under the scheme Is similiar
to that in Britain where, as Jowell and Noble conclude 195] "despite
the recommendations of the Planning Advisory Group, and the desired
shift towards broader criteria and a 'corporate' element in planning,
the Department of the Environment have not been willing to see social
and economic factors reflected in concrete policies and proposals in
structure plans".
In practice, there has been very little ministerial
coordination; the executive ministries generally act in accordance
with their own policies, rather than In accordance with this national
outline scheme. Furthermore, the scheme has had only little affect on
the lower physical planning levels, as exercised by district and
local commission. This reflects the continued political weakness of
the Ministry of the Interior in comparison with the executive
ministries. Planning was still regarded as the enterprise of physical
land use rather than a comprehensive inter-disciplinary activity. In
this respect, the allegedly big change introduced by the new law was
non-existent, as were the supposed differences between the new scheme
and previous non-statutory plans in practical terms	 of
Implementation.
It should be stressed that in a democratic state a forecast
distribution of population cannot be totally guided and controlled.
The setting up of population targets for Individual localities means,
In practice, guiding lower level planning (district and local
schemes) so as not to exceed the prescribed targets. This forecast is
also supposed to act as a guide for the executive ministries and
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public agencies as how to allocate public developments in order to
attain these targets. Influencing the jndividual as to the place in
which he chooses to live has obvious limitations which are rooted in
the democratic nature of the State.
A comparison of population dispersal in Israel in 1966 and the
end of 1981 gives the following picture L96):
PERCENTAGE POPULATION
1966	 1981
Administrative District	 Total	 Jewish Total	 Jewish
Popul. Popul. Popul. Popul.
Central Area:
Tel Aviv	 30.6	 34.3
	
25.2	 29.9
Haifa	 16.5	 16.1	 14.3
	
14.0





	 69.3	 59.8	 66.5
Peripheral Area:
Jerusalem	 8.5	 9.4	 11.5	 10.1









The table shows modest achievements in the population dispersal
population between 1965 and 1981. In view of the gap between policy
and practice, it appears that planning surrendered to those market
forces dictating the growth of the metropolis. Furthermore, in the
political reality of Israel with its inherent pattern of
unco-ordinated government activity, neither centralised nor statutory
planning has been able to achieve fundamental changes in the
population distribution. The attractions of the large major cities
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have always proved too great to combat, and to do so by means of the
existing new towns has been especially difficult. National planning,
as the planners themselves admit, has moved from the objective of
population dispersal to a mere attempt at improving the standards of
living in outlying districts 197].
Difficulties in the statutory policy of population dispersal
have been particularly evident in developments in occupied territory
since the Six Day War of 1967. The development of Jewish settlements
in these areas have been determined by political and defence
considerations. Since vast financial and manpower resources have been
invested in the new areas, this affected the development of the old
districts.
Developments in the occupied territories (save in the areas of
East Jerusalem and, since 1981, in the Golan ieights which were
brought under the jurisdiction of Israeli law) are outside the realm
of the Israeli statutory planning system. Since the statutory scheme
of population dispersal could not include these occupied areas, the
gap between Israel's statutory planning and actual development
remained very wide.
3.	 Consolidation of the Rural Sector
And Protection of Agricultural Land During the Second Stage
As mentioned, the rural sector as a social and economic branch
and as a settlement agency is still very powerful in Israel, though
it lost much of its previous power and status in the second stage due
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to social and economic changes.
Israel's rural population declined from 18.2% of the total
population in 1965 to 13.1% in 1981. The Jewish element in this
sector declined from 11.6% to 9.7% during the same period [98).
Limited arable land and water on the one hand, and technical progress
in production on the other, allowed only a minimum extension of
agriculture as a source of employment. The proportion of people
employed in agriculture decreased from ?% in 1965 to 6.1% in 1981
199].
As a result, the rural sector gradually introduced industries
to its villages. During the second stage, this sector also developed
new experimental forms of settlements, such as purely industrial
villages, community settlements,	 observation settlements and
uninhabited service centres [100]. The rural sector has also been
instrumental in the settlement of areas of security and political
importance [1013.
Under the law, the location of rural (as well as urban)
settlements, their size and type are all subject to national and
district schemes [102], but in practice the planning institutions
lack the political strength to dictate the allocation of settlements
to the rural sector. Inter—ministerial rivalry still makes the
process of rural planning an area for factional interests. While a
national scheme for the location of settlements was under
consideration in 1979, it is not yet completed [103). District
schemes barely exist and also cannot be regarded as effective tools.
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The executive ministries and the Jewish Agency still hold the key
position in these matters.
The new legal provisions for the protection of agricultural
land were of much greater significance. Unlike other planning
policies developed in the first stage, the policy of protection of
agricultural land received explicit expression in many sections of
the law. The particular body set up solely for this purpose with the
power to veto planning decisions involving agricultural land has
already been mentioned. In addition, the legislator made it clear
that in the preparation of schemes agricultural use of land should be
favoured over other uses,
For example, among the provisions to be included by the
National Outline Scheme is (Sec. k9(1)) "to prescribe the purposes to
which land shall be assigned, and the use thereof, while safeguarding
the assignment to agricultural purposes of land suitable therefor."
District schemes are to be submitted to the National Board
accompanied by a map (Sec. 60) "showing the character of the land
comprised in the scheme from the point of view of agricultural
exploitation."
Among the objectives of the local outline scheme as prescribed
by the law is (Sec. 61(1)) "to control the development of the land in
the local planning area, while safeguarding the assignment to
agricultural purposes of land suitable therefor" [1014].
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These expressions show a strong tendency towards rural
ideology, though it is true that the economic factor played a
significant role in the designation of these legal provisions. By the
mid-1970's it was found that arable land per person was 1.0 dunains,
while the area required for the supply of agricultural production was
a minimum of 3 dunams of arable land per person [105]. However,
market pressures for the use of agricultural land for building have
been enormous and more and more arable land has been released every
year by the committee. Furthermore, agricultural land is often
neglected around the towns because of the chances of having its use
changed [106]. All this adds to the evidence that legal and
administrative tools can be used properly only with political support
and suitable economic conditions.
The tools and policy of protection of agricultural land were
also regarded as instruments for the policy of population dispersal.
By limiting the growth of towns in the coastal plain, the authorities
were attempting to redirect development into the north and south.
This again met with only partial success and the effect of this
policy on land prices in the central towns was much more significant
than on population dispersal.
U.	 The Dispersion of Industry during the Second Stage
As explained, the rapid process of industrialisation during the
first stage is also connected with a change in attitude as to the
needs of a modern state, and the policy of distribution of industry
- 326 -
continued to be of utmost importance as part of the population
dispersal policy. However, as with its parent policy, this branch was
also not explicitly expressed in the law.
Section 149, which gives a framework for a national scheme,
provided that such a scheme shall 1107] "set aside industrial zones
and areas for the production of minerals" and [108] "designate places
for public enterprises and purposes of national importance."
District outline schemes could include provisions as to
"different classes of industrial zones" 1109] and, similarly, local
outline schemes could set aside zones for industrial as well as other
purposes [110].
These are merely regulative tools for the industrial dispersal
policy. The much more substantive aspects of social and economic
incentives for industrialisation were not included in the law but
remained in fact the responsibility of the economic ministries.
In practice, planning agencies did not use even the physical
planning tools mentioned above (map—based indication of industrial
centres throughout the country). For example, the statutory national
scheme of population dispersal of 1973 took into account the forecast
of industrial development on a national and regional basis. Yet it
provided no more than a table of the distribution of employment in
industry (as well as in other branches) in the target years (1981,
1982). More practical means for positive industrial development were
outlined merely as recommendations for the executive ministries.
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Another national scheme which is more relevant to the
realisation of the industrial dispersion policy is now in
preparation. This is a scheme for the location of unneighbourly
industries, which might impose restrictions on the operation of
industries in the central areas, thus forcing them out to outlying
districts 1111].
It may be concluded that statutory tools were of almost no
importance in regard to the dispersion of industry during this stge.
Regulative means continued to be considered separately from positive
means, minimising their effect.
The actual process of industrialisation in Israel during the
second stage resulted in the following figures. In 1965 the share of
industry in the GNP was 26.5% and 23.5% of the total labour force
[112]. There were 7,182 industrial enterprises (113], and industrial
exports made up 80.5% of the total export of goods. In 1980, industry
had 35.5% of the GNP -and employed 23.7% of the labour force. Its
share in total export of goods rose to 89.5% [11k].
When industrial growth is viewed through the lenses of the
industrial dispersal policy, it can be seen that the share of the
peripheral districts in total industrial employment grew by nearly
10% from 21.9% in 1965 to 31. L$% in 1978. During the same period, the
population of ticse districts grew by less than 5% 1115]. This is a
clear indication of the important contribution of industry to
employment in these districts and to the population dispersal policy.
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The development of industries based on the Negev's mineral resources,
and the branches of petrochemical and metal industries, were the main
sources of additional industry in the peripheral districts.
Industrial development in the coastal and central districts was
even more impressive during the second stage. Employment in industry
in these districts stood in 1978 at 68.6% of the total industrial
employment [116]. This last figure shows that the forces against
geographical distribution of industry were in fact greater than those
of pro—distribution.
5.	 Slum Clearance and Renewal Neighbourhoods
As described, the years of the second stage witnessed a shift
of emphasis from the problem of physical existence and national
security to domestic problems and the quality of life. With the
economic prosperity which followed the Six Day War, the
socio—economic inequalities between different sections within Israeli
society became extremely marked. This posed a serious threat to the
country's social stability and national unity and led the government
to redefine its social and economic policies. Among these was its
approach to the problems of the communities, mainly of oriental
origin, living in slums in the big cities or in distressed
neighbourhoods in new towns 1117].
With this problem in mind,	 the Rehabilitation Zones
(Reconstruction and Evacuation) Law 5725-1965 [118] was promulgated,
in addition to the new planning law of the same year. This law's
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objective, as stated in the Bill's explanatory note, was to provide
the legal tools for clearing existing slums and preventing
deterioriation of additional neighbourhoods. The new tools were aimed
to help the authorities overcome the difficulty in negotiating with
the evacuees. In several respects this law resembled the planning
law. It focused on the early stages of slum clearance, including the
determination of areas requiring regeneration, making of new plans,
expropriation of land and evacuation of the population. Further
stages of positive implementation, in the sense of redevelopment and
resettlement, were not statutory issues, but were left. to the
initiative and discretion of the authorities. The ideology of
representative democracy and public administration clearly underlined
this law.
The law established a national body, the Authority for the
Reconstruction and Evacuation of Rehabilitation Zones, wh1h was
almost identical to the National Planning Board [119]. This Authority
was to be chaired by the Minister for Housing (or in practice by his
representative) and consist of a number of ministers (in fact
government officials), professional experts in housing, 	 local
government politicians, and two appointed members of the general
public.
The Authority's functions were to declare Rehabilitation Zones,
to prepare new schemes for these areas, and to co—ordinate the
evacuation and reconstruction activities 1120]. On declaring an area
a Rehabilitation Zone, existing statutory schemes were to be
suspended for that area and no building operation or land transaction
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was to be allowed [121]. The State was allowed to expropriate land
subject to the regular compensation, and evacuate the land subject to
the provision of alternative accomodation for the residents [122].
Notably, the law followed the statutory planning procedure in
regard to public participation. The public was to be allowed to
submit its objections to the declaration of an area as a
rehabilitation zone. While objectors were given the "natural justice"
right to voice their opinion, it was the duty of the Authority to
make the final decision [123]. In addition, the public was given the
right to submit its objections to the new planning proposals when
dealt with by the regular planning authorities. 	 No special
requirements regarding the participation of the affected population
were incorporated in this law.
The basic approach to slum clearance and procedures, as
expressed in the Israeli law, resembles the strategy Used in England
during the 1950's and 1960's under the Housing Act 1957 [12k). In
both cases, the purpose of the law was largely to provide for the
demolition of houses no 'longer fit for human habitation. The economic
rationale wsa to resell the land in the inner cities for new modern
development projects, while using the money to rehouse the population
in more appropriate neighbourhoods in other parts of the cities
[125]. Only in recent years has this strategy been replaced by that
of rehabilitation. However, due to lack of financial means very
little use was made of the Israeli law.
During the early 1970's, the Israeli government budgeted
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resources for housing, social services and education, and thus
inter-communal tension appeared to be on the decline. However, the
problems of social and physical poverty - largely faced by Sephardi
communities - were still pressing. In practice, very little use was
made of the Rehabilitation Zones Law, and the problems of slums and
backward neighbourhoods were still to be dealt with in a
comprehensive way [126]..
In 1977, with the establishment of the Likud government, Prime
Minister Begin declared that the core of his domestic policy would be
the rehabilitation of neighbourhoods, called Project Renewal [127].
This project was designed to cover 160 distressed neighbourhoods
throughout the country.. Its cost, estimated at one milliard dollars,
was to be raised largely through contributions from Jewish
communities worldwide, and renewal in each neighbourhood would be
completed within five years.
Though these estimates turned out to be over-optimistic, the
project was put into action; by late 1982, it had covered 83
neighbourhoods and was still continuing elsewhere [128]. From a
number of aspects, this project may be considered a turning point in
Israel's socio-economic life. An integrated project which combines
physical, environmental, socio-cultural and economic objectives, its
principal aim is to close, or at least narrow, the gaps In Israeli
society by improving existing conditions and opportunities for the
underprivileged. Of particular interest in this context of this paper
are two points: the non-statutory nature of the project, and the
declared objective of improving the political involvement and public
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participation of those affected [129]. These signify a remarkable
departure from the old representative democracy expressed in both the
planning law and the rehabilitation zones law.
No special legal structure was set up for this project since
the existing laws generally provide the government with sufficient
powers to carry out this project.
The administration in charge of this project is a non—statutory
one 1130]. At the local level, it includes a steering committee
established in each neighbourhood which is divided almost equally
between representatives of the local community and government
officials and is in charge of designing a comprehensive programme for
the regeneration of the neighbourhood. The programme often covers
physical renovation of private buildings, extensions to existing
small flats, improvements to public utilities and new constructions
for public purposes. The programme also deals with educational and
cultural schemes for both children and adults: different classes are
planned in the formal and non—formal educational institutions.
Furthermore, some programs also deal with unemployment and economic
problems. They detail the needs of the neighbourhood in professional
manpower and the cost of its implementation.
The local programmes are submitted for approval to
inter—institutional steering committees which operate at the national
level. The following stage is the implementation of the programme by
the local population with the support of the various governmental and
municipal institutions.
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An important aspect regarding the design and implementation of
the renewal project has to be stressed. This is the lack of
coordination between the project and the statutory planning system.
The planning institutions were not involved in the decision as to in
which neighbourhoods renewal should take place; nor where they party
to the design of the nature and scope of the project. The project
views neighbourhoods in isolation and the opportunity to create an
integrated overall planning project where neighbourhoods are
redesigned as part of their urban setting must therefore be seen as
having been wasted. This illustrates again the political weakness of
the statutory planning machinery and the secondary importance
attached to it by the executive ministries.
As already mentioned, an underlying principle of this project
is that renewal of neighbourhoods should not be imposed on the local
population but should be designed and implemented with their full
collaboration. This is obviously a noble principle, but it often
conflicts with the actual reality of urban renewal. The conflict is
also shown in the legal tools used for positive implementation. The
following words by Malcolm Grant are of great relevance to the
Israeli stuation:
"It is far from easy tQ create a satisfactory legal structure
for urban renewal. Radical change often requires apparently
arbitrary and individually harmful decisions; yet only radical
change is likely to stem the rate of decline. The law need
therefore to ensure that, whatever strategies are adopted,
there is preserved an opportunity for different viewpoints to
be heard, for conflicts of interest to be openly resolved where
possible and for adequate address to be mde available to those
liable to be adversely affected. It is at best questionable
whether these criteria have been satisfied in the past, and
- 
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there is no guarantee that they will in the future (131)".
In Israel, the existing laws place greater emphasis on the
powers of the administration to impose what it considers necessary,
rather than on real participation of the public affected. A new law,
introduced in connection with the renewal project, illustrates the
inherent problems of' positive planning. The Houses (Renovation and
Maintenance) Law 571;0-1980 (132] 	 aimed	 at	 providing visual
improvements in the urban environment, 	 ensuring government
contributions of no less than 30% of the costs involved [133], the
rest to be raised by the landowners themselves. The law also provided
for administrative powers allowing the declaration of an area as a
renovation zone and imposition on landowners of the duty to carry out
those changes considered vital to the desired physical improvements
[131;].
Although it is still somewhat early to evaluate the
achievements of this project, three aspects are widely , appreciated:
the significant improvement of physical 	 conditions of' these
neighbourhoods; the participation of' the local people in determining
the direction taken by the project; the active involvement of the
Jewish conEnunities from abroad, not only in providing money but also
in givtng advice, professional aid, and monitoring the actual work.
6.	 Regional Planning During the Second Stage
Regional planning policy during the second stage continued to
be of great importance and was given legal form by the establishment
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of a statutory district outline scheme as the second tier in the
hierarchy of the scheme structure. The law made the preparation of
district schemes obligatory and prescribed a maximum period of five
years from the date of coming into force of the law for the
completion of this duty 1135].
District schemes as an intermediate rank have a dual function:
(1) to determine the details necessary for the implementation of the
National Outline Scheme and (2) to provide guidelines for the
planning of local schemes 1136].
Furthermore, the law does not give substantive indication as to
the content of regional policy to be pursued in the outline district
schemes. Instead it gives a rather non-exclusive list of subjects
related to use of land which may be included in a district scheme
[137]. The objectives of such schemes, apart from helping to
implement the national scheme, are to determine "any matter of
general importance to the district which is likely to form the object
of a local outline scheme, including the creation of appropriate
conditions for the district in regard to security and employment"
(138]. This vagually made security and socio-economic considerations
legitimate in regard to regional land use, and provides an
opportunity to widen the scope of planning ends, though it does seem
to extend the scope of means beyond those connected with the use of
land (139].
Another indication as to the content of a desirable regional
policy can be deduced from the provision dealing with documents
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necessary for accompanying the scheme. Among these is a map "showing
the character of the lands comprised in the scheme, from the point of
view of agricultural exploitation" [1 l$0]. This and other provisions
show the emphasis the law put on agricultural use of land above other
uses.
The most significant aspect of statutory regional planning
during most of the second stage is the non-existence of schemes. Not
only were no disttict schemes prepared within the statutory time
limit but, In some cases such as the Tel Aviv District, they were not
prepared until the early 1980's [11].
The unbalanced development of the various distrlcts continued
[1 112], the most problematic district being that of the north which,
due to political neglect, lacked industrial development. Here there
was an additional socio-political problem of an internal Imbalance
between the declining Jewish and growing Arab populations.
The Southern District grew to some extent, thanks to its
industrial potential based on natural resources. In addition, the
evacuation of the Sinai was instrumental In the development of the
Negev.
The Tel Aviv, Haifa and Central districts remained the most
congested and developed. During the second stage they became in fact
city regions, eharacterised by urban clusters around the cities of
Tel Aviv and Haifa. At the same time they contained many ecological
hazards of which the public has become increasingly aware. Any
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attempt to halt further growth of these districts is generally
fruitless.
The distriqt of Jerusalem underwent remarkable changes during
the second stage. It was the first district for which a statutory
regional plan was prepared [1 L13]. This was a map—based zoning scheme
which strove to implement the national scheme of population
dispersal, transportation network and so on, while providing a
framework for local planning. However, while its underlying
principles were presented by the planner, they did not become a
binding part of the scheme. These principles combined elements of
regulative and positive planning such as the preservation of the
special character of the district of Jerusalem, the creation of new
sources of employment outside the municipal area of Jerusalem,
protection of agricultural land, provision for centres of industry
while protecting the environment, development of a transportation
network, centralised development of residential areas and centres for
recreation, tourism and culture. Unfortunately these invaluable
principles led to no more than a physical land use map where
different zones were designated, together with some building
regulations. No further positive planning tools were provided.
Further, the planning of the district of Jerusalem gave rise to
the problematic position of statutory and non—statutory planning in
Israel during this stage, particularly since the Six Day War. The
reunification of the two parts of Jerusalem and the occupation of the
surrounding areas of Judea and Sumaria were of great geo—political,
historical, social and cultural importance. This led to intensive
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planning and development which could not but view the entire
geographical area as a single regional planning unit. This new fact
did not fit into the legal position whose perspective was limited to
areas under the jurisdiction of Israeli planning laws. The result was
that the statutory District Outline Scheme covered merely the
territory within the old legal—administrative boundaries of the
District, while it neglected the new areas which were to all
practical purposes integrated In the region L1J. For example, the
scheme considered tw urban centres, Jerusalem and Belt Shemesh,
while the new town with its industrial area which had been developed
to the east of Jerusalem, called Ma'aleh Adumim, was ignored in this
regional plan. Similar problems arose in the local planning of
Jerusalem.
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C.	 JUDICIAL INFLUENCE ON STATUTORY PLANNING DURING THE SECOND
STAGE
The first notable affect of the High Court on the Israeli
political process during the second stage was its indirect support of
participatory democracy. The limitations imposed by the Court on the
Executive's discretion and use of powers encouraged groups and
individuals to take an interest in the decision making process.
During this period, the State's organs came, to a greater extent,
under the scrutiny of the High Court of Justice, including the sphere
of planning. Though the Court continued to pay lip service to the
principle that it does not act as a planning commission and cannot
replace the competent authority LVt5], it dealt more and more with
substantive planning issues. This was done through the doctrine of
ultra vires and abuse of power by taking into consideration
irrelevant issues, alien considerations, and defiance of natural
justice principles. In determining the nature of planning decisions,
the Court did not content itself with the formal appearance of the
decision, but also examined the content.
In HCJ 392/72 Berger V Haifa District Planning and Building
Commission (1'6], the Court concluded that a scheme proposing to
expropriate land which had been previously purchased by Christian
German foreigners was, in fact, aimed at improper purpose. Although
the official explanation was that the land was required for a
community centre, it was revealed that the main purpose was to
prevent Germans from settling in the neighbourhood. The ruling was
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that the personality and the purposes of landowners in purchasing
land are not relevant for the making of planning decisions of that
kind. The scheme was nullified.
In HCJ 595/75 Salamman V Jerusalem District Planning and
Building Commission L17], the Court was not satisfied that the
planning commission had taken the relevant considerations into
account when it decided that a new trunk road would by—pass land
owned by an Arab notable, rather than cross the land of the
petitioner. The Court thus ordered the commission to reconsider the
petitioner's objection to the proposed road.
In the words of Justice Etzioni: "Even when the authority says
in its decision that it had decided what it did for planning reasons
it does not prevent this Court from examining if this is true"
[1'48).
The Court criticised in particular the local level of the
planning administration for its abuse of planning powers. In HCJ
235/76 Binyanei Kidmat Lod V Lod Local Planning and Building
Commission [ 1 149], Justice Berenzon went as far as to criticise the
statutory provision which allocated powers to local planning
authorities. This case dealt with the discretionary powers of local
commissions to grant planning permits which were in fact deviations
from an approved scheme.
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Justice Berenzon expressed the view that since local planning
commissions are in fact identical to local authorities, parochial
considerations rather than the proper planning ones often influence
granting of such permits. 	 In describing their	 improper
considerations, Justice Berenzon said that local councilors are at
best either over-enthusiastic in the advancement of physical
development of their localities, or too weak to resist the private
and public developers pressure for such development. Hence they allow
deviations from an approved scheme at the expense of the quality of
the environment and urban life.
Berenzon went on to say that at its worse, the discretionary
power of local commissions leads to favouritism, improper conduct and
corruption. He recommended that this power to grant permits, known as
"relaxation" and "non-conforming use", be repealed altogether, and
suggested that such powers be vested with district commissions whom
he considered more professionally equipped and above local politics.
This re-allocation of functions would be, in Berenzon's view, a more
effective method of tackling the problem of abuse of planning powers
than using criminal proceedings and penalties.
The Court per Justice Berenzon went far beyond its traditional
review role and into the realm of the legislature. However, since the
allocation of planning functions was part of the more general area of
central-local government relationships, no changes were introduced in
the law.
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Contrary to the above-mentioned tendency, the Court's ruling on
issues regarding the submission and hearing of objections to proposed
schemes gave no encouragement to participation of the general public
in the planning process.
In HCJ 392/72 French Hill Hotel Ltd. V Jerusalem Local Planning
and Building Commission (150), the Court was reluctant to broaden the
circle of people who may be considered as "interest in any land" for
the purpose of submission of objections beyond those with direct
interest in terms of property rights. This case involved a project of
a multi-story hotel on the French Hill, Jerusalem, near the Hebrew
University Campus on Mount Scopus. In the view of the Court, the
objectors to the scheme failed to show their substantive interest in
the land beyond the general public's interest in the planning of
Jerusalem They were not given this standing in court.
Further, in HCJ 595/75 Salaman [151), the Court limited the
scope of the provision as to hearing of objections in public to the
stage at which objectors are given the right to be heard. The stages
which follow, in which the commission discusses the issues and makes
its decision are, the Court ruled, beyond the rule of' the public.
Considering Prof. McAuslan's thesis as to the link between open
government and public participation (152), these two examples seem to
lead to the conclusion that not only was the Israeli court bent on
protecting private property and discouraging public participation,
but also diminished, or at least did not extend, the duty of open
government and thus hindered public participation in planning.
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1.	 The Scope of Planning Considerations
During the second stage, the High Court of Justice gave several
indications that despite the inherent physical planning nature of the
law, its tendency was towards the broadening of the scope of planning
considerations.
The scope of considerations was repeatedly raised in regard to
the policy of protection of agricultural land. As mentioned, the
legislator adopted this policy and set up a special commission to
deal with the matter. This committee was given the power to declare
land "agricultural land", meaning that any change of use in the land
would have to receive the consent of the committee. Section 11 pf the
First Schedule provides that "the committee shall exercise its powers
under this law to the extent only that it is necessary so to do in
order to ensure that agricultural land remains assigned to, and is
used for, agricultural purposes". This section led to different
opinions aMong the High Court of Justice as to the legitimate scope
of considerations the committee may exercise.
A strict-line view saw agricultural purposes as the sole
consideration of the committee. This line was pursued by Justice
Cohen in HCJ 324/71 Savyon Community Council V The Committee for the
Protection of Agricultural Land (153). The result, implicit in
Justice Cohen's judgement, was that once land was declared as
agricultural land, the discretion to give consent to non-agricultural
use is very limited. It is interesting to note that in the
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circumstances of this case, this view helped a social attitude which
was not at all concerned with the protection of agricultural land per
se. The petitioner, a community council representing a highly
prestigious neighbourhood, actually objected to a proposed scheme to
extend a neighbouring new town which might have brought it to its
doorstep. The scheme proposed to use agricultural land, which
separated the two settlements, for a new housing estate. The local
committee thus wanted to keep the neighbourhoods segregated. However,
under the Court's ruling, the objective of solving the housing
problem of the new town was regarded as ultra vires to the powers
of the statutory committee.
A similar line of interpretation was pursued by Justice Asher
in HCJ '11/78 Neaxnan V The Appeal Committee for the Protection of
Agricultural Land [15 L1J. Though he agreed in principle that the
committee may allow declared agricultural land to be put to
non-agricultural use, he restricted such use to what is deemed to
contribute directly to agricultural use or to maintaining a rural
settlement. The examples Justice Asher gave of such use were dwelling
houses, workshops, public buildings for education, 	 sport and
entertainment and even industries which are an auxiliary source of
income to the villagers. Considerations of improving the settlement's
social structure through the provision of agricultural land for new
populations which were not to be employed in agriculture was regarded
in this case by Justice Asher as beyond the powers of the committee.
Broader interpretation of the scope of considerations of the
committee were given by several Justices in other cases.
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In a second case relating to the Savyon settlement, HCJ 601/75
Savyon Community Council V The Committee for the Protection of
Agricultural Land (155], the High Court of Justice per Justice
Berenzon held that it is inconceivable that In a dynamic country sucth
as Israel, the rural interests would always override all other
interests, and if a land is declared at one time as agricultural land
that it should remain so for good. Justice Berenzon deduced from the
composition of the committee, which had a majority of representatives
from outside the rural sector, that the law allows various
considerations in such matters. He concluded that the committee may
give its consent for non-agricultural use if and when there is a
superior interest and a fundamental change in the circumstances which
led to the declaration, justifying a consent to non-agricultural land
use [156].
In the same case, Justice amgar concluded [157] that
agricultural considerations as expressed in section 11 are limited to
the stage when a declaration of agricultural land is made; namely
that no purpose other than agricultural use would justify such a
declaration 1158). In his view, Section 11 does not apply to a later
stage when the committee is asked to give its consent to a change
from agricultural use. At such a stage, Justice Shamgar agreed, the
committee may also take in other considerations, but in view of the
prescribed policy only use of vital importance may override the
objective of safeguarding agricultural land.
- 3 146 -
This broader line was followed in subsequent cases. In Neaman
[159], the Court in a majority judgement ruled that the committee's
decision, which was based on social objectives, was within its
powers. There the committee allowed the change of agricultural use to
the building of houses for families who, although they would not live
from agriculture, would still contribute the social structure and
would provide services to the rural population.
This line appears to represent. the prevailing attitude of' the
High Court of Justice in regard to the policy of protection of'
agricultural land [160).
Socio—educational considerations in local planning were also
discussed in HCJ 595/75 Salamman V Jerusalem District Planning and
Building Commission [161]. There the Court said that in the planning
of a new road, the commission may legitimately consider the
importance of the use of particular agricultural farm land for the
education of orphans, and would thus prefer the new road to cross
through'
 neighbouring land. Though such objectives are not among the
physical objectives as mentioned in the law, they were regarded as
legitimate considerations,
The tendency to broaden the scope of planning considerations
was also evident in other spheres of planning.
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In a recent case '86/81 Notzer V Orbit Medicenter [162], the
Supreme Court went much further with this tendency. The Court
considered a scheme which provided for the building of a medical
centre in the prestigious residential neighbourhood of Hertzlia
Pituach. The centre was initiated by Jewish Investors from abroad and
was expected to provide clinics for immigrant doctors. It was proved
that these two points played a major role in the commission's
decision to approve the scheme. The Judge in the first instance ruled
that these are irrelevant considerations. However the Supreme Court
of Justice per President Landau ruled that considerations such as the
absorption of professional immigrants and the encouragement of Jewish
investment in Israel, although not explicitly stated in the law, are
of high national priority and thus may come within the scope of
planning considerations.
This ruling may be explained as an expression of some of the
tenets of Zionist ideology in the physical planning sphere. The need
to provide for the absorption of Jewish immigrants and the
soclo-econotnic policy of encouraging Jewish investment in Israel were
recognised as relevant considerations in making planning decisions.
2.	 Flexibility and Stability In the Planning Process
The conflict between a flexible planning process and stability
in the way land should be used Is Inherent in any statutory planning
system. In a system such as the Israeli one which opts for a high
degree of certainty through a rigid type of scheme, the problem of
- 38 -
how to allow for flexibility in planning for adjustments in view of
actual development is particularly difficult. The Israeli legislator
attempted to tackle this problem by providing discretionary powers to
the authorities to change, repeal and suspend statutory schemes. This
was in fact similar to the way the Mandatory legislator had dealt
with the problem.
The Court added its own measure of flexibility through the
ruling that the principle of res judicata is not in general
applicable to the planning decision making process [163). The Court
deduced this among other things from the statutory provisions for the
scheme making process. Under these provisions, there are two main
stages of decision making. First, before the deposit of a proposed
scheme, and second after the hearing of the objections [16k]. The
fact that the law itself allows the commission to reconsider the
proposal and make changes before the final decision is made led
Justice Bernzon, in FJCJ 189/7$ Bruno V Jerusalem District Planning
and Building Commission [165), to reaffirm that the rule of res
judicata does not apply in the same way to those statutory planning
bodies as to other administrative bodies. The result is that the
planning commission may reconsider a proposed scheme indefinitely
until it has become a legally binding document.
There are some limitations to this principle, First, when an
individual has been given planning permission, the commission is not
at liberty to change its decision and repeal the granted permit
[166), save in some specific circumstances [167]. The principle that
granted rights are to be protected by law prevails in such cases.
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Second, reconsideration is always subject to the principle of
reasonability; i.e. the commission cannot fundamentally change its
decision within a short period of time when no factual changes have
taken place, or where there was no justification for a new valuation
of the existing circumstances [168].
In practice the legal position, which still offers wide
discretion to the authorities to reconsider their decisions, is often
used only in one way; namely to allow something which has been
previously refused. It opens the door for further political pressure
which eventually pays off. The problem is that surrender to
applicants' pressure is often at the expense of the objector who
expects some degree of certainty in the planning process. However,
the conflict is still far from being solved.
3.	 Planning Bargaining
The practice of planning bargaining in Israel during the second
stage was very common, although very little has been said publicly
about it. As explained, this is rooted in political reality,
particularly at the local level. However, since the process was often
motivated by factional interests, this casts a shadow on the
legitimacy of its use. On the rare occasions when bargaining has come
to the surface, the Court showed a negative attitude which generally
reflected the suspicions that such agreements encountered.
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In CC 19/69 Meler V Salmon (169], a district court heavily
criticised the Municipality of Haifa for an agreement it made with a
developer. Under that agreement, the t&nicipality was to receive a
piece of land for the use of a kindergarten, while the local
commission would give the developer a permit for extra building
density. The Court quoted anothe case which distastefully named such
agreements as "trade in densities", inappropriate conduct for a local
authority. The Court pointed out that the authority had all the
legitimate means for purchase, exchange or expropriation when it
needed land for public purposes.
In a later case, CA 73/76 Schneider V Jerusalem Local Planning
and Building Commission and the Municipality of Jerusalem 1170], more
complicated bargaining was involved. There the local authorities
opened proceedings to evacuate a house which, because of its
location, created a serious hasard for traffic. Under the order of
the arbitrator, the authorities had either to compensate the dwellers
or provide them with alternative housing. The authorities then
purchased a small piece of land on which the scheme in force
prohibited any building. It proceeded to initiate a change in the
scheme so as to allow the building for rehousing the evacuees. The
new scheme had gone through all the formal procedures and was
approved. When this scheme was considered by the Court, it was ruled
illegal because it sought to promote a purpose alien to the law. The
attempt to solve problems in one area by causing new problems in
another area, said the Court, is alien to the purposes of the law.
The Court restricted the imposition of provisions in local scheme for
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solving problems in the area under the scheme, and not for solving
problems of different areas. More generally, the Court saw in that
scheme an attempt to solve the financial problem of the Municipality
rather than a purely planning problem, and thus found it exceeding
the powers under the planning law.
In both cases there were individuals who were particularly
aggrieved by the outcome of the planning agreement. Their interests
conflicted with those who were parties to the agreement. This leads
to a fundamental problem j.nherent in bargaining by planning
authorities. Planning authorities, particularly at the local level,
have a dual task. On the one hand they are the executive power
concerned with positive development, and on the other they are
planning decision making bodies which have quasi judicial powers to
determine between conflicting interests. To allow planning bargaining
by planning authorities seems to allow an interested party to become
a judge of its own court. This problem is somewhat less critical in
Israel because of differences, in some cases, between decision making
bodies and executive authorities. Nonetheless, the problem is far
from any solution 1171].
The Effect of Planning Provisions on the Individual
During the second stage, the ideology of collectivism still
dominated the statutory planning provisions. Individualism was given
only secondary importance. This was most distinctly manifested in the
provision which enabled the authorities an acquisition without
compensation of no less than Z O% of each plot of land for a
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prescribed list of public services. The new provision both increased
the percentage from 25 to O and extended the list of purposes for
which expropriation could take place. Such a provision would
unthinkable under the British system, but was enabled in Israel
because it merely broadened the age-old power of expropriation
without compensation [172]. This extension emerged from the growing
needs of public services which were not catered for in the old
schemes, and from the financial difficulties faced by local
authorities in meeting these needs. However, in the explanatory note
of the Bill [173), the emphasis was placed on another reasons; namely
that "experience has shown that landowners benefited from the
implementation of schemes in regard to alignment of roads,
maintaining open spaces and so on, far more than the loss from the
25% (of land) they had to dedicate without compensation". In other
words, the gain of the private sector was given as the official
justification for the extension of the public share in land
ownership.
Another significant tool which expressed this collectivist
attitude was again in regard to combination and repartition of plots
of land. As stated, the ill-effects of the old speculative partition
of land during the Mandatory period led to the extensive powers given
to planning authorities for the rearrangement of plots. These powers
were maintained in the new law 11? z4]. They were also used to replace
the first generation of statutory schemes by more modern and updated
arrangements of land. Hence detailed schemes which include
combinations of plots and repartition into new plots remained very
common during the second stage.
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It is of interest to note that this type of re-planning was
often utilised by the authorities to acquire part of the land for
public purposes while preserving the value (if not the size) of' the
remaining land by allowing greater densities and other benefits to
the developers. This way of evading payment of compensation was even
approved by the Court although, as one Justice noted, it might
sometimes unjustly put the burden on the few rather than on the
public in general.
With the years, and owing to the growing tendency towards
individualism and private initiative, landowners beoame more and more
reluctant to accept the authorities' intervention in their property
rights. The implementation of the kO% expropriation without
compensation became legally and politically very diffleult. The
result was that expropriation is carried out, but compensation is
"paid" by means of relaxation of planning restrictions and greater
densities on the remaining 60% of' land. Nevertheless, private
developers increasingly challenge in Court the authorities' powers to
intervene In their property.
In a recent case (175) which concerned a planning provision
prescribing that residents of one house (will) have a right of way on
neighbouring land, District Court Judges expressed different opinions
as to the scope of the authorities' powers to prescribe such rights
and duties. The legal position on this point Is thus uncertain.
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PART III
STATWORY PLANNING AS A FORM F SOCIAL CONTROL
Part III sums up the analysis of the two statutory planning
systems of Palestine and Israel in respect to their 	 special
significance as components in a complex system of social control. The
concept of social control elucidates the phenomenon of social order
and norm-oriented behaviour. The application of this concept to the
above-mentioned planning systems leads to the identification of three
inter-related roles which were exercised by these systems.
As mentioned previously, these roles can be classified loosely
as 1) political role - to serve as a tool for effective government;
2) economic role - to provide efficient utilisation of scarce
resources; 3) social, role - to advance human welfare and process. The
cumulative exercise of these roles, from which statutory planning
largely draws its nature as a component of social control,
contributes to the maintenance of the prevailing social order.
An analysis of the planning systems of Palestine and Israel
reveals that almost every facet of the planning systems expressed all
the roles mentioned above. It is thus sometimes difficult to assign a
particular role to a specific part of a system. Nevertheless, it is
considered useful for both an understanding of the significance of
the three roles and the basic facets of the systems to analyse each
facet in conjunction with the major role it played and expressed.
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The analysis in this part of the work proceeds through a
typology of four facets: 1) The organisation of planning in
connection with the political role of the system; i.e. effective
government. 2) The planning process viewed from the economic role;
i.e. efficient utilisation of scarce resources. 3) The substantive
content of planning, focused through the social role; i.e. human
welfare and progress. i4) The implementation of statutory planning,
both positive and regulative. This final facet elucidates the mutual
relations between the statutory planning system and the prevailing
social order. Here the special character of statutory planning as a
theoretical form of social control is contrasted with the actual
functioning of the systems being studied during the various
historical phases,
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CHAPTER 9. THE ORGANISATION OF PLANNING AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT
Pursuant to the underlying thesis of this work as to the nature
of planning systems, the organisation of planning in the statutory
systems mentioned above can be described in general terms as an
agency of social control with the following set of elements:
An organised body of government with formal hierarchal
structure. Its composition was mainly affected by the balance of
political power in society. It was assigned a range of functions for
which it enjoyed the backing of the force of law. Its functions were
directly related to the physical environment but were, more broadly,
inter—connected with the social order as a whole. This relationship
with the social order was largely affected by the political role
exercised through the systems as tools for effective government.
Some of these elements will now be discussed, thus elucidating




The formal-official character of the statutory planning
machineries me them an obvious and visible tool for social control
[1].
The Mandatory era saw the establishment of a governmental
organisation whose task was to implement modern town planning in
Palestine. For most of this period, town planning relied solely Qfl
the statutory planning institutions. Although non-statutory local
planning agencies were gradually created and functioned towards the
later stage of the British Mandate, they were relatively weak and of
secondary importance. This position remained unchanged during the
formative years of the State of Israel. Formal and institutional
planning organisation thus marked the development of the planning
systems in Palestine and in Israel.
This was not exclusive to these two systems. In Britain, too,
the modern era of planning which began in the 20th century was
characterised by the introduction under the 1909 Act of formal
legal-administrative organisation in charge of town planning 12].
However, in Britain this organization owed much of its existence to
non-institutional pioneering thinkers, private philanthropists and
the "garden cities" movement, while in Palestine the official
government planning system preceded non-statutory local planning
institutions 12]. During the first stage in Palestine, the official
machinery could draw only limited help from non-official planning
agencies, though by the second stage these agencies were actually
- 358 -
able to offer more than they were asked to do by the machinery of the
government	 ].
The intensity and complexity of modern life gave rise to a
general tendency to prefer formal agencies of social control. This is
usually characteristic of societies with great divisions of labour,
heterogenity of population and sub-groups with different sets of
norms and ideologies 15]. Such characteristics were shared by the
societies of Palestine and Israel, as well those of Britain and the
Western world. This tendency also led to preference for centralised,
formal town planning machinery as opposed to non-formal, fragmented
or ad-hoc governmental bodies, and for profit-oriented private sector
planning.
The creation of an explicit structure of planning
administration may be seen as corresponding to the Weberian view of
the ideal-type bureaucracy [6) and to a later development of
administrative management principles by a school of thought known as
"scientific administration" [7).
	
Under	 these,	 the effective
performance of administration rests, among other things, upon formal
structure and hierarchal and disciplined organisation with a clearly
defined division of powers and responsibilities. Although these
traditional administrative concepts were criticised 	 [8]	 for
over-emphasising the importance of formal, as opposed to informal,
structures and relationships, they are of great importance in
bringing to light the advantages of orderly organised machinery for
efficient governmental operation and in fact for effective mechanism
of social control.
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The formal character of the statutory planning organisations,
the explicit definition of the hierarchy of institutions, their
composition, nature of their powers, duties and modes of operation,
put them In line with other obvious agents of social control such as
the military, the police and the courts. Their activities in
rule-making, adjudication of conflicts, 	 law enforcement and
implementation accumulate into making them a fundamental instrument
of social control in respect of regulation of social, economic and
political behaviour.
It should be noted that even non-statutory planning agencies
fulfill functions of social control, no less than other agents of
socialisation such as teachers, social workers or psychiatrists. As
Robert Goodman says in reference to planners: "As ostensible
technicians we are not the visible symbols of oppression like the
military and police. We are more sophisticated, more educated, more
socially conscious than the generals - we are the soft cops" [9).
As mentioned, the planning organisation of Mandatory Palestine
consisted largely of the official statutory planning machinery; thus
its salient role of Social control was clear and visible. Such
domination of the official	 planning Institutions was	 also
characteristic to the Israeli system, particularly during
	
the
formative stage. Hence the conclusion as to the significant social
control role of the planning machinery applies also to the Israeli
system.
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However, the evolution of the systems above revealed that
formal statutory planning institutions were sometimes less effective
than other agencies of social control (e.g. governmental executive
bodies and private market forces) in influencing people to follow
prescribed patterns of urban and rural development. Furthermore, in
many instances the statutory organisation was a relatively weak
centre of decision making and was controlled from other centres. This
leads to the conclusion that the effectiveness of formal statutory
planning machinery is only partially related to its administrative
structure and efficiency; it has far more connection with the
socio-political setting within which the machinery operates. As it
has been shown above, different sets of socio-political circumstances
led to different results in terms of effectiveness of the machinery.
However, the very act of creating statutory machinery turned the law
into a factor in the socio-political arena and influenced the balance
of political power [10].
The role of planning law, from this perspective, was fulfilled
by the provision of a legally defined organisation, its composition,
powers, duties and the legal requirements governing its operation.
Yet beyond this classic role of administrative law, planning laws in
the systems above played a somewhat exceptional role as an instrument
of what is called "status raising". This was demonstrated
particularly with regard to the local authorities during the
Mandatory era [11] and with regard to the Ministry of the Interior in
Israel. Their statutory basis provided the former institutions with
great power in their political struggle with the national communal
institutions. It also helped the latter in its struggle for greater
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influence over the country's physical development with the executive
Ministries and other public bodies.
Though it could be argued that the effectiveness of the
machinery resulted solely from its statutory powers backed by the
force of law, it is contended here that an equal contribution to the
effectiveness of planning resulted from a psychological aspect which
is derived from the law, this aspect is described as "status raising"
112].
If It Is accepted that there exists such a phenomenon as
respect for the law and statutory institutions, then the very
definition of a planning body as a statutory planning body gives it
psychological weight, adding to its existing status by virtue of its
statutory powers. A striking example Is the Israeli National Planning
Board. Positive planning at the national level requiring
collaboration between many public and governmental institutions could
not be pursued under the threat of coercion. When such collaboration
was achieved it was, to some extent, due to the psychological effect
of the legal status of the planning machinery, in this instance the
National Board. However, as it has been said, on many occasions
planning agencies which had greater political status than the
statutory machinery showed greater influence over social behaviour.
It may be deduced from the above systems that formal statutory
planning machinery can be an effective agency of social control
providing It does not compete directly with counter—forces which are
backed by a greater political strength than that enjoyed by the
statutory machinery. In other words, the advantage of formal
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statutory planning machinery strongly depends on its consistency with
the broader socio-political framework and its position within such a
framework [13).
B.	 C4POSITION
Of all the organisational-administrative arrangements, the
composition of the planning machineries was most directly affected by
the prevailing power structure while reinforcing the existing
political system and, more broadly, the social order in general
i1].
"Social order", as Joe Baily says [15] "is	 constructed
principally by the social organisation of the state". It is thus
important to study the statutory organisation of planning and its
social control significance in the context of other major
socio-political institutions which exist in a given society and
affect its social order. This is the reason for the elaborate
description of the social and political institutions during the
Mandatory and Israeli eras. The descrJption above leads to the
identification of two socio-historical processes which took place in
these eras. The processes are particularly relevant to an
understanding of the political role of the planning organisation.
These were a) the institutionalisation of the power structure [16],
and b) the acquisition of legitimacy of the governing bodies [17].
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Some explanation as a reminder of these powers seems necessary.
Public life in both Mandatory Palestine and Israel was characterised
by the formative-innovative nature of their social and political
systems. The crystalisation of a new society and the formation of a
new political-governmental system in each of the cases can be sharply
contrasted with the long tradition and stability of socio-political
systems such as that of Britain. Since the eras under discussion in
this work saw a complicated process of the laying of foundations of
new states in Palestine and later in Israel, the power struggle
between different groups and institutions in each case was
significantly sharper than in Britain during the same period. This
struggle affected, as was reflected in, the statutory planning
machinery. Further, the changes which the governmental machinery
underwent throughout these years were also explained as inter-related
with the particular social, economic and political developments in
Palestine and Israel, and as attempts at re-establishing the
legitimacy of the governing bodies.
To return to the link between the social structure and the
composition of the planning institutions, as stated above, the
concept of social control Is based on the assumption that a degree of
social solidarity is essential for the existence of any society,
irrespective of its political system. Yet social integration between
groups and individuals is a serious problem in any society which is
characterised by widely differing interests, impulses and attitudes.
The society of Mandatory Palestine with its complicated structure
made social cooperation an ideal which, if not within the boundaries
- 364 -
of the different sectors of the Arabs and the Jews, could hardly be
accomplished. Furthermore, even within these two communities, there
was a complicated power structure which created many centres of
influence and thus, at times, a fragile equilibrium in their internal
social order.
On top of this division in society was the distinction,
resulting from the mandatory situation, between the rulers and the
ruled, and the interests of the mandatory power with those of the
local population.
The situation in Israel regarding the complexity of the power
structure has not changed to any large degree. Despite the great
majority of the Jewish community in the entire population, the
demography of Israel has been characterised by wide hetrogentty. The
new political system, based on proportional representation, also
contributed to the diffusion of power between many groups and
parties. The fact that Israeli society has demonstrated a high level
of solidarity concerning matters of national security does not
contradict another truth that there have been great differences of
opinion regarding social values, 	 ideologies,	 perceptions and
political objectives. The resulting agreement to preserve the "status
quo" in social and economic matters signifies a pragmatic solution to
incompatible views.
Shean McConnell is right in saying that "planning is practised
in any country in accordance with the political will of those in
power" [18]. The statutory planning machineries of the systems
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described above reflected an attempt to create social stability under
the prevailing governing powers. That stability was to be achieved by
a composition which generally adhered to the division of power within
the respective soøieties [19]. But who actually exercised social
control thorugh the statutory planning organization?
Answering this question in regard to the mandatory era, three
elements ought to be mentioned: 1) the British administration; 2) the




The British administration formed the responsible [20] central
government and dominated the statutory planning machinery, following
colonial—paternalistic ideology. A basic postulate prevailing
throughout the British Empire was that government powers should first
and foremost be utilised to advance British interests, both strategic
and local. Palestine, although a Mandated territory in which Britain
had dual obligations to both Jews and Arabs, was no exception. For
the achievement of British objectives in Palestine, common colonial
methods were employed with varying degrees of success. Among these
were 1) The impositior of law and order to secure the obedience of
the local people. 2) The imposition of an administrative and legal
framework which embodies British values and attitudes as a means of
indoctrinating the local population towards the British point of
view. 3) The maintenance of existing institutions and the
establishment of new bodies as vehicles for indirect rule. The high
degree of solidarity within the central government in carrying out
the British policies is noteworthy.
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The government of Palestine was anxious to retain its control
over the main decision-making institutions. Several organisational
reforms in the planning machinery changed the distribution of
functions between the various bodies, but they did not alter
governmental dominance. Whether it was centralised, decentralised or
a mixture of the two, the composition was designed to serve the
government in its aim of' supervising the working of the machinery.
Such supervision was part of a broader attempt at ensuring the
authority of the government over the local population and its
institutions in planning as well as in other aspects of life. An
accepted authority could help the government pursue its planning
goals (the ostensible goals) and also general British objectives
(meta-goals) in Palestine.
The national institutions of the local population were
represented in statutory planning bodies during the 1920's and the
1930's. Casting together leaders of the rival communities was in
itself a British attempt to achieve conformity of the local
population with the Britjsh perceptions, interests and prescribed
rules. However, it was also an opportunity for the national
leadership of both Arabs and Jews to participate in policy making, or
rather to exert pressure on British officials to advance their
different natIonal goals. On the other hand, their participation in
the Central Planning Commission also helped the leadership to
consolidate its authority over the respective communities.
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At the end of the British rule in Palestine in 19k8, the last
High Commissioner, Sir Alan Cuningham, wrote about British planning
activities in Jerusalem as "one feature of administration here, which
has been persistently pursued without regard to politics or schism by
the selfless devotion of individuals of all races and creeds" 122).
However, despite this description of an ideal working of the planning
machinery, solidarity between British, Jews and Arabs even in this
spehre of life was not accomplished. In fact, the idea that such
solidarity could be feasible, despite the general	 political
conflicts, seems somewhat naive. It is probably rooted in a narrow
perception of planning as the art of physical preservation and
architectural-aesthetic enterprise, isolated from ideological motives
and socio-economic and political implications.
However, the national communities in Palestine under their
emerging leaders had a much more politically-oriented perception of
the country's planning and development. Thus, although there was no
consensus between the different perceptions, the local leaders
succeeded in achieving some degree of solidarity within their
respective communities concerning national goals. The participation
of the local leaders in the official planning organisation and their
interaction with planning decision making bodies thus had a dual
affect.
Firstly, it made physical planning and development an issue in
the political struggle between the rival communities. Secondly, their
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involvement can be seen as a stage in which they gained legitimate
authority by the local national leadership, externally and internally
alike.
The local authorities, were gradually made into planning
commissions under the provisions of the law. They drew great
political strength from the statutory provisions, particularly in
regard to the Jewish community.
In a period which saw the institutionalisation of the Jewish
national bodies under a Socialist-Zionist party, the growing power of
local authorities, some of which were capitalistic-oriented, had
far-reaching consequences for the development of	 Lsrael.	 The
resulting balance of power gave rise to the many, and often
conflicting, ideologies and social values, which also ensured their
reflection in the physical planning of the country.
The discussion will now turn to the socio-political structure
of Israel and its connection with the composition of the planning
organisation. The reformed composition of the planning machinery
during th early stage of the State of Israel and the move towards a
more integrated structure in the second stage justify a different
emphasis on the elements which exercised social control through this
machinery. They were only formally similar to those of the Mandatory
era.
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The first element was the central government of Israel. It took
over the dominant position of the Mandatory government in the
planning machinery. The transformation from a Mandatory rule to a
democratically constituted government was not considered at first as
requiring dramatic changes in the composition of the machinery since
central government control over the planning machinery was not
regarded as inconsistent with the democratic nature of the State.
Furthermore, in view of the coalition government of Israel, where
different parties and social groups were represented, such control
was considered a positive factor in the legitimacy of the inherited
composition of the planning machinery. 	 Under the prevailing
ideologies of representative democracy, Zionist statehood 	 and
collectivism, as described above, the central government was to be
the dominant force not only in planning policy making but also in
actual land development. Taking the leading position within the
planning organisation was the realisation of these ideologies. It was
also an important tool for the institutionalisation of government
authority within the country over local authorities and the general
public.
The second element was the small party which held political
responsibility for planning and thus controlled the planning
machinery. Amongst the parties whiqh held that responsibility since
198, the National Religious Party - controlling the Ministry of the
Interior for most of the years - was dominant in the planning
machinery. As elaborated above, the coalition governments were far
from being united in their opinions concerning social values and
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internal way of life. Political struggle through utilisaUon of
administrative powers has been characteristic of Israeli democracy.
The National Religious Party (N.R.P), being a junior partner in the
coalition, saw the planning machinery as a legitimate tool in the
power struggle, both inside the government against the other partners
which held the executive ministries, and outside the government in an
attempt to consolidate its influence in local authorities and the
general public.
The third element is the local authorities, which continued to
see their statutory planning powers as a source of political
strength. Though they developed through the years their own ties with
the government, bearing responsibility in local and environmental
affairs, their dependence on the central	 government remained
excessive. However, the legal position of the local authorities as
planning decision making bodies helped them institutionalise their
authority, which was recognised by both the central government and
the general public. This led to the growing partnership between
central and local government within the planning machinery.
In the later stages of the Israeli statutory planning (i.e.
since 1965 when the new law was enacted), the most interesting
elements are those related to the composition of the new bodies which
were constituted for national and regional
	 planning.	 Central
government representation in these bodies is strikingly strong, yet
on the other hand there is a growing strength in local authorities'
representation, a reflection of their growing stand In Israeli
politics.
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The main additional element in the planning machinery Is the
representation of various sectors and public organisations as full
members of the commissions, allowing public participation not only
through elected representatives but also through representatives of
public sectors and voluntary organisations. This signifies some
ideological shift from representative democracy towards greater
public participation in the formal agencies of social control in
Israel. Participation of the Israeli type can be seen as the middle
way between the traditional view of public interest as expressed in
Britain by Sir Desmond Heap [23] and the populist view of direct
public participation expressed by Prof. Wade and others [251. However
in Israel, it has been argued, this shift was part of a wider social
change by which the Israeli public became more sensitive to both the
politics of decision making and to the quality of urban and country
life.
It should be stressed that the incorporation of representatives
of voluntary organisations as participants in some statutory
commissions means for them very little real decision making power.
Their main benefit Is in obtaining information, knowledge and easy
access to the decision making bodies. These help them to utilise
other methods, such as public opinion and pressure groups, to
exercise social control. Thus what appears to be a tendency towards
participatory democracy may be regarded also as a method of
re-institutionalisation of the authority of governmental bodies which
held the real power within the planning machinery. The incorporation
of a few members of public organisations in planning commissions may
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be no more than a mask over the unaltered face of the planning
machinery. It may be considered helpful by the government because of
the bad image of the planning machinery as a body strongly influenced
by "narrow" political interests. Such an image, as it has been shown,
strongly affected the effectiveness of the planning machinery and its
legitimacy.
"The injection of a new element into the decision making
process", noted McAuslan "is likely to be successful only if it is
realised that the whole process will change whether it is planned to
change or not" [25]. The Israeli experience of real public
participation provides evidence of the truth of this comment. Since
the planning process has hardly been changed, the statutory provision
as to the composition of the planning machinery has not led to any
significant citizen involvement in planning.
The administrative factor in the composition of the planning
machinery is exemplified by the growing share of professionals among
the members o planning commissions. The inclusion of professional
planners as full members has historical roots. During the Mandatory
era the main planning institutions consisted solely of government
officials, among them the government town planning officer. There
were no politicians in these institutions: thus all the officials,
including the professional town planner, followed the policies
prescribed by the Mandatory government. In planning institutions at
the local level, which consisted of locally elected members, the town
engineer served only as planning advisor and not as a member in the
decision making body.
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This structure was inherited by the Israeli system. However,
during Israel's formative stage there was a growing demand to raise
the status of professional planners, particularly in the local
planning institutions. This tendency towards professionalism in
decision making was an antithesis to the influence of' factional
political interests in the planning process. The professional
planners who claimed impartiality in planning matters and promised to
consider the interest of the public at large received, in the
circumstances, wide public support.
The growing complexity of the inter-related problems of the
environment also contributed in two different ways. While the
realisation of the true nature of town planning led the public to
demand greater direct involvement in planning decision making, at the
expense of professionals and politicans, it also led to a counter
demand for greater democratic representation and greater involvement
of professionals from various disciplines in the process. Thus
incorporation of professionals as members appears to mean some
administrative improvement in the functioning of the machinery. This
should be regarded also as a contributing element in the
institutionalisation of the machinery's legitimate authority [26].
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CHAPTER 10. THE PLANNING PROCESS AND EFFICIENT WILISATION OF
SCARCE RESOURCES
The planning process in the abovementioned systems is
considered a mechanism of social control with the following set of
elements:
The planning process was a statutory process of decision making
in the environmental sphere. It entailed plan making, adjudication of
conflicts, law enforcement and tools for positive implementation.
This planning process had, among other things, an economic role which
was to contribute to efficient utilisation of the country's scarce
resources. In this context, efficiency was aimed at through two
different but complementary aspects: through the functioning of the
planning institutions and the practical effect on the physical
environment.
From a broad perspective such efficiency was not only of
economic significance but also had social and political implications
- in terms of the stability of the political system and the social
order as a whole. Hence the planning process can be seen as a
mechanism of social control. Some of these elements will be discussed
below.
The activity of town planning in the sense of basic regulation
of the layout and design of human settlements has been exercised
since time immemorial. However, town planning in the modern era has
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been characterised by its institutionalisation as a formal, binding
process. The economic role of this process, which is its contribution
to greater efficiency in the utilisation of scarce resources, is
considered to be a product of the performance and results of the
unregulated development market and the arbitrary modes of
bureaucratic behaviour. Hence this role has two aspects.
The first aspect relates to the design of the process itself in
order to achieve greater efficiency in bureaucratic behaviour and
administrative functioning. Since 	 efficiency in this sphere
contributes to the authority and legitimacy of the government, it has
inherent social and political implications which ultimately lead to a
stable social order. This process can be seen as part of the system
for social control [1).
The second aspect relates to the actual use of the planning
process for efficient utilisation of land and other economic
resources. Since efficiency here attempts to provide a higher quality
physical environment, it has even greater social, economic and
political implications. Herein lies the link to social order and
control [2).
These two aspects will now be elucidated further in regard to
the evolution of the planning process in the Mandatory and Israeli
systems.
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A.	 FORMAL DECISION MAKING PROCESS
The first statutory planning process worthy of this name in
Palestine was introduced by the 1921 Ordinance. This Mandatory law
followed its British counterpart in providing a detailed procedural
framework for planning decision making. The planning process
prescribed within followed Geddes' working method, which then became
part of the	 British	 standard	 sequence	 of	 planning:
survey-analysis-plan [3]. For example, under the 1921 Ordinance the
planning process entailed provisions for the declaration of town
planning areas, gathering of relevant information by the plan making
body, procedure of preparation of plans - including publication and
hearing of objections - and the approval of each plan and tools for
their enforcement. Though many more details were added to the
framework in subsequent Mandatory legislation, they did not change
its underlying Geddesian perceptions.
From an administrative perspective, this procedural framework
was part of a new bureaucratic culture which was introduced into
Palestine by the British [ II). The innovation of this administrative
mode of operation is brought to light when compared with the previous
despotic methods of the Turkish rule. By contrast, in Britain's
laissez-faire atmosphere at the end of the 19th century the
administrative aspect of the new planning process acquired a totally
different meaning.
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The first important aspect of the innovative town planning
process is that it was not merely left to the discretion of the
administration, but was also enshrined in the law. This was of great
significance to both the administration and the public. Prior to
1921, the setting down of regulations concerning land use and
physical development was a much shorter and less rigid process than
that prescribed by the new law. This was true not only with regard to
the Turkish era, but also to British military rule. As Colonel
Storrs, the Military Governor of Jerusalem, noted: "My word was law"
[5]. Though the Mandatory planning law provided the administration
with very wide powers, in contrast with the past the statutory
planning process imposed some restrictions on the freedom of the
government to regulate physical development. For example, the law
imposed upon the authorities the duty to prepare town planning
schemes, to follow certain procedures of plan making, to consider
objections from Interested parties to the planning proposals, and In
some cases to reach an agreement with landowners before prescribing
certain planning rules.
Following Prof. McAuslan's view of "the debate on open
government as being an extension of the debate on public
participation in planning" [6), here too the formalisation of the
planning decision making process can be seen as a tool of open
government.
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It can thus be concluded that the introduction of the new
planning process in Palestine gave hope for a more accountable and
responsible government in the sense of greater personal integrity,
and a move away from the corruption which characterised the Turkish
rule. This point was of great Importance in the circumstances of
Palestine since the legitimacy of the Mandatory Government and the
new social order was built upon the confidence of the local public in
responsible use of power by government officials.
It is worth noting that even when the breach in this public
confidence occurred during the years of the second stage, it was not
in general because of a feeling that British officials were abusing
their powers for personal gain, but for advancing the interests of
the Mandatory power at the expense of the local population.
The second important aspect is that of professionalism in the
functioning of government. The introduction of an orderly and formal
process of planning decision making in Palestine provided the tools
for administrative efficiency in the utilisatlon of public resources.
This was useful for the inexperienced, newly established Mandatory
government which had to deal with pressing environmental problems.
However, the formal statutory planning process was particularly
important as an example to the local population and the international
community of the professional mode of administrative functioning,
enabling the Mandatory government to establish its authority and
maintain social order and stability.
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The advantage of professionalism in public administration
through an explicit statutory decision making process was of no less
importance in Britain on the eve of the introduction of its first
planning legislation than it was in Palestine. In Britain the move
from empiric and pragmatic administrative methods of dealing with
separate environmental problems, as demonstrated In the nineteenth
century's land use legislation, into a much broader method of
systematic physical town planning, as expressed in the early
twentieth century planning laws, was of utmost importance. Inherent
in this move was the claim that the new planning process along
professional lines would be a more efficient government tool for
tackling environmental problems 17]. Another claim inherent in the
new government Intervention in the development market in Britain was
that the administration was acting in the public interest 18]. Such
claims were, in turn, part of an attempt at maintaining the
legitimacy of the government system, since they entailed the
assertion that through the newly established town planning process,
the government was the appropriate Institution to deal with the
pressing problems 19].
Returning to the statutory decision making process of
Palestine, it should be pointed out that what may seem to be a formal
an rigid decision making framework entailed wide discretionary powers
and measures of flexibility in the planning process. Significantly,
this discretion was vested with the planning institutions which
largely consisted of' members of the central government. The statutory
process could not prevent arbitrariness and abuse of powers or, at
the very least, manipulation of the planning powers for irrelevant
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objectives. As asserted above, the flexibility which was inherent in
the statutory planning framework could be used, and was used, by the
British administration to advance its interests in maintaining the
existing soclo-political system and British rule over the country
[10].
Thirdly, from the perspective of the affected public, the
introduction of a statutory binding decision making process allowed
some control to public opinion and judicial review over
administrative performance. By comparison, at the beginning of the
British military rule in Palestine, such opportunities for control
over the administration and its functioning were non-existent. As
Colonel Storrs noted: "As there were no lawyers, judges or courts
[his commending word] was the only law. Better for Palestine then,
there were no newspapers. Legally and journalistically we lived in a
State of Innocence" [11].
Control over any governmental organisation is widely
appreciated to be of vital importance in preventing waste of
resources, corruption, abuse of powers, and in achieving efficient
administration. This control process was, in the circumstances of
Mandatory rule, also a factor in the building up of public confidence
in the government and stable socio-political systems. By providing
the opportunity for such a control, the establishment of the
statutory planning process can be considered a mechanism of "social
control from below" [12].
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The administrative significance of the statutory planning
process during the early Israeli era was especially great because of
the anti-planning and pro-improvisation tendencies in the name of
pragmatism. These tendencies prevailed among the Jewish national
institutions of the pre-State period and infiltrated into the newly
established governmental organisations. The fact that. an orderly
formal process of town planning was made binding under the law helped
counter pro-planning perceptions of which the advocates were mainly
the professionals.
There was however a great difference from the past which
resulted from the new political setting in which the planning process
was made operative. With the establishment of the State of Israel,
the planning process became part of the new democratic system. Thus
notions of representation, public participation, responsibility and
accountability acquired much greater significance. The planning
process gave rise to high expectations for a rational, serious,
professional and, above all, democratic process of rule making and
policy formulation in the interest of the general public. This was of
the outmost importance in establishing the authority and legitimacy
of the new political system and the stability of the social order.
The many changes introduced in the statutory framework of
planning law between 1921 and the 1980's sought, among other things,
to remedy defects such as rigidity of the organisational structure,
inappropriate composition of planning institutions, unreasonable
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allocation of functions, cumbersome procedures, lack of coordination
and unworkable enforcement provisions.
The tackling of such problems by law can, in itself, be
regarded as an expression of administrative-organisational planning.
In this way the law stimulated what Karl Mannheim called [13]
rational management of society and the restriction of the irrational
power which is a disintegrative force and thus poses a threat to the
existence of a free society.
The degree of statutory intervention in the way the planning
organization was internally organised and functioned varied from one
stage to the next. They in fact provided different answers to the
question of detailed design of planning machinery, whether it was a
legal or administrative issue. The determining factors in the degree
of intervention were obviously connected with the more general
legal-constitutional framework and the broader socio-political
circumstances.
Influenced by the English legal conception as to the role of
administrative law, these systems left a great deal to the discretion
of the executive power. The basic principle which provides that
administrative law is concerned with issues such as institutions,
powers and procedures only when they turned outward against a person
or property was generally upheld in the planning systems.
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For example, the plan-making technical units, their manning and
working procedures were barely covered by the statutory provisions.
The law focused rther on decision-making institutions, though it is
obvious that the functioning of the latter depends to a great extent
on that of the former. For the same reason, institutions and
procedures regarding governmental positive planning was also largely
in the realm of the executive.
However, the statutory provisions regarding the structure of
the planning decision making institutions under the Mandatory and
Israeli systems had been by far more detailed and interventionist
than in the English system. Here the delicate socio-political
circumstances induced the legislator to dictate a particular
structure rather than rely on the executive's discretion.
In most other social and economic policy spheres, where the
government intervened without a formal statutory decision making
process, its discretionary powers were less restricted than in town
planning. The alternative to the centralised planning process then
was not less governmental intervention in the market mechanisms, nor
greater public participation, but rather wider administrative powers
and thus greater opportunity for inefficiency and even corruption.
The limitations on the administrative discretion which derived from
the binding planning process had thus great importance in building up
the legitimacy of the new governmental institutions.
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Furthermore, the	 inherited	 process	 restricted	 the
administration by imposing procedural and substantive duties which
largely protected private property rights. These accorded well with
the liberal perceptions and the ideology of individualism held by
large groups within the urban population. Though these conflicted
with the Socialist—Zionist perceptions of the Israeli leadership,
they seemed to provide an acceptable mode of administrative operation
during the formative stage.
However, breaches in the legitimacy of planning as a rational
and efficient decision making process gradually surfaced during the
first stage of the Israeli system. These can be attributed less to
the stagnation of the statutory structure than to the factional
political utilisation of planning powers by the decision makers.
Obviously the needs of Israel as a rapidly developing country
required a much more co—ordinated environmental policy than that
which could be achieved under the old Mandatory process. The
seemingly orderly process of decision making proved narrow and
limited In scope and form. The loose framework of decision making
with its wide discretion allowed easy manipulation of power by the
decision makers. Instead of real participation of the public, the
statutory process provided the opportunity for lobbying and exerting
pressure by powerful groups and individuals. Thus, paradoxically, the
statutory process which gave rise to hopes for an efficient and
democratic administrative process lost, during the first stage, most
of its legitimacy [14].
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As a result, the second stage in the evolution of the Israeli
planning system saw much greater public concern with the
professionalism of the system. This concern was based on the new
developments in the planning profession in the Western world, and the
planners' claim for objective, rational, apolitical and professional
planning activity [15]. These new developments since the mid-1960's
stemmed from the subjection of planning to a scientific basis of
which the origin was the natural sciences. "Systems approach",
"decision theory" and other methodologies were applied to town
planning prograisnes. Though some of these theories did come under
criticism for their inapplicability to complex environmental
circumstances, they did lead to significant changes in governmental
planning activity.
In Britain, they broadened the process to include more
integrated socio-economic-physical planning. Structured plans,
independent of local plans, allowed concentration on strategic
policies beyond and above detailed land use provisions.	 The
methodology of plan making was also influenced by the models of
"rational comprehensive" decision making.
The enthusiasm with which the new dimension of town planning
was received in Britain is expressed in the following statement: "It
legitimises governmental planning by divorcing it from historical
stigmata and diffusing it of political dogma" [16). Not everybody
would accept this statement in regard to the British contemporary
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planning process and least of all to the Israeli planning process. In
Israel the influence of the "rational comprehensive" models on the
statutory process has been relatively weak.
For example, McLaughlin's model [17], which is a one of the
more well-known plan-making models, involves six consecutive stages:
1) Decision to plan; 2) Goal formulation: identification of
objectives; 3) Study of possible causes of action with the aid of
models; It) Evaluation of alternatives by reference to values and
costs/benefits; 5) Action through public investment or control over
private investment; 6) Review/monitor the state of the system. The
final stage leads again to the first and thus the process repeats
itself.
The analysis of the Israeli process, in the light of
McLaughlin's model, reveals that, in theory, most of these stages are
permitted to take place within the statutory framework. However, the
authorities are not required to use new methods and techniques, since
the loose framework leaves much of the actual plan making stages to
the discretion of the planning institutions.
The decision to plan became under the law compulsary in certain
cases. The legislator itself dictated that regional plans and local
outline plans are necessary tools and then prescribed time limits for
their preparation. Yet the decision to prepare national plans are
discretionary and may result from an evaluation of the problems. The
statutory requirement that at an early stage a "notice of preparation
of Scheme" be published allowed the accomodation of the first two
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stages of McLaughlin's model within the statutory process, in that
such notice would signify both the decision to plan and the
identification of the objectives. Further, the statutory stages
ending with the deposit of a scheme may correspond to McLaughlin's
third stage of study of' possible courses of action. The hearing of
objections and the final decision as to the approval of the scheme
may signify the fourth stage of evaluation of alternatives.
McLaughlin's fifth stage, in which actual implementation through
public and private sectors takes place, is generally beyond the scope
of the statutory planning process. The law provides tools for
expropriation of land and collection of betterment tax,
	 both
necessary for public development. However, the actual implementation
of the plan, either by public or private sectors, are in the hands of
the respective sectors. Finally, the statutory powers of
cancellation, variation and suspension of schemes may be regarded as
an inducement to monitor and review the situation, which could lead
to a new planning process.
A formal comparison of' this kind may be misleading if a review
of its potential use would overlook the fact that in practice the
decision making process is carried out in Israel in a rather
superficial manner. Open—ended as it is, the statutory framework
encourages haphazard rather than systematic consideration. The
statutory minimum tends thus to become the acceptable standard.
A gap between rational comprehensive models and the statutory
planning process can also be seen in the British system. Malcolm
Grant points out that "an essential element of the model is the
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adoptive process based upon monitoring and that it envisages a
continuous process. But in translating the model into the format of
statutory planning, much of its logic has been lost. The formalities
and delay surrounding plan preparation and the complexity of
processes of urban change have long precluded effective monitoritg
and speeding revision" (18].
This is also valid in regard to the Israeli system. However, a
more substantive cause for such a gap in Israel should be pointed
out. This is the executive orientation of the theoretical models, as
opposed to the regulative nature of the statutory planning process.
The models view plan making and its implementation as stages in one
continuous activity. Such a view is mostly relevant in regard to
executive bodies. Yet the statutory planning has been based on an
institutional separation between planning and its implementation. The
latter is vested with public and private sectors, which are totally
distinct from the bodies in charge of the former. Though the current
Israeli planning process acquired new elements of positive planning,
its basic regulative nature has not been changed. However, the new
elements which are particularly expressed in the introduction of
statutory national and regional planning imposed much greater
administrative responsibility on the planning institutions. This
responsibility is aimed at achieving, through the planning process,
greater coordination between the forces acting in the physical
development market and in the wider environmental sphere. The degree
of such coordination is becoming the main yardstick of evaluation of
administrative efficiency in the planning process and in turn of the
government as a whole [19].
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The complex structure of modern administration and the
accumulation of many kinds of knowledge and experience in its various
branches made coordination of both organisations and specialised
knowledge highly desirable. Such coordination in fact facilitates
social interaction and it is thus an important measure of social
control.
As demonstrated above, proliferation of separate institutions
exerts influence over different aspects of the environment. Since
these aspects often overlapped, resulting in inconsistencies and
contradictions in policies and decisions, coordination at the
organisational and functional levels became one of the prime
objectives of statutory planning. In order to achieve this objective
emphasis has been placed on coordination through both the design of
the planning machinery and its procedural patterns.
It is necessary here to distinguish between external and
internal coordination. External coordination means coordination
between the statutory planning machinery and other social, political
and administrative centres of decision making, while internal
coordination is related to the relationship between planning
institutions within the hierarchy of the statutory planning
machinery.
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These can be illustrated by some examples from the
abovementioned systems. For instance, some statutory planning
institutions under the Mandatory and Israeli systems consisted of
representatives of various central and local government bodies and
different public organisations. These representatives were expected
to form channels of communication between the different agencies and
the statutory machinery so as to achieve consistent planning and
harmonious implementation. This can be seen as an expression of
external coordination. Another example is the composition of the
lowest level of planning institution under the Israeli system (i.e.
the local planning commission) which include representatives of the
higher institutions in the hierarchy (i.e. the district planning
commission). Through the representatives, coordination between the
two levels of the planning machinery is expected to be achieved. This
can be seen as an expression of internal coordination.
The English system provides somewhat different examples. Under
its current structure the Department of Environment is the
governmental agency responsible for planning local government,
suing and public works. Since the Secretary of State for the
Environment serves as the highest planning authority, "external
coordination" between these agencies is at the same time "internal
coordination" within the statutory machinery itself.
So much for the statutory attempts at achieving coordination
through structural design. The main question is, however, the
relation between the attempts and actual results. The systems
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described above provide different answers as to the degree of success
of such coordination and the effect on the administrative efficiency
of the respective systems. Parts I and II of this work hopefully make
it clear that coordination has been In general the "Achilles Heel" of
the planning systems. Appraisal of the various reasons behind the
lack of external and internal coordination leads us to consider the
political factor in the statutory planning machinery. This Is so
since coordination has been not only a way of achieving
administrative effiency per se but more broadly as a way of settling
differences and
	 resolving conflicts which were rooted
	 in
political-ideological perceptions and social values [20].
Given this use of coordination, it has been found fruitful to
consider the correlation between the degree of effective coordination
and the magnitude of the socio-political conflict between the
agencies which were subjected to that coordination. Some examples
serve to demonstrate this correlation.
Under the Mandatory system, coordination between the various
agencies of the central government through the design of
inter-departmental planning commissions achieved a relatively high
degree of success. This can be attributed to the shared ideology
which prevailed among the various branches of the administration. As
elaborated above, Under the colonial ideology regulative-restrictive
planning was pursued. Contrasting with this were the mld-1930's in
which there were signs of discoordination between government
agencies. This was somewhat of an exception, which proves the
validity of the general rule since it can be attributed equally to
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differences in political interests between the branches of the
Mandatory government. In that stage some governmental agencies
(notably the army) pursued a different policy of positive planning
motivated by imperial strategic objectives. This policy was not in
line with the restrictive planning of the statutory machinery.
Turning to English and Israeli contemporary systems, when the
government consists of one party as In Britain, coordination between
the various central government agencies is far greater than between
similar institutions in a system such as the Israeli one which
consists of government by coalition. The political and ideological.
differences between the partners of a coalition lead to the essential
difference in the level of coordination between the two systems.
It is therefore not surprising that the overall picture
resulting from actual functioning of the planning machinery in Israel
is one of arbitrariness, inconsistency, waste, and in some cases even
corruption. This planning process, almost counter to a coordinated,
rational and efficient decision making process, weakens public trust
In governmental institutions and therefore reduces the power of the
planning process to act as an efficient mechanism of social control.
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B.	 THE EFFECT OF THE PLANNING PROCESS ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL SPHERE
The second aspect of the system's economic role is more
specific than the first, which centred on the planning process as a
method of governmental decision making. The economic aspect focuses
on the application of the process to the environmental sphere with
the view of weighing the social costs and benefits and thus achieving
greater efficiency in the utilisation of the country t 5
 scarce
resources.
The goal of achieving efficiency in physical development
emerged in Britain after the post-industrial experience, being
contrasted with the operation of the development market. As John
Ratcliff [21] says:
"In the absence of town planning, land would be apportioned
between competing uses by the price mechanism and the
interaction of demand and supply. In this free market
situation, land would be used for the purpose which could
extract the largest net return over a foreseeable period of
time but experience has shown that, unfettered, the market can
consume resources in an ill-conceived and short-sighted way,
creating almost unsurmountable problems for generations to
come. Moreover, the competition engendered in the private
sector where laissez-faire conditions prevail can all too
often breed waste. The private sector developer seeking to
maximise his personal profit frequently neglects the provision
of both social services and public utilities. The very need for
planning arose out of the inequality, deprivation and squalor
caused by the interplay of' free market forces and lack of
social concern prevalent during the nineteenth century.
Furthermore, unplanned, these forces combine to produce the
fluctuating booms and slumps that epitomise private sector
instability".
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The link between the economic role and social control is
clearly expressed in these words.	 Since efficiency in the
environmental sphere has been assumed to serve the public good, its
ultimate purpose can be regarded as the provision of greater
stability in the social order 122]. WasP this the case under the
Mandatory and Israeli systems?
As shown above, on the eve of British rule in Palestine,
conditions were far from the laissez-faire model. There was no free
operation of the land development market. Physical development, on
the rare times it was initiated by local forces, was subject under
the Ottoman law to governmental direction - or rather resiriction -
through the use of building permits. Though to government officials
the development control powers were merely measures for collecting
additional revenue, the potential government intervention in this
sector did not allow even theoretical operation of a free market.
However, it is clear that despite the existence of development
control powers, the quality of the physical environment itself was of
the least concern to the Ottoman authorities, and pressing problems
faced by the British in Palestine required immediate attention.
Government intervention in the regulation of physical development was
deemed necessary in order to achieve a higher quality in the physical
environment [23]. Thus the British legal framework of town and
country planning was adjusted to fit the conditions in Mandatory
Palestine.
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The fact that Mandatory planning law was rooted in contemporary
British planning legislation allows utilisation of the latter's
underlying principles for analysis of the former.
The statutory planning systems in Britain and Palestine were
centred around the physical environment, largely viewing this
environment from a local perspective. In retrospect, such a planning
outlook might appear limited and narrow; however, in view of the
circumstances prior to the introduction of the respective planning
systems, this was In fact an innovative move. The statutory scheme
was oriented towards producing clear and rigorous pictures of the
physical development of towns and villages: It expressed the ultimate
physical goal through a desired pattern of land use allocation.
Efficiency in the utilisatlon of physical resources was
expressed in terms of zoning, allocation of development rights,
provision of public services and public utilities, transport routes,
recreation areas and the setting up of building regulations.
The planning process was by nature a regulative process which
largely relied for its implementation on the forces of the
development market; however it cannot be disassociated from its
origins In the western Industrialised world.
Regulatory planning emerged in the second half of the
nineteenth century, generated by the need for radical improvement of
the appalling living conditions of the post-Industrial Revolution
period [2J. It is said that the British town planning movement of
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that time was concerned with comprehensive social solutions to the
"physical fabric" as well as to "the life and activities contained
within the town" 125]. However, this was not to be the mainstream in
the evolution of planning. From public health and housing reforms,
planning regulations became the ultimate method of tackling the
problem of inflammable, instanitary and inadequate living conditions
which required space, light and air. These planning regulations were
applied uniformly to towns in general.
"Zoning" as a regulatory device to solve urban problems -
separating towns into various zones according to different land uses,
height of buildings, their capacity and so forth - was first
developed in Germany at the end of the 19th century and was adopted
in Britain and the United States at the beginning of the 20th century
126). This signalled a definite break and move from the laissez—faire
system to one of extensive regulation and represents the entry of
government into a thriving development market where both private and
public bodies operated relatively freely.
The traditional concept of town and country planning is
expressed in Keeble's description of planning as "the art and science
of ordering the use of land and the character and siting of buildings
and communication routes so as to secure the maximum practicable
degree of economy" (27].
The terms "master plan" and "blueprint planning" were
innovations of the 1930's which contributed	 to the "design
orientation" 128] and the legislative "rule model" 129] of planning.
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The essence of statutory planning was the distribution of land
between competing uses, as can be illustrated in detail on a map and
expressed in building regulations. It was seen as a kind of totally
rational and value—free process of rule making and adjudication of
conflicts. Ends and means could not be directly related to
non—physical objectives such as the composition or distribution of
population, ensuring of sources of employment or encouragement of
educational systems [30]. At that time planning was considered only
as an attempt to formulate the principles "that should guide us in
creating a civilised physical background for human life" [31].
The attempt to achieve more efficient use of the physical
environment by concentrating on regulative planning was based on the
realty of the western world where market forces existed and could
react positively to the provisions of' the statutory schemes. On this
basis it was felt necessary to guide the development forces of
private and publia bodies, while operating "within the wisdom of the
market which itself is based on individual entrepreneurial decision
making" [32). In these circumstances, the content of' social control
can be said to result from the interaction between the formal
planning provisions prescribed by the authorities and the informal
planning implementation of the development market forces.
Circumstances in Palestine were somewhat different. As
described above, during the first stage of statutory planning in
Palestine the local market forces were very weak. Improvement of
physical conditions ifl existing towns could not be changed by the
local populations without government intervention. More efficient
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utilisation of the land and other economic resources required not
only passive-regulative planning in the British style, but
executive-positive orientation. It should be stressed that the 1921
Ordinance did take some innovative steps in this direction, providing
local authorities with some positive tools for expropriation of land
for public purposes and financial means through the betterment tax.
This was nonetheless no more than an attempt to create a new local
force in the development market, thus increasing its capacity. The
central government kept to its colonial policy of limited involvement
in positive development [33].
The fact that the market forces were much weaker than in more
developed countries gave the planning process in Palestine a
different meaning as a mechanism of social control. The modes of
social behaviour in this sphere were exerted more from the
formal-official planning provisions of restrictive implementation
than from the deeds of the development market. In such circumstances
the economic role of the planning system, efficiency of the physical
environment, was hardly fulfilled.
During the second stage of the Mandatory planning system the
potential of local development markets grew substantially in relative
terms. This was a result of growing Jewish immigration from Europe
and the establishment of political and economic institutions.
However, the needs of the population in terms of physical
infrastructure, roads, housing, recreating areas, etc., also grew,
while World War II and the internal strife in Palestine led to
limited public and private investment in the physical environment. At
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the same time the Mandatory official policy was to restrict physical
development of the Jewish sector in the name of striking a balance
between the rival communities; hence the planning process operated
outside "the logic of the private market". This obviously conflicted
with the interest of the Jewish sector and the result was gross
breaches of planning regulations at the local level through
cooperation of' the local authorities arid the local development
forces.
f
In such circumstances it is obvious that the quality of' the
physical environment could not be improved by the planning system.
The system's effect on the modes of social behaviour became
complicated: from a national viewpoint, 	 the	 formal	 planning
provisions imposed by the Mandatory government provided for a general
pQlicy of restrictive planning while the statutory provisions at the
local level imposed by the local authorities tended to become very
loose. Actual implementation of development activities by the public
and private sectors often took little notice of the statutory
planning provisions [31$J• The interaction between these formal and
non-formal elements led to a situation where the economic role of the
system, i.e. efficient uti,lisation of the resources for the benefit
of the public at large, was hardly fulfilled.
The limits of the existing property market mechanisms in their
ability to cater for social benefits and public needs were
particularly striking after the establishment of the State of Israel.
Concentration on regulative planning while relying on the existing
property market for implementation was considered insufficient for
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the task of solving housing and other physical problems. In the
circumstances, the solution was the establishment of a new
public-governmental development market for more positive planning
which lay outside the statutory planning system.
During the first stage of the Israeli system the passive
attitude towards physical planning was changed. This period was
characterised by the great involvement of central government in
positive planning with emphasis on centralised implementation of
policies. As described previously, the central government took charge
of establishing new towns and new neighbourhoods in existing towns in
order to absorb the growing immigrant population. This policy which
was the mainstream of governmental planning strove to achieve a
balanced dispersal of the country's population. Industry was also
directed to create employment in the northern and southern regions
and the national transport network was designed to meet the new
requirements which resulted from the population distribution policy.
However, as mentioned the rapid physical development of the
1950's was largely outside the realm of the statutory planning
system. It thus had many characteristics of informal social control,
though exercised by the government. Centralised action by the
government was enabled under the inherited Mandatory legal system
which gave the government wide powers to intervene in socio-economic
fields; yet it did not apply the statutory planning process to
development activities undertaken by the government itself.
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This legal position suited the prevailing perception of
pragmatism which considered formal and broad statutory planning as
incompatible with the pressing needs of the times. This may explain
to some degree the fact that the statutory planning system remained
unreformed for such a long period. Further, the regulative planning
system remained dependent on the economic logic of the private market
for its implementation, while the government-public market was
self-sufficient and thereby independent.
The achievements of the government's positive actions in land
development during Israel's formative stage should not be dismissed,
though they were achieved at a high cost. The government-public
sector was motivated largely by social and political needs even when
these were inconsistent with economic logic. In terms of greater
efficiency of building development, accomplishments during this stage
were phenomenal, though far from perfect. The environment was still
viewed in physical terms and thus the dominant policy was to make
efficient the physical design and use of land while 	 social,
educational and economic planning aspects lagged behind. The gap
between the parallel mechanisms of regulative and positive processes
widened and, furthermore, the government did not have an authorative
planning body for the coordination of its activities; sectional
planning and development were carried out independently by the
various executive ministries. Powers were also used to advance narrow
factional interests at the expense of the public good.
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The second stage of the Israeli planning system saw some
organisational improvement in the coordination of the formal and
informal mechanisms of physical planning and development. It. saw the
establishment of reforms in the planning organisation and process
whereby some of the past mi5takes and wasted resources which were a
result of planning for sectional and factional interests could be
corrected, though some had already done irreparable damage to the
environment.
It should be pointed out that despite the abovementioned
manifestations of waste and inefficiency,, non-statutory governmental
positive planning greatly contributed to raising the quality of the
physical environment and helped the government to establish its
authority and legitimacy in the country. In this respect it was an
effective mechanism of social control.
However, with the years the problems of physical land use were
gradually seen as only one aspect of more comprehensive environmental
problems. The words of Rittel and Webber in their analysis of the
nature of planning in the 20th century are relevant to the Israeli
situation. They say: "the tests for efficiency that were once so
useful as measures of accomplishment are being challenged by a
renewed preoccupation with consequences of equity" [35]. In the
Israeli society the socio-economic gaps which began to surface during
this first stage were also reflected in the growing difference
between the physical layout of the new towns and the big cities. The
facilities provided in the former were of a much lower quality than
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in the latter. The problem was intensified by the identification of
the new towns with immigrants of Oriental origin, while the veteran
population of European background was concentrated in the big cities
and more prosperous rural settlements. The soclo-economic rift
between these groups to some extent posed a threat to the national
consensus and thus to the stability of the political and social
system.
The overall picture of the results of the directed development
process is thus a mixed one. On the one hand the process contributed
to the creation of a new society and was thereby a successful
mechanism of social control. On the other hand the high social price
paid for achieving such physical progress and efficiency pointed to
the weakness of the process in its inability to provide stability to
the political and social systems.
In the second stage the Israeli planning system was reformed
and given a new statutory cloth. The reform was achieved in an era
when planning in Britain and other developed countries underwent
re-evaluation as to its proper basis, philosophy, 	 scope and
procedure. As mentioned, a move was made away from the limited
physical view of planning with a new perception of town planning as a
system entailing not only physical land use but an interplay of three
sub-systems: physical, social and economic. 	 Furthermore,	 the
realisation that the aims of planning are based on socio-economic
foundations - although the means of achieving them are expressed in
physical terms - was demonstrated by the shift towards an extension
of the scope of planning 136].
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Static planning was found to be incompatible as an adequate
solution to nost social and economic problems. Therefore a new
"process planning" was developed, a dynamic concept which emphasised
a continuous process of plan making and performance analysis leading
to necessary adjustments.
An additional move was made by the acceptance that for
effective guidance of change, town planning must consist not only of
coordinated policies in a wide array of fields, but must also use a
broader means o implementation in these fields. Planning became
conceived as part of the field of politics, since it was "essentially
a reallocative process whereby resources were redistributed
throughout the community" 137].
In Britain these developments led to the introduction of
"structure planning" or "strategy planning" by which goals,
strategies and policies are formulated. Under this comes local
planning which is of a lower level and in which the policies are
applied in detail. In addition, more positive action is now allowed
by statute for "steering the forces for development and change in
society in a desired direction" 138]..
In Israel the reformed planning process was also somewhat
influenced by these new developments. The main step towards a broader
scope of planning was made by the introduction of statutory national
and regional planning. These new levels allowed the incorporation
into planning of strategies and policies which could guide planning
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at a local level. Positive planning by the government was exercised
within the statutory planning system and, to a large degree, within
the logic of the market. This step obviously allowed more efficient
utilisation of the country's physical resources.
	 However,	 as
described previously, the great potential of this system has not been
fulfilled in practice and little improvement has been felt during the
years of the second stage. Rather, the old regulative perceptions
were still applied to the new levels, leaving positive planning
outside the statutory system. Furthermore, the extended scope of
planning was only made in spatial terms and was not matched by an
extension in the scope of the planning subject matter. Thus the
relevance to the statutory physical planning process of aims,
considerations and means in the ocial and economic spheres remains
unclear [39].
At the local level no significant change was Introduced In the
planning process. Not only were no improvements felt but public
expectations of the planning system had grown, and the system's
legitimacy faced a grave crisis. Plan making which requires long and
cumbersome procedures becomes an unworkable process and since only
parts of the frontier schemes had been prepared in practical terms,
the structure lost much of its logic and consistency. The static
perception of a scheme was not replaced by a more dynamic outlook and
only limited steps were taken to involve the public more actively in
the process.
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The planning process during the second stage indeed lost the
public's appreciation which it had earned for its achievements in
physical development in the first stage and at the same time was left
with many unsolved problems. Currently the system is regarded as
inefficient, even in the limited sphere of' physical land use
planning.
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CHAPTER 11. THE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF PLANNING AND SOCIAL
PROGRESS
The substantive content of planning, as seen in the systems
described above, can be said to be an expression of social control
with the following set of elements:
The substantive content of statutory planning is considered to
be those formal normative provisions in the environmental sphere
which were made legally binding. These provisions provide a basis on
which social interaction was exercised. Even when such provisions
were limited to regulation of land use and consideration of land
rights, they had a wider social significance through their affect on
life of the general public. An underlying goal of these provisions
was stated in vague terms as social progress, public good or human
welfare. However, their meta-goal is considered here to have been the
establishment and maintenance of the socio-political order.
The elements of this description of substantive content of
planning will be now further elucidated during the discussion of the
content of the planning provisions and their objectives in the
various systems.
The introduction of the statutory planning systems was
innovative In that they replaced with, or added to, the existing
informal modes of social behaviour in the physical environmental
sphere some formal, legally binding provisions.
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The content of the statutory planning provisions which were
introduced under the Mandatory system can be classified into three
main groups: 1) Provisions which strove to achieve coexistance
between the various owners of property rights; 2) Provisions which
strove to achieve coexistence between the general public and the
property owners; 3) Provisions which strove to achieve coexistence
between the different national communities of Palestine.
All these groups, it is argued, ultimately strove towards
coexistence between the Mandatory rule and the local population and
thus to the maintenance of' the socio-political system.
This classification of the Mandatory planning provisions is, in
general, relevant also to the Israeli planning system. The difference
lay in the third group of provisions which, under the Israeli system,
did not emphasise coexistence between Jews and Arabs, but between the
various social groups of the heterogeous Jewish society. The groups
of provisions under the Israeli system strove to maintain the
democratic socio-political order of Israel.
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A.	 COEXISTENCE BENEEN THE CMNERS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
Though statutory planning provisions are generally considered
to fall into the sphere of public law, in the systems analysed above
they often include elements which were aimed at regulating the
socio-legal relationships between
	 neighbouring	 and	 other
inter-related property rights.
This may seem an artificial division but for the purpose of the
discussion here the elements of private law are separated from the
more common planning elements aimed at providing for co-existence
between general public and private property rights. The former
elements can be referred to as micro-planning provisions. In order to
prevent "bad neighbour" development, micro-planning provisions often
imposed rights and restrictions such as: size of plots, building
densities, setbacks and building lines, open space surrounding
buildings, height of buildings and conditions for use of land.
Furthermore, they sometimes structured the property rights themselves
by providing for partition or combination of plots with or without
the consent of the owners.
It is worth stressing that micro-planning provisions are those
which do not seek any special advantage for the general public; nor
do they affect the general public in any significant manner.
Nonetheless, the mere regulation of co-existence between the owners
of property rights should be considered as a method of serving the
public interest. This is so since the micro-planning provisions and
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the legal provisions imposed under property law, or under the concept
of nuisance, had a common goal which is to enable beneficial use of
land within an acceptable balance of interests of the different
landowners and land users. This is, in turn, aimed at preventing
conflicts and ensuring social interaction, justice and stability in
the social order (1].
The importance of micro-planning provisions as tools of social
control and social stability can be demonstrated in regard to
conflicts which arise among people of lower status. As Black and
others 12] point out, the poor and the disreputable rarely use law
against their social superiors, or among themselves. Yet for these
people the use of micro-planning provisions through the hearing
process of objection to planning proposals has been much easier,
cheaper and feasible than the regular legal process (3]. They often
benefit from the "corporist decision model" 1] of planning decision
making much more than from the regular "adjudicative dispute
resolution" of law courts.
The mutual relations between the micro-planning provisions and
the rules of private law were multi-faced. In general, the planning
provisions which reflected the public point oc view superseded any
private agreement between neighbouring landowners. Nonetheless, in
some cases the planning provisions themselves allowed the relevant
property owners to reach an agreement as to the use of land, within
certain prescribed limits [5].
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From another point of view, the planning provisions did not
replace private law principles. For example, planning provisions
which allowed building operations of any kind did not stop an injured
party from taking action against that building activity under the law
of nuisance. Moreover, in some cases the planning provisions
facilitated legal proceedings in private law; for example, under the
law of tort known as "breach of statutory duty" 16].
However, a major difference between the provisions of property
law and town planning rules was that while the former provided
general principles and a permissible framework, leaving much of its
content to be agreed upon by the interested parties, or to be decided
upon by the courts, the latter prescribed a detailed code of rights
and restrictions as to the use of any single plot of land. The
planning authorities which designed and imposed these detailed
planning rules strove to balance the different private property
interests, thereby playing an important role of social control.
The task of these planning provisions may correspond to what
Prof. Foley 17] defined as the first ideological proposition of
British, town planning; i.e. "to reconcile competing claims for the
use of limited land" so as to provide "consistent balanced and
orderly arrangement of land". Foley rightly points out that this
seemingly neutral task carries an ambiguity as to what constitutes
this balance and orderly management, thus leaving the decision makers
wide discretion for the application of their values and perceptions.
-
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This is actually the situation, whether decisions are taken by
the law courts in the sphere of property law or by planning
authorities in the sphere of statutory planning. Prof. McAuslan, when
dealing with judicial regulation of land use via nuisance, raised the
question as to the merits of courts as opposed to more specialist
bodies for the resolution of disputes regarding unneighbourly
developments 18].
In his article "The Limits of Law in Urban Planning' t , Prof.
Jowell [9] identified a move away, within the British planning
system, from the "judicial model" where decisions are made according
to relatively objective rules and standards to a system based upon
bargaining and negotiation. One of the explanations given for this is
the limitations in the law's ability to decide on complex planning
problems which cannot be solved in accordance with clear-cut
authoritative guidelines, but which require value judgements and
subjective evaluation of the nature of the problem and its solution.
Such problems require room for maneouvre and compromise.
Jowell's thesis can be applied to the planning systems
described in this work. It is relevant not only to macro-planning
problems, in the sense of problems which involve a balance between
public and private interests, but also to micro-planning provisions
which seek co-existence between the various property rights. This
latter type of provision was also the outcome of planning bargaining
and negotiation rather than of a rational, objective adjudication of
conflicts.
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During the Mandatory period, the British planning authorities
were considered to exercise this type of micro-planning power with a
relatively high degree of impartiality. They seemed to be above the
internal politics of the local communities and were considered to be
less open to influences than local planning institutions. They had
the benefit of being administrative bodies with greater expertise in
planning problems than the law courts and kept wide discretions for
themselves while providing local planning institutions with the as
precise planning provisions as possible.
However, two points must be stressed here. The first is that
the impartiality of British decision makers was lessened by their own
subjective values and perceptions as to what constitutes a just
balance of interests. For example, the British Liberal ideology which
preferred private initiative over public intervention was often
reflected in Mandatory micro-planning provisions. This ideological
perception was one of the reasons why Mandatory provisions rarely
gave priority to Jewish national institutions over 	 private
landowners, though the former were acting In the interests of the
general Jewish population, while the latter were usually concerned
with personal interest. It also explains the Mandatory planning
authorities' apathy to, even collaboration with, speculative use of
land by allowing division of land into very small plots with no due
respect to the requirements of modern neighbourhoods.
The 3econd point to be made here is that the British were
beyond politics only in those limited cases where the only concern
was to balance diverse private property rights. Since most planning
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decisions involved public and governmental interests as well, the
British decision makers were usually strongly influenced by their own
political interests in Palestine.
The use of micro-planning provisions in the sense of regulation
of relationships between private property rights parallel to the
tools of private law continued during the first stage of planning in
Israel and was reinforced by the Supreme Court. In the words of
Justice Landau: [10]
"It appears to me that alongside the benefits derived to the
general public from statutory regulation of building and town
planning, such legislation provides additional specific
benefits to certain individuals or types of person. This is so
whenever the right of the landowner to build on his land as he
desires is restricted by the legislator in order to benefit and
protect his neighbours. Statutory provisions which regulate the
relationship between neighbours, such as provisions which
impose setbacks and building lines, are undoubtedly for "the
benefit or protection" of the neighbour. I would go further and
say that ., they create rights, in the full sense of the term,
to the neighbour".
Obviously, micro-planning provisions under the Israeli system
were also influenced by prevailing values and ideologies. 	 A
mentioned, the socialist-zionist ideology which led to large-scale
publically organised development favoured the legal provision which
exempted the State when acting in the capacity of landowner and
developer from statutory planning restrictions. The public sector was




Furthermore, even the balance which was attempted between
private property rights was often subject to planning bargaining and
strongly influenced by factional-political considerations taken by
the planning institutions. This obviously led to social conflicts,
loss of creditability of the local planning institutions as
objective, rational arbitrators of property rights and to the
detraction of the effectiveness of the micro-planning provisions as
mechanisms of social control.
The shift in emphasis from collectivism and ruralism to
individualism and urbanism led, over the years, to greater public
concern with the way development rights were distributed and how the
balance of interests had been weighed. Judicial control over the
administration and reviews by the State Comptroller also helped
reduce factional considerations in the process of setting
micro-planning rules.
However, the disappointment in the mode of administrative
behaviour by the planning institutions and the contrasting wide
appreciation of the law courts shown by the general public led, among
other things, to a tendency to confine statutory planning to matters
which directly involved the public good. In a series of judgements,
the High Court of' Justice ruled that it is not for planning
authorities to intervene in the sphere of property law or to prevent
injurious affect to an individual's rights. Whenever the "rule model"
and the "judicial model" could be applied, they were considered
better than a discretionary planning system.
-	 -
In a recent case the Court ruled that a planning application
regarding land in joint ownership need not, in the circumstances,
have the consent of all the owners involved.
"The local commission", said the Court "does not have the
faculties to consider and determine factual and legal
controversies between joint owners of property as to whether
one of them has the right to build on the land without the
consent of the other; it does not have the tools to take
evidence and determine its reliability; it does not have the
legal knowledge to resolve such conflicts and the Regulations
do not intend the commission to have such knowledge" [11].
Together with the tendency to prevent planning provisions from
intruding into the sphere of private law and regulation of property
rights per se, there has been growing realisation of the
socio-economic nature of physical planning and the "limits of law in
urban planning" which reinforced the use of planning provisions of
the second group, which will now be discussed.
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B.	 COEXISTENCE BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS
Though the right to property was recognised in the Western
world as fundamental and its preservation became itself a major
public interest, nonetheless, the modern planning legislation was
introduced in the name of another public interest: the improvement of
the quality of the physical environment and thereby advancement of
social progress and welfare. The publid as a collective group was
considered party to any arrangement of land use and its interests
were given priority over private property rights. Though planning
decisions did not necessarily involve conflicts between different
property rights, they were almost always matters in which the private
interest in land had to be balanced with the public good.
'Public good', 'public interest' or 'social progress' are all
vague terms, open to a number of interpretations. As mentioned, many
writers point out the fallacy in the claim for rational, objective
and apolitical exercise of the planning process: they stress that
determination of the political meaning of these terms in physical
planning inherently involves value judgements based on ideological
and political perceptions 11?). A subjective image of a desirable way
of life inevitably influences the decision makers in their
arrangements for land use. A Rittel and Webber write: "in a
pluralistic society there is nothing like the undisputable public
good; there is no objective definition of equity; policies that
respond to social problems cannot be meaningfully correct or false;
and it makes no sense to talk about 'optimal solutions' to social
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problems unless some qualifications are imposed first. Even worse
there are no 'solutions' in the sense of definitive and objective
answers" [13].
The problematic issue of setting general planning objectives
and solutions has been largely manifested in regard to macro-planning
policies. At the local planning level the public interest could be
identified more easily with physical land use provisions, while
questions such as the ultimate social and economIc objectives of
physical planning could hardly be ignored when dealing with regional
and national planning. According to Peter Self Ilk], the roots of the
difficulties in setting clearly defined objectives, common to all
spheres of public administration, are the tendency of politicians to
avoid systematic policy making in order to avoid conflicts and to
maintain coalitions of support. The outcome is often an inconsistent
set of ill-defined goals.
Under the Mandatory system the planning perspective was formally
focused at the local rather than national level. The explicit goals
of statutory planning expressing the public good were to ensure
public health, conveniences, amenities and welfare of the community.
The practical content of the planning provisions, which were aimed at
the fulfillment of these goals was, as mentioned, controlled by the
British rule. Thus even when stripped of British political interests,
this content reflected Western values regarding the needs of modern
society and desirable urban way of life.
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Foley's second preposition can be most helpful towards
understanding the British perceptions According to Foley, a central
function of the British town planning system can be described in the
following way: "To provide a good (or better) physical environment; a
physical environment of such good quality Is essential for the
promotion of a healthy and civilised life" [15]. Foley points out the
attraction to the British public of physical planning. The pPovision
of designated space standards, density controls, large parks, playing
fields and green belts accorded with British values, as did direct
attack on overcrowding, congestion and physical blight which, we may
add, were associated with the "villains of private property".
However, even when focusing on the quality of the physical
environment, British values not only conflicted with the traditional
values of the Arab community, but also with those of the Jewish
sector which largely came from East European background. The
imposition of the British perceptions and values In Palestine can
thus be regarded as part of a colonial process of socialisatlon.
Socialisation is considered the method by which culture is
transmitted and the individua3. is placed into an organised way of
life [16]. This term is largely associated with education of children
so they may adjust to the group and society. However, it Is also
relevant to describe it as the way adults are involved in new social
forms, absorb new disciplines and create new values 117].
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The expression of the socialisation process in the planning
sphere appeared In the early actions taken towards the preservation
of the Old City of Jerusalem; in the planning of garden cities in the
main urban areas, in the emphasis on low density, open spaces,
recreation areas, road networks and public utilities; In the
assignment of different functions not only to different zones within
one city, but also to each of the main cities: Jerusalem, Tel Aviv
and Haifa, and lastly in laying the foundations for regional outlook
and inter—relationship between rural and urban areas. At the same
time it also appeared in the respect shown to private property and
the rights accorded to a landowner in the event of injurious affect
to his property.
These basic planning principles were in sharpr contrast with the
traditional organic development of the Arab sector. They also acted
against the short range interest of property owners in both the
Jewish and Arab sectors and did not always fit the physical, social
and economic circumstances of Palestine. Moreover, they often
conflicted with the national interests of the respective communities.
NOnetheless, they left their mark on the planning and development of
Palestine and Israel, particularly on the relationship between public
and private interests. It is argued here that this was not merely
because of their legal backing but because of the socialisation
process which the local population underwent during the Mandatory
period (18).
- 21 -
The process of socialisation via planning continued after the
establishment of the State of Israel. As described above, the nst
characteristic element in the social process which took place in
Israel was the absorption of immigrants from all over the world. The
multi-cultural composition of the population called for a
socialisation process whereby the different groups could be brought
into some kind of social harmony, or at least have a common basis for
social interaction. Planning provisions were part of a centrally
organised attempt to bring the Jews from eastern and oriental
backgrounds into the prevailing western way of life [19]. The
planning and building of the new towns by the government and the
absorption of immigrants, largely of eastern background, in these
towns provide a striking example of that socialisation process.
Again, western-type physical planning principles of low density
building, public open spaces, recreation areas, zoning, hierarchy of
settlements and regional and national outlooks were imposed upon a
population which was, in general, unaccustomed to such planning and
development ideas. However, the public good - expressed in terms of a
higher quality of the physical environment - was determined after
198 by a democratically elected government. This government was, by
definition, more responsive to public demands and waves of public
opinion than the previous Mandatory rule. It is true that during the
first stage of the Israeli system there was a wide gap between the
policy makers themselves and the new immigrants who were mostly
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affected by the poltey makers' decisions. Nevertheless, as shown
above, this gap was somewhat narrowed during the second stage, both
in planning and other spheres of administration [20].
Circumstances were such in Israel that the large-scale
development projects of the . 1950's were carried out by the public on
public land using public resources. This removed the sting from the
development projects since it prevented any great conflict between
public and private interests. Such a conflict did appear in the
planning of the more populated areas around the three major cities of
the country. However the Israeli law was markedly in favour of the
public interest, though private property rights were never
disregarded completely. Since the Israeli legislator and the
administration were strongly influenced by the ideologies of
representative democracy and collectivism, new legal tools were given
to the planning authorities, enabling them to introduce radical
changes in the distribution of land between the general public and
private landowners.
The years of the second stage gave rise to the ideology of
individualism. The private sector was gradually re-organised as a
positive development force, sometimes able to advance the interests
of the public better than the public development bodies themselves.
Budgetary limitations on public bodies also led to greater reliance
on private initiative and planning bargaining flourishes. At the same
time there was a shift towards participatory democracy and new social
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groups emerged with greater involvement in planning decision making,
thus safeguarding what was considered by them as the public
interest.
The new balance between the public and private interests
remained unchanged on the whole, without any significant shift
favouring either side.
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C.	 COEXISTENCE BETWEEN DIFFERENT NATIONAL C1MUNITIES AND SOCIAL
GROUPS
Physical planning could not be presented fot long as an end in
itself. Despite the socialisation process via physical planning in
Palestine and Israel or rather as a result of such processes, the
inherent fallacy in the planning objective of advancing merely the
quality of the environment for the good of the general public was
soon revealed. This was particularly striking when planning was
viewed from a broad national planning perspective. The bitter
conflicts between the Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine and
the wide gaps between Jews of Oriental and European background in
Israel both led to the realisation that physical planning could not
advance the interests of all groups equally, but served some groups
more than others. The conclusion that planning is a political
activity which undergoes changes under varying political systems and
in line with different ideologies [213 is self-evident in these
systems.
Physical planning thus became no more than an intermediate goal
to further social, cultural, political, economic and strategic goals.
Moreover, as mentioned its meta goal was to facilitate the prevailing
social order and thereby contribute to the social stability. Foley's
third proposition, named "the social ideolog", points to this wider
context of physical planning. Under this proposition, "town planning,
as part of a broader social programme, is responsible for providing
the physical basis for better urban community life" (22]. Foley then
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describes the ideal patterns of social-spatial interaction which
accorded with British values; for example, small communities in low
density residential areas. Foley's social ideology is, in principle,
relevant to the planning systems of Palestine and Israel, despite the
differences in the content of' the social programmes and the patterns
of social-spatial interaction between the British and these systems.
It should however be stressed that the social content of planning was
not, in general, prescribed directly by the planning laws, but was
determined by the authorities at the time.
Social programmes during the Mandatory period varied from one
sector to another. The Jewish sector was united in the view that
physical planning and development should facilitate the Zionist
ideology; i.e. the establishment of a Jewish State. This led to a
basic positive planning precept which rose above and beyond internal
controversies concerning the nature and content of the desired
social-spatial interactions in such a State. The Arab sector, on the
other hand, held a negative attitude towards physical planning, since
it realised that any change in the physical status -quo was
detrimental to its own socio-political goal of an Arab State
embracing the entire territory of Palestine.
The British stood between these controversies: their rule
served their own political-strategic interests and preservation of
this rule became an important tool. Regulative planning systems of
the Mandatory type allowed on the one hand some positive planning
while at the same time it restricted physical growth. The resulting
balance between the two sectors was effectively held during most of
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this period, though each sector obviously had reservations as to the
British use of its planning powers.
The statutory planning framework in Palestine was broad enough
to include traditional forms of social-spatial interactions such as
the Arab village as well as innovative forms of collective settlement
such as Kibbutz and Moshav; to preserve the old-type Arab town and
allow establishment of new Jewish garden suburbs; to permit the
growth of the Jewish population which was guided to the coastal plain
and the big cities while maintaining an Arab majority which was
dispersed throughout the country. In the name of preservation of the
status quo, the government pursued a flexible political policy
which strove towards co-existence of rival communities under
Mandatory rule.
An expression of this co-existence was town planning in
Jerusalem. As explained above, Jerusalem was preserved as a cultural,
political and administrative centre while its controlled growth did
not include significant economic or industrial development. In some
respects the planning of Jerusalem could be regarded as part of a
broader colonial phenomenon. In his analysis of the British colonial
experience in the sphere of town planning, A.D. King 123] provides
some examples which resemble the planning process in Jerusalem and
other parts of Palestine. Regarding India, King writes:
"The major city building exercise during two hundred years of
informal and formal colonial rule - the planning and
construction of New Delhi (191119 LtO) - involved the creation
of a capital city almost entirely devoted to administrative,
political and social functions, with virtually no attempt made
to plan for industrial development" 12k].
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As King points out, this repeated itself in British colonies in
Africa:
"The built environment of the 'ideal type' political
administrative capital was characterised by those buildings
housing the key institutions of colonialism: government or
state house, the council or assembly buildings (if any), army
barracks or cantonment, the police lines, hospital, jail,
government offices and the road system, housing and
recreational space for the expatriate European bureaucracy and,
occasionally, housing for local government employees" [25].
In the African colonies too the official planning policy under
which urban centres were established expressed "urbanisation without
industrialisation" [26].
In explaining the British urban planning policy in the
colonies, King applies the "dependency theory" [27]. This theory
advances the notion that the interests of the developed capitalist
society of the home countries were best served by designing dependent
peripheral economies in the Third World. The spatial expression of
this economic dependency, i.e. lack of industrial infrastructure, was
meant to halt the progress of the colonies into independent
economies. This theory can also be related to the circumstances in
Palestine where the political interests of the Mandatory power were
superior to its economic interests: in fact, political dependancy can
be considered the main objective of the British rule in Palestine.
One of the ways this objective was advanced was by restricting the
physical and economic growth and accordingly the political power of
the Jewish sector, while at the same time showing indifference to the
physical and economic requirements of the Arab sector. Coexistence of
the two rival sectors in the environmental sphere was thus a way of




Turning to the internal composition of the respective sectors,
it is asserted that the social programme to be achieved through
physical planning was an attempt to enable co-existence between the
various classes and groups. The Jewish sector is used in this work as
the main example of such co-existence. During the Mandatory period
the majority of the Jewish sector was composed of urban population
which held the ideology of urbanism and Individualism. However, the
leading powers of the Jewish community were the Socialist-Zionist
parties which held views of collectivism and ruralism. The central
communal institution persued their policy of positive planning mainly
in the rural sector, though it allowed major urban growth through
both public and private capital. This was due to the fact that any
form of social-spatial interaction was considered in the best
interests of the common goal of the establishment of a Jewish State.
Thus different types of towns and neighbourhoods were established by
the various social groups, providing for the different physical,
social, cultural and economic needs of the heterogenous Jewish
society.
Differences within the Jewish community became more marked with
the establishment of the State of Israel. The main divisions included
urban and rural populations, socialists and liberals, religious and
secular, new immigrants and veterans, though the most serious
division was between Jews of Oriental and European background. The
main positive planning effort in the first years was to settle the
new immigrants, largely of Oriental origin, in the newly established
towns throughout the country. By this centralised national initiative
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the absorption of these social groups was made possible, providing
them with the basic physical and economic means to start a new life
In the country. However, with the years the gaps between the various
sectors grew wider, while at the same time the expectations of the
disadvantaged groups also grew higher, thus shaking the social
solidarity within the Jewish community. Several social programmes
aimed at the redistribution of public resources and social justice
were prepared and put into practice. These were reflected in
statutory national, regional and local schemes which encouraged the
dispersal of population and industries and the generation of
employment opportunities in the new towns and outlying regions. The
"Project Renewal" Is a recent example of this type of comprehensive
effort at bridging the gap between the more advantaged and less
advantaged sectors.
The ultimate task of positive and regulative planning systems
has been to facilitate coexistence between different groups and
sectors of a heterogenous society.
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CHAPTER 12. PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION AND THE SOCIAL ORDER
The stage of implementation of planning is that which turns the
whole process into a purposeful social activity. In many decision
making models, implementation is an integral part of the entire
planning process; in some models, it is the stage following the
planning process.
For Keeble [1], "planning is not the carrying
	 out of
development; it is the creation of a framework into which development
shall fit". He continues: "Admittedly the boundary between the two is
not sharp; very large development projects may be indistinguishable
from very detailed planning. However, except at this frontier the
distinction is clear". With the move from a static plan into a
dynamic plannLng process, the stage of implementation became much
more important.
Alexander [2] describes planning as the development of optimal
strategy of future action which is "attended by power and intention
to commit resources to act as necessary to implement the chosen
strategy". The potential ability and the intention to carry out the
plan is sufficient to make the process worthy the name of planning.
On the other hand, Wi].davsky [3] considers planning as "the ability
to control the future by current acts". For Wildavsky, "the object
and its fulfillment are part of the same series of actions".
Therefore without producing results, planning is but a failure.
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The meaning and use of the term "implementation" in the context
of town and country planning varies from one writer to another.
Detailed planning can be regarded as the implementation of a general
policy and strategy; planning permission can be said to be the
administrative process of implementation of planning principles; law
enforcement is the legal tool to aid implementation of planning and
administrative processes, and the actual building and use of land is
obviously the substantiatiofl of planning in the environment.
Focusing on planning implementation, this chapter sums up the
interdependency of the three facets of statutory planning, analysed
above: the machinery, process and content, and actual implementation
in the given social orders.
The term "planning implementation" is used here in a broad
sense to include all that made the statutory planning systems a




The colonial order prevailing during the Mandatory era
dominated the establishment of the planning machinery and the
exercise of the planning process. It influenced the purpose served by
the plans and decisions and led to the excessive concentration on
development control and law enforcement. As a result the Mandatory
planning implementation can be called restrictive implementation.
The implementation during the Mandatory era was begun with the
prompt action of institutionalisation of the planning machinery. The
main town planning institutions were established at a very early
stage. This action was taken with the political aim of expressing the
authority of the new rule in Palestine.
The discretionary power as to the manning of these bodies was
used to ensure the dominance of the central government over the
planning machinery. This too was aimed at the consolidation of the
authority of the Mandatory power in the environmental sphere. However
the machinery included representatives of local institutions which
could help the government exercise indirect rule through the
collaboration of the local population. In such a way the machinery
could acquire additional legitimacy in the eyes of the affected
public.
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With the years the local planning institutions grew in number.
The separation between planning institutions of the Arab sector and
those of the Jewish sector attempted to minimise the national
conflict while at the same time ensuring greater political dependancy
of both sectors on the central government.
Coupled with the institutionalisation of the planning machinery
was the rapid imposition of development control over the main urban
areas. The legal provision which required the local population to
acquire planning permission from the authorities reinforced not only
the authority of the central government but also the political power
of the local institutions. These local bodies were gradually given
power to carry out statutory plans and decisions of the central
government through the granting or refusing of planning permission.
These bodies were also in charge of law enforcement.
The statutory planning process and especially the plan making
process were considered in retrospect rigid, lacking the flexibility
required for a dynamic development system. The idea that a plan
should provide an explicit picture of the future of the physical
environment can be regarded as inconsistent with the mechanism of
social—spatial interaction. In practice, however, the plan making
process, in the sense of comprehensive outline schemes, was rarely
implemented. The socio—political circumstances prevailing in
Mandatory Palestine persuaded the authorities to avoid explicit
policies and plans and instead to preserve their wide discretion in
making ad hoc decisions. Since the political future was uncertain, a
- k31 -
status quo between the rival communities was the prime governmental
policy. The actual meaning of that status quo in land use decisions
was vague enough to allow restricted growth and controlled
development of the Jewish sector, while preserving the Arab majority
in most parts of the country.
The central government showed only limited interest in physical
planning for the sake of a higher quality of the environment. Low
density urban areas, zoning, conservation of valueable sites and
buildings, national roads and railway networks, recreation areas and
other modern planning principles were introduced where and when there
was either governmental interest or particular local demand. For the
most part the internal arrangement of land use at the local planning
level was in the hands of the local institutions which, in the
circumstances, were often used for political and economj.c gain.
Following the Mandatory planning machinery, process and content
described above, is that restrictive implementation has been the
prime task of statutory planning. This mainly involved the guidance
of existing market forces through development control and imposition
of law and order through law eflforcement. The administrative stage of
licencing and the use of legal proceedings were regarded as the major
statutory tools of the planning authorities whereby they could
achieve regulative implementation.
Implementation of this kind resulted from a passive attitude on
the part of the government towards environmental problems and
corresponded to liberal principles of limited government involvement
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in the private market. The basic assumption underlying this approach
at the time in Britain was that not only were there existing
development market forces capable of carrying out any required
physical improvements, but that these forces, if only guided and
controlled, could perform this task better than any government
institution.
Though it is doubtful that this assumption prevailed in the
Mandatory government of Palestine, nonetheless the attraction of the
regulative planning method to the Mandatory authorities stemmed from
British colonial policy of limited economic investment in the
colonies and mandated territories.
	
Furthermore, the colonial
perception of law and order accorded well with restrictive
implementation. The government's authority, which depended to a large
degree on the imposition of law and order, was also measured by the
replacement of unplanned, chaotic development with governmental
control over land use. Finphasis was therefore placed on licencing and
law enforcement rather than on positive effectuation as a government
tool in the task of' environmental reform.
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B.	 REGULATIVE IMPLEMENTATION
Restrictive implementation as provided by the Mandatory
government, was not an inescapable consequence of the regulative
planning system but rather the motive for shaping the statutory
system of Palestine as a regulative one. The nature and character of'
planning implementation was determined to a large extent by the
legislative process which shaped planning law itself. The ideologies
and perceptions held by those responsible for the formulation of'
Planning Ordinances and Laws involved not simply the nature of the
planning system, but the method by which the system should be
implemented. On the other hand, the different points of view as to
planning implementation were expressed even more strongly at the
stage of carrying out of planning law, often notwithstanding the
explicit provisiQns of' the law.
Since the point was that statutory planning was not a process
by which the executive intended to lay down plans and proceed onwards
to their positive implementation, but merely a method of' controlling
the development activities of the lOcal population. The system
fulfilled its political role even without bringing significant
improvement to the physical environment. For the same reason there is
little relevance in the fact that there were no comprehensive plans
but many ad hoc decisions, often inconsistent with each other.
As a result of the Mandatory perception, the scope of
development control during the Mandatory era was much broader than
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that of the British counterpart system. The duty imposed on any
building operation of first obtaining a permit from the planning
authorities, the wide scope of control which included not only
matters of some public interest but also trivial land use matters,
and the rule that the carrying out of development without planning
permission was a criminal offence, were all expressions of the
Mandatory order in Palestine.
In the first stage of the Mandatory system the pace of
development carried out by the local population was such that
effective control could, and in fact was, exercised by the
government. This was largely due to the fact that the political
situation allowed the collaboration of the local institutions in
ensuring obedience to the law. However the increase in the country's
population and the extensive development achieved during this stage
required the central government to leave much of the burden of
development control to the local institutions. During this second
stage the political conflicts grew between the two major sectors and
between these and the central government. This significantly reduced
the effectiveness of the control process by the central government.
The decrease in the status of the government and growing questions as
to its legitimacy led to a parallel increase in the power of the
local institutions. However, the local authorities adopted a
selective mode of law enforcement in accordance with factional
interests and irrelevant considerations. This obviously undermined
the legitimacy of the entire planning process.
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With the establishment of the State of Israel, a new order
based on the Jewish democratic nature of the state began to develop.
This order, which wa influenced by the order prevailing within the
Jewish community before 19k8, was expressed in the new method of
implementation of the inherited regulative planning system. It led to
prompt institutionalisation of representative planning bodies whose
political role was to ensure the authority of the newly established
government. The composition of these bodies reflected the
heterogenity of political groups which characterises Israel. Though
this composition was influenced by the prevailing ideologies of
representative democracy, the planning process was in practice open
to non-official involvement of influential political and social
institutions. This was not formalised as a public participation
process, but rather created on a selective basis in accordance with
political and economic interests. In view of the growth in the
country's population, the content of planning decisions and plans
became more positive towards physical development than during the
previous rule. The restrictive approach and status-quo policy of the
Mandatory era were repealed since they were inconsistent with the
nature of the new Jewish State.
Nonetheless, the tendency to avoid long-term planning but
rather progress through ad hoc decisions continued under the new
system. This has been explained as necessary due to the highly
dynamic pace of development and the flexibility required in the
circumstances. However, the main reason was probably the pre-State
legacy of anti-planning and pro-improvisation.
-	 -
In the spirit of nationalism and representative democracy, the
central government took charge of the main positive implementation
projects. Its executive bodies planned and carried out the
establishment of new towns and villages in what may be considered a
far-reaching social engineering project. The central government was
also active in building new neighbourhoods in existing urban areas,
This gave wide political and economic powers to the governmental
executive bodies. At the same time it limited the power and authority
of the statutory planning bodies which were left with the task of
merely controlling private sector development. Development control in
this limited form remained the main tool of implementation of the
planning machinery.
The statutory planning powers were subject to political
struggles between the central government (actually the political
party with which the Ministry of the Interior was invested) and the
local authorities. Both saw in these powers an important source of
influence. Some compromise was achieved by an institutional
integration of the central and local government in the introduction
of a broader composition of' district planning commissions. tbwever,
the implementation of the planning process reflected the race of'
these bodies for political and economic infuence. During the first
stage outline or comprehensive plans for an entire city or town wre
rarely prepared. Instead, detailed plans which were narrow in scope
were submitted by either the local authority or private developers.
The absence of an explicit outline plan and comprehensive planning
outlook helped the planning institutions retain wide discretion and
enabled them to use their power of approval in accordance with
-	 -
different political and economic interests. Further, the nature of
the statutory land use plan helped control the powers of the local
authorities by imposing on them detailed and rigid provisions which
left very little discretion in the stage of granting permits. The
local authorities on their part attempted to retain the maximum
planning freedom for themselves. They thus manipulated not only their
development control powers, but also their law enforcement duties in
order to advance political and economic interests.
The seemingly democratic power struggle through statutory
planning often exceeded the legitimate boundaries in a democratic
system. Factionalism and favouritism dominated this process,
particularly at the local level. This exercise of regulative planning
implementation, characteristic of the formative years of Israel,
encountered heavy criticism from the State Comptroller and the High
Court of Justice. The situation in regard to planning law enforcement
was such that not only were criminal proceedings initiated on a
selective basis, but even court orders of demolition of unauthorised
constructions were given according to various alien considerations.
This obviously undermined the authority of the Judiciary and the
Executive alike.
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C.	 TCJ.4ADS POSITIVE IMPLEMENTATION
The years of the second stage were marked by a somewhat
different socio-economio order in Israel which can be traced largely
to the maturation of society, the successful absorption of
immigrants, and the growing role played in the country's public life
by a generation born in the country. It is characterised by greater
social stability through a more acceptable balance between Jews from
the West and East, between the public good and individual interest,
between representative and participatory democracy, between urbanism
and ruralism, and between other traditional sources of social
conflict. It is asserted that the more balanced emphasis on positive
and regulative planning implementation, reflected In the contemporary
planning system, derives from the mutual relations between the system
and the prevailing stable social order.
The reformed Israeli planning system which was implemented
during the second stage (1965-1980's) expressed a desire for greater
positive implementation within the statutory framework. This was
manifested in the planning machinery, process and content.
The new structure of national, regional and local planning
machinery incorporated many representatives of executive bodies. The
local authorities, which became far more active in physical planning,
consolidated their status in the planning machinery. Public bodies
concerned with environmental issues also became involved in the new
machinery. This broader composition of the planning institutions led
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to greater interest in positive implementation and less concern with
the regulation of market forces.
The planning process was also broadened: The new national and
regional plans provided not only guidelines for local planning but
also served the government—public sector in coordinating country—wide
development projects. This sector still carried the main burden of
Israel's physical development; hence the practical importance of the
reformed planning process. The fact that the activities of the
government were brought under the roof of statutory development
control led also to the change in orientation from regulative to
positive implementation.
However, the importance of this new tendency should not be
exaggarated. The planning institutions remained distinct from the
executive bodies, despite the involvement of the latter in the
process taking place in the former. Since the political power
struggle within the central government and the public sector still
relied on administrative authority and the practical resources
allotted to each body, coordination of positive implementation often
failed due to narrow political interests.
From another perspective, a marked tendency towards planning
bargaining between local authorities and private developers surfaced
during the second stage. The budgetary limitations of the local
authorities during times of growing public expectation for physical
improvements in urban environments encouraged the use of' planning
bargaining. On the other hand, there was also a growing public
-	 -
involvement in the planning process: The public often objected to the
long-term cost when the short-term benefit was considered out of
proportion 11$).
The new generation of multi-level statutory schemes expressed,
to seine extent, a more comprehensive environmental outlook. The
national scheme for dispersion of population included guidelines for
implementation, such as economic incentives and tax relief for
residents in outlying districts, and suggested greater government
investment in sources of employment and educational facilities. The
social, economic and physical factors in the urban and rural
environments were recognised far more clearly during this stage than
at any previous time.
Nonetheless, the inherited regulative implementation nature of
the system was still of greater importance than positive
implementation. Development control and law enforcement were not only
used to control the development initiatives of the private sector,
but also of the public sector. These powers were manipulated in the
bargaining process which took place with both sectors. The tighter
supervision of law courts, the State Comptroller, and the general
public over the administrative modes of operation did change to some
extent the bureaucratic behaviour, leading to more systematic action
against unauthorised building. Unfortunately it also led to greater
sophistication in the manipulation of legal powers and factionalism
and favouritisin still took place under the new system. However, with
-
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growing public concern in envirornenta1 issues and the social—spatial
relationship, regulative and positive implementation were often
subject to profound and fruitful debates.
The main conclusion of this analysis, which should be stressed
at this point, is that the statutory planning systems which have a
major political role as a tool for effective government, economic
role in the provision of efficient utilisation of scarce resources,
and social role in the advancement of human welfare and progress,
were moulded to fit the prevailing power structures,, They were
largely disarmed as effective mechanisms of social change but becane
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PART I
Chapter 1
1. The geographical and political boundaries of Palestine have been
variously defined and are a matter of dispute. For the purpose
of this study, the term "Palestine" will be limited to the area
which came under the British Mandate, excluding Trans-Jordan.
However, the emphasis will be on the territory which is now
included in the State of Israel. Further, the term will be used
with reference to the period frOm the end of Turkish rule until
the establishment of the State of Israel.
2. For geographical data of Palestine, see: R. Nathan, 0. Gass,
D. Creamer, Palestine: Problem and Promise. (Washington D.C.
196) pp. 101-102w For the geographical aspects in relation to
planning see also: E. Orni, E. Efrat, The Geography of Israel,
(2nd ed.) (Jerusalem 1966); E. Brutzkus, Physical Planning in
Israel, (Jerusalem 196 Z ); A. Sharon	 Physical Planning in
Israel, (Tel-Aviv 1952),
3. E. Brutzkus Regional Policy in Israel, (Jerusalem 1970) p.3.
LI. See: P.E. Schoenberg, Palestine in the Year 1914, Ph.D thesis,
(New York University 1978), Vol. 1 (unpublished).
5. Orni & Efrat op. cit. p. 168, 24LI; D. Stanislavski, The Origin
and Spread of the Grid Pattern Town, Geographical Review, 36,
19LI6, pp. 105-120; For the particular German's planning in
Jerusalem see McLean's City of Jerusalem - Town Planning
Scheme, (1918) (unpublished); S. Waterman, Pre-Israeli
Planning in Palestine. The Example of Acre. Town Planning
Review, (January 1971),
	 p.85;	 M.	 Gilbert,	 Jerusalem,
Illustrated History Atlas, (1977). Schoenberg, op. cit. pp.
6-21.
6. An Interim Report on the Civil Administration of Palestine
during the period 1st July 1920 - 30th June 1921, [prepared by
Sir H. Samuaj.J H.M.S.O. 1921 (Qnd. 1k99) (Thereafter "Interim
Report").
7. Interim Report, op. cit. p. 1;	 Palestine Royal Commission
Report ("Peel Report" thereafter) 1937, HMSE 1937 (Cmd 5LI79).
B. Wasserstein, The British in Palestine 1917-1924,
	 (London
1978).
8. As there was no official census until 1922, various sources give
different numbers. See: Interim Report op. cit.; Schoenberg op.
cit. p. P12; R. Bachi, The Population of Israel, 	 (Jerusalem
197LI).
9. Interim Report op. cit.; It should be stressed that this
division on a religious basis is not congruent with ethnic
groups. Arabs are, for example, Christians as well as Moslems.
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10. Schoenberg op. cit. p.11.
11. S.E. Eisenstadt, Israeli Society, (Jerusalem 1967).
12. Wasserstein op. cit. p.5; Schoenberg op. cit. p. 355.
13. The Balf'our Declaration was a statement of British policy Issued
on 2 November 1917 by Mr. (after Lord) Balfour, the then Foreign
Secretary. Its opening words were "His Majesty's Government view
with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home
for the Jewish People and will use their best endeavours to
facilitate the achievement of this object ..."
1. This was an ambiguous pledge given on 2'I October 1915 on behalf
of the British Government to Hussein the Sherif of Mecca by Sir
Henry McMahon, the then High Commissioner in Egypt. This was
issued in the framework of negotiations with the Sherif of Mecca
regarding independence for the Arabs following the Sherif's
refusal to support the Turkish Sultan-Caliph's declaration of a
Jihad against the Allies. Preceding the actual wording of the
pledge, McMahon excluded certain territory from the claim of the
Sherif to independence. The pledge stated: "Subject to the above
modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and
support the independence of the Arabs within the territories
proposed by the Sherif of Mecca." See: Wasserstein, op. cit.
15. In most cases Britain was not trusted by either side, see:
Norman & Helen Bentwioh, Mandate Memories 1918-19'5, London
1965; See: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the
Disturbances in May 1921. HMSO 1921 (Cmd 15k0); Interim Report
op. cit.; Peel Report op. cit.; Wasserstein op. cit.
16. For British interests in Palestine, see: The Royal Institute of
International Affairs, Great Britain and Palestine 1915-19L5,
Information Papers No. 20 (3rd ed.) (London 19'êô); Al Tbawi,
British Interests in Palestine 1800-1901, (London 1961), pp.
183-205; Y. Ben Arieh, The Rediscovery of the Holy Land in
the Nineteenth Century, (Jerusalem 1979), pp. 195-198; Penner
Brockway,	 The Colonial	 Revolution,	 (London	 1973),
pp . 156-161.
17. B.W. Tuchnian, Bible and Sword, (N.Y. 1956) (Republished G.B.,
1982).
18. Schoenberg, op. cit. pp . 172-187; G.E. Franklin, Palestine.
(New York, 1911); H. Luke and E. Keith-Roack, The Handbook of
Palestine and Trans-Jordan (3rd ed.) (London 1933) p. 56.
19. For Turkish administrative structure see: E. Samuel,	 The
Ottoman Legacy to Israel, Jewish Journal of Sociology, 2
(1960) pp . 219-235; Peel Report op. cIt. pp. 150-153 and map No.
1 of the administrative districts p. 18; Schoenberg op. cit. pp.
68-516; The Vilayet Law of 13 March 1913.
20. G. Young, Corps de droit Ottoman, (7 vols.) 1905-1906, Oxford
University Press, Vol. 1, pp. 66 ff(129t).
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21. I. Ben Zvi, Local Autonomy in Palestine, in the Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science; T. Sellin and
D. Young (eds.), Palestine: A Decade of Development,
	 Vol. 16
(Philadelphia 1932), pp . 27-33.
22. For the Turkish system of land rights and distribution of land
ownership see: J. Weitz, Struggle for the Land (1950); A.
Granott, Land System in Palestine: History and Structure,
(London 1950); F. Goadby and M. Doukhan, The Land Law of
Palestine, (Tel-Aviv 1935); A. Ben Shemesh, Land Laws in the
State of Israel, (Tel-Aviv 1953) (Hebrew).
23. This code was first published in 1858 and was amended by
numerous Turkish laws, especially after the Turkish revolution
in 1910. See: Goadby and Doukhan, The Land Law of Palestine,
(Tel-Aviv 1935); Goadby, Palestine Law, Sources and Judicial
Organisation,	 reprint	 from Opera Academia	 Universalis
Jurisprudentinse Comparativea/Berlin, (1920's).
24. The Tapu Law, A.H. 1275 (1858) and other laws. See: Goadby &
Donkam, op. cit. Chap. XVIII.
25. It has been repealed by the Israeli Land Law 5729 - 1969. 23
Laws of the State of Israel (thereafter cited L.S4.) (1968-69),
p . 283.
26. See: Law of the Administration of the Vilayet 1871, G. Young,
op. cit. Vol. I. p.59; Law of the Construction and Alignment of
Streets of 1891, Young, op. cit. p.137.
27. See: Regulations for Expropriation for Public Purposes A.H.
1926, and the particular law dealing with expropriation by the
Municipalities of A.H. 1332; Goadby & Donkam, op. cit. Chap.
XIV.
28. W.H. McLean Regional and Town Planning in Principle and
Practice, (London 1930), p. 120; McLean, a British town
planner who worked in Jerusalem in 1918, made that comment on
the way the Turks exercised development control in Jerusalem.
However, a better example of controlling building activity was
Haifa in 1909-1910, see: A. Carmel, The History of Haifa under
Turkish Rule, 2nd ed. pp. 161-169.
29. For Zionist activities and development of land see: Leah
Dukhan-Landau, The Zionist Companies for Land Purchase in
Palestine 1897-191k, (Jerusalem 1979) (Hebrew); A. Ruppin,
The Agricultural Colonisation of the Zionist Organisation in
Palestine (London 1926); Schoenberg, op. cit. pp . 269-363.
30. Israel Pocket Library,
	 Immigration and Settlement,
	 Keter
Books, (Jerusalem 1973); N. Bentwich,	 Fulfilment in the
Promised Land 1917-1937, (London 1938); Among these were
Jewish neighbourhoods outside the Walls of •the Old City of
Jerusalem which were founded in the nineteenth century, e.g.
Yemin Moshe, Nahalat Shivah, Meah Shearim; Tel-Aviv, a garden
- L150 -
suburb of Jaffa was established in 1905; Hadar Hacarmel a suburb
of Haifa was established in 1881. Schoenberg, op. cit. vol.11,
p. 36; A. Ruppin, Memoirs, Diaries, Letters 	 (A. Bein ed.)
(London 1971), p. 19.
30. For example: The engineer Joseph Levi of the Technical
Department of the Zionist Organisation's Office in Palestine,
who made the subdivision of plots of land in Tel-Aviv in 1913;
The architect Buerwald made the plan for the rural settlement of
Merhavia in 1912.
31. A. Sharon, Collective Settlement in Israel, The Town Planning
Review vol. XXV, 19545, p. 255; A. Ruppin,	 Agricultural
Settlement in Palestine by the	 Zionist Organisation,
1908-1923, (Tel-Aviv 1975), pp. 52-5g.
32. Israel Pocket Library,	 History from 1880,	 Keter	 Books,
(Jerusalem 1973).
33. A. Arian, Ideological Change in Israel, (1968).
3L. See: S. Reichman,	 From Foothold	 to	 Settled	 Territory
1918-19k8, (Jerusalem 1978) (Hebrew).
1$i4	 Schoenberg, op. cit. p . 355.
Chapter 2
1. The town had surrendered on December 9 1917. The official entry
was, however, two days afterwards. See Lt. 	 Colonel	 H.
Piric-Gordon,	 Record of the	 Advance of the	 Egyptian
Expeditionary Force;	 Captain	 Cyrill	 Falls,	 Military
Operations Egypt & Palestine, 	 2 Parts, (London 1930); M.
Gilbert, Jerusalem - Illustrated History Atlas, (1972) p. 63.
2. Peel Report, op. cit. pp. 153-158.
3. Ibid.
14 A tendency to reduce their number through amalgamation made them
10 in 1919, 7 in 1920, and 3 in 1927. See H.C. Luke & E.
Keith-Roach, op. cit.
5. Ibid: Interim Report op. cit.
6. An example of' this gap was the separate legislation for the
construction of roads and railways from other planning matters.
This followed the line of English legislation.
7. Peel Report op. cit.: R. Storrs, The Memories of Sir Ronald
Storrs. (New York 1937) (Reprint 1972). The writer was an
exception. He was an officer who also had some experience in
administrative work; Wasserstein op. cit.
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8. Among these: W.H. McLean, C.R. Ashbee and P. Geddes, and in
latter years P. Aberorombie, Holliday and H. Kendall.
9. Allenby to the War Office, Oct. 1918, Public Record Office,
Foreign Office 371/3384/1358 as quoted in Wasserstein op. cit.
p. 20. Wavell: Allenby, Soldier and Statesman, (London 1946)
p . 261.
10. Wasserstein, op. cit. p. 21.
11. N. Bentwich, Fulfilment. op. cit. p. 122. Wasserstein op. cit.
pp . 34-57.
12. N. Bentwich, Legislation of Palestine 1918-1925, Vol. I.
(1926). The proclamation prohibiting land transactions in the
Ottoman Sunjak of Jerusalem was made by the Chief Administrator
Major-General Money on November 1, 1918 (p. 613) and another one
for the rest of the Occupied Territory was made on Nov. 16, 1918
( p . 617). These proclamations included the official explanation
that as the registers of land had been removed by the Turks, it
was impossible to allow further transactions. See: Peel Report
op. cit,
13. For example, the railway line which was laid from the Suez Canal
to Haifa long the army advance. See: N. Bentwich, Fulfilmen, op.
cit. p. 9.; M. Gilbert op. cit. p. 65.
14. Storrs op. cit. p. 323; G. Biger,	 The Contribution of the
British Administration to the Development of Jerusalem During
the First Period of its Rule. Mahkarim Begeographia Shel Eretz
Israel 5736 pp . 175-200, 179, (Hebrew).
15. Town planning in Palestine was introduced at an earlier stage
than in most Africa Colonies and India, see: comment in T.A.
Concannon Review of Jerusalem - the City Plan, 34 Journal of
the Town Planning Institute, 19'IB, p. 171: planning in Egypt and
the Sudan was however more comprehensive and included regional
and national planning; See: W.H. McLean, Regional and Town
Planning In Principle and Practice, (London 1930).
16. For the full text of this proclamation see: Legislation of
Palestine op. cit. p . 599; Falls op. cit. pp. 260-261; Wavell,
op. cit. p. 193.
17. N. & H. Bentwich op. cit. p. 31; Wasserstein op. cit. p. 20.
18. An indication of this can be found in his agreement with the
enemy - the Turks - to silence the guns on the approach to
Jerusalem in order to save the city from destruction. He also
showed personal interest in the city plan and his support of' the
Pro Jerusalem Society (see below).
19. As N. Bentwich wrote (Fulfilment op. cit. p. 64): "Jerusalem was
fortunate in its first British Governor after the Occupation,
Sir Ronald Storrs, an artist administrator who, having a deep
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regard for the beauty and history of the city ..." For a
personal account of his activities in Jerusalem see: Storrs op.
cit.
20. McLean, op. cit. Pp. 63-65; H. Kendall,	 Jerusalem: The City
Plan, Preservation and Development During the British Mandate
1918-19k8 H.M.S.0. (London 19148) p. 14.
21. Public Notice No. 3I of April 8 1918, see: Storrs op. cit.
p. 327. McLean op. cit.: Kendal] op. cit.: Gilbertop. cit.
S. Shapiro,	 Planning Jerusalem:	 The First Generation
(1918-1968), in Urban Geography of Jerusalem - a companion
volume to the Atlas of Jerusalem 1973.	 For the	 legal
significance of the term "Public Notice" 	 see:	 Bentwich,
Legislation of Palestine op. cit. p. III.
22. Storrs (op. cit.) explained this as "respecting the tradition of
stone vaulting the heritage in Jerusalem of an immemorial and a
hallow past"; Gilbert, op. cit.
23. W.H. McLean, City of Jerusalem, Town Planning Scheme, 	 (1918);
Kendal op. cit.; McLean Regional op. cit.
2 11. Sapiro, op. cit.
25. Storrs op. cit. p. 328.
26. McLean's Scheme op. cit.; McLean's book op. cit.
27. Storrs op. cit. p. 3314.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Storrs op. cit. p . 327.
31. Storrs' preface to C.R. Ashbee (ed.) Jerusalem 1918-1920.	 The
Records of the Pro Jerusalem Society, p. VII; for the
contribution of the Society, see Appendix I p. 71; Storrs op.
cit. p. 328.
32. Storrs op. cit. p . 327. The Society ceased to operate when
Storrs finished his term of office in 1925 (see Storrs, op.
cit.).
33. Storrs op. cit. p. 328; Storr's preface to C.R. Ashbee ed.
Jerusalem 1920-1922 p. VI; Ashbee, A Palestine Notebook, op.
cit. p. 139.
34. C.R. Ashbee, Where the Great City Stands: A Study In the New
Civics, (Essex House Press 1917); G.E. Cherry, The Evolution
of British Town Planning, (Leonard Hill Books 197 14), p . 53.
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35. See: the criticism of J.M. Neufeld, 	 Planning in Palestine,
Journal of the American Institute of Planner, Vol. XV, 19k9,
p . 27.
36. C.R. Ashbee, A Palestine Notebook, 1918-1923, (New York 1923)
p . 20; C.R. Ashbee (ed.) Jerusalem 1918-1920. The Records of
the Pro Jerusalem Society, (London 1921) (thereafter Jerusalem
1918-1920).
37. H.Z. Hirschberg, A Turning Point in the History of Jerusalem
in the Nineteenth Century, in H.Z. Hirschberg (ed.), Yossef Y.
Rivlin, Memorial Volume, (Ramat Gan 	 196k),	 pp.	 78-107,
(Hebrew).
38. For account of this aspect see: Ashbee op. cit.
39. Other legal measures which were introduced by the Military
Administration followed the same line. Under these Antiquities
throughout Palestine and certain trees such as olives, oaks and
carobs, were conserved. See: The Antiquities proclamation of
December 1, 1918, Proclamations, Ordinance and Notices issued by
OETA (South) Cairo 1920, p. 1$; and for the preservation of trees
see: Public Notices No. 37 op. cit. p. 1 and No. 59 op. cit.
p. L.
LW. For the treatment of town planning as a predominately
architectural function see: W. Ashworth,	 The Genesis of
British Town Planning, (London 195k) pp . 193-19k.
kl. Storrs op. cit. p. 327; Ashbee, Jerusalem 1918-1920 	 op. cit.
p. V.
k2. An unusual example of this was the Public Notice No. 82 (op.
cit. p . 3) in which the authorities encouraged local bodies to
reafforest the hill tracts by means of exemption from taxes. The
main interest of the military authorities was not the
reafforestation of the country per se, but rather their use of
the wood.
143. Geddes, Jerusalem Actual and Possible.
1414 •
 Ashworth op. cit. p. 175; Cherry op. cit pp.149, 52.
145. Geddes, Cities in Evolution, (London 1915).
146. Geddes was initially invited by the Zionist Organisation to
prepare a plan for the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. While
there he was also invited to prepare the plans for Jerusalem and
Haifa.
147. merry op. cit. p. 52.
148. Boardman, The Worlds of Patrick Geddes, 	 (London 1978), p.
3114.
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49. P. Geddes,	 Civics as Applied Sociologically, 	 Sociological
Papers 1905 McMillan.
50. Boardman op. cit.; Kendall op. cit.; Sapiro op. cit.
51. Jerusalem 1918-1920 op. cit. p . 13.
52. Wasserstein op. cit.
53. See: S. Reichman op. cit. p. 1I8.
54. J. Tishler, The Settlement of the Land of Israel, 	 (Tel Aviv
reprint 1947) (Hebrew).
55. E. Howard, Garden Cities of Tomorrow, (London, reprint 1965).
56. Reichman op. cit.
Chapter 3
1. C.L. IJpthgrove, Empire by Mandate, 	 (New York 1954); F.M.
Goadby, Palestinian Law, Sources and Judicial Organisation,
op. cit.
2. N. Bentwich, The Mandates System, (London 1930).
3. For the text of the Mandate see: N. Bentwich op. cit. Appendix B
p . 137.
1 . Peel Report op. cit. p., 158.
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